Essay on Self Determination

The text you're about to read was published at EUobserver, the author tries to make sense out of the way the international community sees the right of self-determination enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Here you have it:

No easy answers to the status of Ossetia, Abkhazia and others

Richard Corbett

EUOBSERVER / COMMENT - The collapse last week (on the first day!) of EU backed peace talks between Georgia and Russia to resolve the crisis in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with the sides unable to enter the same room, serves merely to illustrate that there are no easy answers to the question of the status of Ossetia, Abkhazia, and indeed many other territories in the world.

Ever since US President Woodrow Wilson's 14 points, borne out of the wreckage left by the First World War, the self-determination of peoples has featured as a principle of international affairs. But less clear is the definition of who has the right to self-determination.

When Yugoslavia broke up, the international community was willing to recognise the right of its internal units that had the status of republics (such as Slovenia and Croatia) to declare themselves independent, but not to recognise such a right for those that had the status of provinces (namely Kosovo, despite its having a bigger and linguistically more distinct population than some of the republics).

Recently though, after lengthy deliberations, part of the international community has changed its mind and recognised Kosovo's independence.

When the Soviet Union broke up, the 15 internal units that had the status of Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR) were recognised as sovereign states, but not the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR) or Autonomous Oblasts (AO).

Some of the SSRs (such as the Baltic republics) had previously existed as independent countries, but others were based on somewhat arbitrary boundaries, many of which were drawn up by Josef Stalin when he was commissar for nationalities.

Mr Stalin also determined the hierarchy of which groups were to have their own SSR, which an ASSR, and which merely to be an AO. This sometimes changed over time: the Karelo-Finnish SSR was downgraded in 1956 to the Karelian ASSR. Had this not happened, we would presumably now have an independent Karelia, possibly seeking unification with Finland.

A Transcaucasian SSR existed until 1936, when it was split into Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, the latter two including their own ASSRs and AOs. Would we now be defending the territorial integrity of Transcaucasia against Georgian demands for independence had the Soviet leader not re-designed the borders?

It is not surprising that the legacy of Mr Stalin's frontiers is now causing problems. The South Ossetians do not want to be part of Georgia and do not see why they cannot be independent.

Moreover, the Ossetians were bound to see Kosovan independence as a precedent. And if Serbia had sent its troops back into Kosovo in August, the Western countries with troops there would certainly have reacted, as Russia did when the Georgians sent their troops into Ossetia - but hopefully not have over-reacted as the Russian's have done so brutally.

Complex situation

The situation is highly complex. Georgia was wrong to attack Southern Ossetia, and Russia was wrong to have reacted unilaterally and so disproportionately.

Due recognition by the West of this complexity would go a long way to avoiding any continued flexing of muscles by Russia or other actors in the region. As would some more consistent thought on the principles at stake.

It is not as though these issues are new. When Ireland opted out of the UK, its right to do so was challenged by many in Britain. Many Irish then questioned the right of Northern Ireland to opt out of Ireland and many in Northern Ireland opposed the right of Fermanagh and Tyrone to opt out of Northern Ireland.

Divergent opinions on who or which unit has the right to self-determination are inevitable and inherent to such situations.

Indeed, the question of whether Kosovo and South Ossetia should be recognised as sovereign states is only the latest in a trend that has seen the number of sovereign countries in Europe more than double in the space of a century, with every possibility that this trend will continue.

Only 22 states in Europe prior to 1918

In the living memory of our most senior citizens, there were only 22 states in Europe prior to 1918 (and two of these by then, Albania and Norway, were only recently independent).

The break up of Austria-Hungary and the Tsarist empire at the end of the First World War saw this rise to 29, soon reaching 30 with the establishment of an independent Ireland.

At the end of the Second World War, however, this fell to 28, with the disappearance of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania hardly compensated for by the creation of the German Democratic Republic. This figure remained stable during the entire Cold War period.

Since the end of the Cold War, the break-ups of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia saw this jump within a decade to 46.

Recognition of the independence of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia would bring us to nearly 50 sovereign states on the territory of Europe. And, of course, some would argue that the independence of Flanders, Scotland, the Basque country, Catalonia and Corsica is not beyond the bounds of the possible.

Some of these would be strongly contested, others less so - but what are the criteria? Is it possible to have objective criteria? If so, who should define them? If not, should any group that so wishes be able to constitute its own state?

What about my constituency of Yorkshire (it's far bigger than Luxembourg!)? Should Gibraltar? What about the Channel Islands? How would Russia feel about applying the same principle they argue for South Ossetia to Chechnya or Northern Ossetia?

In any case, it is possible that a continent of 20 sovereign states in 1900 could swell to one with over 50 in the coming years. Most of them will be in the European Union, so fragmentation will have been balanced by a degree of integration. Indeed, it is this very integration that has made it plausible in some cases for smaller units to be viable states.

Arguing for independence within Europe sounds far less isolationist when you are simply making the case to upgrade your status rather than head off into the wilderness (although any area opting out of an existing EU country would require the agreement of all member states to become a separate member of the EU).

Nonetheless, a world fragmented into several hundred small countries along with just a handful of giants would not necessarily be a better place for smaller countries, nor in terms of achieving world level agreement on global issues - not least environmental concerns.

The proliferation of states could also produce an arms race as such countries seek to develop their own armies and defend themselves against real or imaginary threats from their neighbours. Much would depend on the multilateral frameworks created for integration and co-operation.

While the EU certainly remains relatively successful in balancing unity and diversity, most of the world does not.

