The Kurds and The Basques II

Here you have the second part of the essay published by Kurdish Media:

Challenge to the Transition and ETA’s Movement for the Basque Separatism

KurdishMedia.com - By Welat Lezgin
10/07/2002 00:00:00

Continued from

Until 1978, the problem of ethnic-nationalism not only remained unchallenged, but it was made worse by the policies of the Francoist regime which radically opposed to all the regional claims in favour of ‘centralism’ – which in fact was not a centralism of Castille or even Madrid, but of the State above the people. [1] According to Conversi, at the end of Francoism, not only was Francoism doomed but the very idea of the Spanish State was not legitimate in the Basque Country. This remained the case at least until the late 1980s, well after the Transition had run its course. [2] ETA’s violence during this period was at its peak. As Robert Clark puts it:

“The Basque region during these days was like a pressure cooker about to explode. Sentiments for change had been so sharply suppressed during the dictatorship of Franco that there had been little opportunity for the expression of dissent with dictator gone, Basques now sought to release the pressures built up over the preceding forty years.” [3]

There are several reasons why the violence by ETA continued despite the historic changes in Spain. On several occasions ETA was convinced that the Basque Country was on the verge of national extinction, of being erased from the map of peoples, because its language and culture were slowly dying out and its customs were being replaced by the alien ones. [4] Hence, they saw a peremptory and urgent need to put an end to this progressive disappearance. To achieve this end, the establishment of an independent Basque country was pivotal. As Conversi puts it:

“The subordination of cultural to political goals is reflected in an eschatological vision of independence as a panacea for all problems of cultural identity, in particular the recovery of the language: ‘There is only one path to save Euskera: political independence for -Euzkadi’. [5]

But also by now, due to Franco’s harsh oppressive policies, ETA had become highly radicalised and had experienced extensive splits. In its earlier days ETA was a heterogeneous organisation, made up of an uncomfortable mix of nationalists, socialists, students, labour activists and rural Catholic youth. By the late 1960s ETA was being pulled in at least three ideological directions: (1) toward a new Left, proletarian tradition; (2) a guerrilla national front tradition; and (3) non-violent, ethically oriented, cultural tradition. This heterogeneity resulted in a series of splits. In 1966 – 1967, ETA split into ETA-Berri (New ETA) and ETA-Zarra (Old ETA); in 1970, it split into ETA-V (followers of the program of the Fifth Assembly) and ETA-VI (Sixth Assembly). The final split took place in 1974 between ETA (m) and ETA (pm) and ETA as we know it is ETA Militar, which continues to use violent methods to this day. [6]

Despite conflicts over the use of violence within the organisation, ETA’s military activities have continued unabated. The outcome of every internal dispute on the matter had been the expulsion or defection of the advocates of non-violent means. [7] In the 1970s a similar pattern in ETA’s evolution began to acquire a quicker tempo as the more experienced and mature leaders of ETA were killed or forced into exile, younger and more radical ones quickly replaced them in a process that currently continues. The Military front, composed predominantly of very young people, became more and more uncontrollable, while its autonomous initiatives provoked further conflict. Therefore violence has become, a self-generating mechanism, a vicious circle very difficult to stop. Violence also served to complement internal fragmentation. Since 1975, and as a result of many splits, ETA has become progressively dominated by groups who spend little time debating ideological issues and see military confrontation as the only way to achieve their goal of independence for Euzkadi. [8] What is interesting to note is that while Spain was being painfully transformed into a democratic and a devolved state, ETA had transformed in the opposite direction where moderates and those against the armed struggle had been eradicated from the organisation. [9]

To understand the continuation of violence and the ideological void of ETA we also need to look at ETA’s action/repression/action theory. According to this theory, attacks on the Francoist state would lead to universal repression, which would lead to greater popular anger, which would spiral into mass rebellion, eventually resulting in the civil war and the Basque secession. [10] As predicted by Fanon, the state violence as an indispensable ingredient in spreading a general ‘national awareness’ among the wider population instigated them to fight back. [11] In synthesis, the adoption of the Third Worldist models could not be realised without the state repression and this repression was the central part of the ‘theory of action/repression/action’ taken up by ETA. [12] This theory of violence as the only solution was obviously also determined by the prevailing internal condition of ruthless dictatorship in Spain. [13] What mattered to ETA was that the nation found itself in a lethal situation and that, in order to save her, it was urgent to adopt a series of drastic measures. As a consequence it considered the will of the Basque people to recover their national identity as the only valid element to save the nation. [14]

The role of state repression in cementing a common identity out of previous anthropological chaos should be emphasised here. While the police actions hampered the activities and mobilisation of ETA on various occasions, the indiscriminate repression of the Francoist regime generated a climate of understanding and support for ETA activists among the certain nationalist sectors and clandestine left-wing organisations. In the Basque Country political violence responded both to an internal logic (the need to foster unity in the organisation) and an external logic (the need to respond to the challenge of the state). However, at any moment of the stormy ideological debate within ETA, violent factions seized the initiative. This direct action, and not ideology or culture, showed the way to follow in order to achieve mass mobilisation and the public support. The hard-liners, with their attacks, overcame the ideological debate and demonstrated the simple reality that only direct action could achieve popular support and even extend mobilisation to the non-ethnic population of the Basque homeland.

During the Franco period, there were strands of shared meaning as to what it meant to be a “Basque”. There was (1) a myth, a shared understanding of an ancient Basque past (including the Fueros), (2) an awareness of the structural pressures for the extinction of the Basque culture, which increased the participative function of the Basque language, music, games, etc., and its capacity for symbolising solidarity and differentiability, and (3) anti-state violence, as an expression of the direct Basque action. Yet, the symbols perceived to be “Basque” – including the Fueros as well as the Basque language – were defined largely by their transgression from and rejection of the centralist regime. There was no consensus as to the nature of the new Basque identity in the post-Franco state, or even about how to define the Basque identity. The old method of the action-repression theory continued to hide such worries.

In general terms, a common feature of the insurgent nationalist guerrillas in various countries is their relation with, and even dependence on, the state repression. All over the world, a plethora of nationalities and former tribes are drawn into violent confrontation with the state as a result of decades of coercion by the central authorities which is largely illegitimate. The more recent the memories of suffering and horrors, the more acute the conflict seem to be, as ETA’s hold on the armed struggle shows. The principle of ‘retaliation’ as expressed in the theory of action/repression/action was the key one, which in practice remained constant for ETA throughout its long history of splits and mutations within the party itself. [15]

For the first time since the Civil War, political channels were open for the Basques to peacefully negotiate their legitimate rights. As explained above this dilemma was overcome by the emphasis on the continuation of the action/repression theory, which in return made the Spanish government respond to ETA attacks by anti-terrorist laws and police measures that reminded many Basques of some of the worst features of Francoism. [16] These anti-terrorist laws helped the survival of the perception of the state as a terrorist machine after the demise of the dictatorship but also kept ETA’s recruitment machine alive. Despite its external image as a “terrorist” organisation, ETA enjoyed significant popular support under Francoism (and indeed well until the 1980s.) in the Basque country. Most Basques felt more threatened by Spanish security forces than by ETA. Whereas ETA killed 6 people in the 12 months prior to Franco’s death, Spanish police and civil guards killed 22, and injured 105 a trend that continued well into the 1980s. [17] ETA was viewed in terms of “patriotic action”, rather than of (irrational) terrorism. [18] Basque nationalist parties alleged that repression continued unabated after Franco’s death. For instance, the anti-terrorist laws, some of which were later condemned as unconstitutional, resulted in arbitrary arrests and detentions. [19] Widespread opposition to the law was being expressed through popular demonstrations in several Spanish regions. Furthermore, the murder of Basque political exiles in France by the GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion) a self-styled ‘anti-terrorist’ commando group, provoked angry popular demonstrations, and revealed a political scandal. [20]

Instead of assisting and fighting for Basque rights (even the right to self-determination) through peaceful means, due to the reasons explained above, [21] ETA continued its violence and as Conversi explains:

“The intrinsic confrontational character of Basque mobilisations, a partial fulfilment of the ‘action/repression/action theory’ envisaged by ETA’s first theorists, has in many ways handicapped any peaceful solution of the conflict.” [22]

While ETA’s violent methods were the voice of the Basque people but also the voice of dissidence during the Franco years, with the transition to democracy, ETA’s violence almost resulted in the abrupt end of democracy with the attempted coup on February 23, 1981. [23] As democratic reforms progressed – and ETA violence increased – reactionary sectors of the armed forces grew more volatile. In addition to increasing skirmishes between ETA, the police and the army in the Basque country, between 1978 and 1982, five different plans for a coup d’etat against the democratic regime were uncovered. [24]

The 1988 inter-party agreement to condemn violence unreservedly and to marginalise those who refused to do so played a big role in the marginalisation of the support for ETA’s violence. Known as the Pact of Ajura Enea, it was signed by all significant players in Basque politics apart from ETA’s political wing HB (Herri Batasuna). HB has suffered steady erosion of its support, which reflects ETA’s political marginalisation. That is apparent also in another way. Ross, J. has argued that to a significant extent, support for HB is unconnected with regionalist sentiment. Instead, it comes from disoriented and disillusioned young people in a society particularly hard hit by social problems, who sympathise primarily with ETA’s anti-state violence. [25]

With the establishment of democracy in Spain, many formerly private and semi-clandestine initiatives passed into the public hands. The nationalist movement was formalised and became articulated in different political parties. As the political struggle became institutionalised, the civil society which was previously ETA’s only support, begun to lose its former role. [26] The advent of democracy and the arrival on the political scene of a greater number of political parties resulted in the emergence in the Basque Country of a political-party system similar to the one seen for so long in the Catalonia region. The Basques voted in favour of the Statue of Autonomy, which was negotiated on behalf of the Basque people by the PNV (‘Basque Nationalist Party’), and a majority of them chose the bourgeois nationalist parties over the revolutionary nationalist organisations in the electoral contests. The popular support for independence seemed to have diminished up to the present era and the legitimacy of ETA’s actions were questioned more seriously by its potential sources of support amongst the people of the Basque Country.

Conclusion

The right to self-determination and secession is one of the most controversial issues both in the European and the world political contexts. This is particularly the case since the division of political units concerns the nation-state, which is located in a strategically sensitive area in Europe. Since the attacks on the World Trade Centre in the United States on September the 11th, any attempt to achieve self-determination by violent means is doomed to face the label of terrorism. This current context is in contrast to the ongoing process of fragmentation as more independent States continue to emerge on the map of World Politics.

The emphasis on the preservation of the map of international relations and the view that the nation-state is the final political structure can be a flawed argument. Regionalism is one of the challenges to the Centralist thesis of the nation-state also both in the European and non-European contexts. It is important to put these two arguments, namely those of the nation-state as the ideal and ultimate political form as opposed to its further fragmentation, in a comparative perspective at a time when, as Harold Isaacs argues, ‘two thirds of the world has barely begun to emerge from pre-industrial era and before most of the world’s people could glean any advantages at all from industrialisation and modernisation’. [27]

In Europe the nation-state has become under heavy pressure both from above by the supranational organisation of the European Union and from below by the regional powers and separatist movements, such as ETA’s struggle for the Basque Country in Southern Europe. As Wallace puts it, ‘to a remarkable degree, the processes of government in Europe overlap and interlock: among different states, between different levels of governance below and above the old locus of sovereignty in the nation-state’. As a result of this, the continent where nationalism and the nation-state first emerged after the French Revolution is going through an historical process of devolution where the national States, regional sentiments, minority identities and ethnic-nationalisms aim to get the chance to bypass the traditional nation-state. Although this recent trend should not be exaggerated, it is encouraging at the same time as the Catalan case demonstrates.

The Basque citizens have gained a broad-ranging Autonomy Statute over the course of the recent decades and an unprecedented level of self-government not enjoyed by any other European region. At the same European level, the nation-states can show a greater understanding for the self-government of the regional identities for their autonomous development as a democratic-constitutional necessity against the political manifestations of separatist ethnic nationalism. The right for the preservation and representation of ethnic identity, culture and language is a democratic right, which should not be seen as a threat to the ‘unity’ of the nation-state. As this essay has demonstrated, the repression of ethnic nationalism without any consideration of these basic rights and freedoms helps its growth and mobilisation across the society.

The dilemma between Centralist repression and unlimited political freedom has been at the centre stage of ETA’s separatist campaign and the Spanish government’s response increasingly after the end of the oppressive Franco regime. Democratic transition has brought into question the legitimacy of the Basques’ armed struggle both in the eyes of the Spanish public and within the organisation itself. At the same time, for many within ETA, the transition represented an opportunity to use violence to force Madrid to concede Basque independence. It is perfectly possible for ethnic minorities to succeed in their language and identity revival and national survival within a democratic nation-state. The possibility of national co-existence and the possession of multiple-identities can help to overcome the challenge of regional separatism as long as the essential element of a strong democratic context and self-government gain the upper hand.

Footnotes:

1. Maries, J. (1990) Understanding Spain. San Juan: University of Puerto Rico Press. p. 413

2. Conversi, D. (1997) p. 141.

3. Clark, R. P. (1984) The Basque Insurgents. ETA, 1952-1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. p. 90

4. Conversi, D. (1997) p. 241. An ETA document produced in 1979 reveals to us the importance of the Basque language in defining the Basque identity: “Since the times of Machiavelli [language] is an extremely well-known political counsel, and one which works infallibly, that to kill a pueblo there is nothing more deadly than to kill its language. A pueblo which stops speaking its language is a pueblo which has died. A pueblo which changes its language for that of its neighbour, is a pueblo which changes its soul for that of its neighbour.” See, ETA (1979), Documentos, 18 vols. San Sebastian quoted in: MacClancy, J. ‘Bilingualism and Multinationalism in the Basque Country’ in: Mar-Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (Eds.) (1996) Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities. Oxford: Berg. p. 211.

5. Conversi, D. (1997).

6. Zirakzadeh, C. (1991) A rebellious people. Reno. University of Nevada Press. p. 143.

7. Jauregui, B. (1981) Ideologia y estrategia politica de ETA. Madrid Siglo XXI. Cited in: Medrano, J. D. (1995) Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia. London: Cornell University Press. p. 149.

8. Ibid. p. 149.

9. On internal killings within ETA see: States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1 program on ETA, dated December 1st 1993.

10. Clark, R. P. (1990) Negotiating with ETA. Reno. University of Nevada. p. 8-9.

11. See: Fanon, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin Books.

12. Conversi, D. (1997). p. 244.

13. It is important to keep in mind that, at its inception, ETA did not advocate violence as a method of achieving political change, but was forced onto this road by the tactics of the Franco regime and its gratuitous physical suppression of any visible symbol of Basque national identity. See: Moxon-Brown, E. (1989). Political Change in Spain. London: Routledge. p.52

14. Jauregui, B. G. (1981) Ideologia y estrategia politica de ETA. Analisis de su evolucion entre 1958 y 1968. Madrid: Siglo XXI. p.151. Quoted in: Conversi, D. (1997). p.240.

15. A survey carried out by Irvin, L. C. which shows the distribution of ideologues, radicals and politicos in Herri Batasuna by the period in which they became active, supports the argument that regime repression, unless extremely severe, serves as a stimulus rather then a brake on the general recruitment of activists into militant nationalist organisations. See: Irvin, L. C. (1999) Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. p.199-200.

16. Clark, R. P. (1984). p. 103-105, 252.

17. Sullivan, J. (1988). ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euzkadi, 1890-1986. London: Routledge. p. 94.

18. According to a poll conducted in 1979, over half the Basques surveyed thought that ETA militants were “patriots” or “idealists” and only 14 percent considered them “madmen” or “criminals”. See: Desfor Edles, L. (1998) Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.128.

19. Clark, R. P. (1991).

20. GAL, a death squad created to wage a dirty war against ETA resulted in a major scandal that damaged the credibility of the Spanish State and the democratic transition. While GAL’s ruthless killings of ETA leaders dealt a big blow to ETA, these acts at the same time helped ETA’s recruitment activities as GAL had shown a darker side of the Spanish State. The GAL scandal uncovered by El Mundo revealed that top leaders including the Minister of the Interior, Jose Barrionuevo, were allegedly directly involved and that GAL mercenaries were paid with public funds. The scandal grew as rumours suggested as many as nine of the GAL’s twenty-seven victims may have had nothing to do with terrorism. See: Woodworth, P. (2001) Dirty War Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy. Cork: Cork University Press. The issue is also extensively examined in: States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1 on 01 December 1993.

21. Besides, as a proof for total belief in violence to reach their aims, Spanish democracy is seen by ETA as a “sham bourgeois democracy” to be used as a tool but not as an aim as a matter of fact. The following extract reveals this: “It is necessary to participate in the legal framework of bourgeois democracy . . . However, . . . a revolutionary strategy cannot limit it self to this path . . . . . to fall into electoralism is to suppress political principles for the sake of securing a certain number of votes . . . . Experience teaches us that it is utopian to believe that in playing the game we will receive any real advantages; and little is it possible to use those institutions as a tribunal in which to denounce them because we are there.” See, ETA (Commandos Autonomous), internal discussion document (1979) p. 275. Also see Paddy Bolger, interview in IRIS, 7 (November 1983): 7. Cited in Irvin, L. C. (2001). p.6.

22. Ibid. p.158.

23. On 23 February 1981 a session of the Spanish parliament was interrupted by a group of Civil guards led by Colonel Antonio Tejero, who seized the assembly and held the MPs prisoner for more than a day. A providential intervention by the King prevented the attempted coup. This coup attempt had long-lasting and damaging implications for the young democracy and halted further democratic progress, especially in matters of regional devolution. See: Aguero, F. (1995) Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. London: Johns Hopkins University Press. p.161-180.

24. Gilmour, D. (1985) The Transformation of Spain. London: Quartet Books. p. 230.

25. Ross, J. C. (1997) Contemporary Spain: A Handbook. London: Arnold. p.93.

26. What happened to ETA is not very different from what happened to the PSUC in Catalonia, or the Spanish Communist Party. Despite their having led the opposition to Franco during the 1960 and 1970s, all of them were defeated in elections by more moderate parties. The fact that this happened reveals that the role of political capital and the logic of mobilisation in shaping political structures are constrained by socio-economic structural conditions, which in the end determine what is and what is not politically possible.

27. Isaacs, H. R. (1989). Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. p.215

28. Wallace, W. 1999. ‘The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox’, in Political Studies. Vol. 47. p.503.

Sources:

Aguero, F. (1995) Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Clark, R. P. (1990) Negotiating with ETA. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Clark, R. P. (1984) The Basque Insurgents. ETA, 1952 - 1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Desfor Edles, L. (1998) Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fanon, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin Books.

Gilmour, D. (1985) The Transformation of Spain. London: Quartet Books.

Heywood, P. (ed.) (1999) Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Irvin, L. C. (1999) Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Isaacs, H. R. (1989). Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Maries, J. (1990) Understanding Spain. San Juan: University of Puerto Rico Press.

Mar-Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (Eds.) (1996) Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities. Oxford: Berg.

Medrano, J. D. (1995) Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia. London: Cornell University Press.

Moxon-Brown, E. (1989). Political Change in Spain. London: Routledge.

Ross, J. C. (1997) Contemporary Spain: A Handbook. London: Arnold.

Sullivan, J. (1988). ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euzkadi, 1890-1986. London: Routledge.

Woodworth, P. (2001) Dirty War Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy. Cork: Cork University Press.

Zirakzadeh, C. (1991) A rebellious people. Reno. University of Nevada Press.

Wallace, W. 1999. ‘The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox’. Political Studies. Vol. 47.

States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1, 01/12/93.

The Basques will forever support the right to the self determination of the Kurdish people, no matter what the Turkish nor the Syrians nor the Iraqis nor the Iranians nor the Armenians have to say about it, citing their own constitutions and their laws.

This is the link to the first part.

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