Richard Corbett is Deputy Leader of the Labour MEPs and speaks for the Socialist Group on EU Reform in the European Parliament

If Richard Corbett things that Kosovo has all what it takes to be an independent state, then truly there is not a single reason to deny this right to Euskal Herria, if anything, the Basques have a lot more assets to sustain their claim than the Kosovars.

Oh, by the way, do you remember when smack in the middle of the recent peace process Zapataro insisted that the right to self-determination did not exist? Well, he stands corrected.

.... ... .

Sacred French

Here you have a letter to the editor of the Financial Times regarding a recent article about the way France "defends" the French language:

Standard French is a state religion

Published: September 13 2008 03:00

Sir, Your editorial “Les mots justes” (September 6) was funny. Indeed, standard French is a state religion in France, and the French centralists will not tolerate any other religion. Not only does France try to keep English at bay, but it also did and still does its best to eradicate what the French authorities call “regional languages” within its borders, whose recognition in the constitution was recently turned down by parliament. These are Flemish dialects in Flanders, German dialects in Lorraine and Alsace, Celtic dialects in Brittany, Italian dialects in Corsica, Basque in the “French” Basque Country and Catalan in “French” Catalonia, in addition to the Romance Occitan dialects of southern France. Not to mention Polynesian in Tahiti and the other French confetti in the Pacific Ocean, as well as Kanak in New Caledonia.

Article 2 of the French constitution states that “la langue de la République est le Français” . France is the last country in the European Union which stubbornly refuses to ratify the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages which recognises citizens’ right to use in the “public sphere” their “regional” idiom, that is to say the language from the neighbouring state or entity they used to be part of before undergoing a process known as réunion in French, Anschluss in German ... and English. That is less funny. Spain ratified it after Franco’s death.

Claude Kretz,
Oberwil, Switzerland

And this is why insist that the only way Basque culture can ever survive is if the Basque Country to be free and sovereign.

Kudos to Mr. Krets for setting the record straight.

.... ... .

Hands Off

This article published at the Media Monitors Network highlights the hypocrisy by the leaders within the international community that one day demand freedom for the Kosovars, the next day they deny that same right to the Kurds and one day later they are back to demanding independence for the Tibetans, here you have it:

"Not You! You!!!"

Uri Avnery

"The world media are shedding tears for the Tibetan people, whose land is taken from them by Chinese settlers. Who cares about the Palestinians, whose land is taken from them by our settlers?"

"Hey! Take your hands off me! Not you! You!!!" - the voice of a young woman in the darkened cinema, an old joke.

"Hey! Take your hands off Tibet!" the international chorus is crying out, "But not from Chechnya! Not from the Basque homeland! And certainly not from Palestine!" And that is not a joke.

LIKE EVERYBODY else, I support the right of the Tibetan people to independence, or at least autonomy. Like everybody else, I condemn the actions of the Chinese government there. But unlike everybody else, I am not ready to join in the demonstrations.

Why? Because I have an uneasy feeling that somebody is washing my brain, that what is going on is an exercise in hypocrisy.

I don't mind a bit of manipulation. After all, it is not by accident that the riots started in Tibet on the eve of the Olympic Games in Beijing. That's alright. A people fighting for their freedom have the right to use any opportunity that presents itself to further their struggle.

I support the Tibetans in spite of it being obvious that the Americans are exploiting the struggle for their own purposes. Clearly, the CIA has planned and organized the riots, and the American media are leading the world-wide campaign. It is a part of the hidden struggle between the US, the reigning super-power, and China, the rising super-power - a new version of the "Great Game" that was played in central Asia in the 19th century by the British Empire and Russia. Tibet is a token in this game.

I am even ready to ignore the fact that the gentle Tibetans have carried out a murderous pogrom against innocent Chinese, killing women and men and burning homes and shops. Such detestable excesses do happen during a liberation struggle.

No, what is really bugging me is the hypocrisy of the world media. They storm and thunder about Tibet. In thousands of editorials and talk-shows they heap curses and invective on the evil China. It seems as if the Tibetans are the only people on earth whose right to independence is being denied by brutal force, that if only Beijing would take its dirty hands off the saffron-robed monks, everything would be alright in this, the best of all possible worlds.

THERE IS no doubt that the Tibetan people are entitled to rule their own country, to nurture their unique culture, to promote their religious institutions and to prevent foreign settlers from submerging them.

But are not the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria entitled to the same? The inhabitants of Western Sahara, whose territory is occupied by Morocco? The Basques in Spain? The Corsicans off the coast of France? And the list is long.

Why do the world's media adopt one independence struggle, but often cynically ignore another independence struggle? What makes the blood of one Tibetan redder than the blood of a thousand Africans in East Congo?

Again and again I try to find a satisfactory answer to this enigma. In vain.

Immanuel Kant demanded of us: "Act as if the principle by which you act were about to be turned into a universal law of nature." (Being a German philosopher, he expressed it in much more convoluted language.) Does the attitude towards the Tibetan problem conform to this rule? Does it reflect our attitude towards the struggle for independence of all other oppressed peoples?

Not at all.

WHAT, THEN, causes the international media to discriminate between the various liberation struggles that are going on throughout the world?

Here are some of the relevant considerations:

- Do the people seeking independence have an especially exotic culture?

- Are they an attractive people, i.e. "sexy" in the view of the media?

- Is the struggle headed by a charismatic personality who is liked by the media?

- It the oppressing government disliked by the media?

- Does the oppressing government belong to the pro-American camp? This is an important factor, since the United States dominates a large part of the international media, and its news agencies and TV networks largely define the agenda and the terminology of the news coverage.

- Are economic interests involved in the conflict?

- Does the oppressed people have gifted spokespersons, who are able to attract attention and manipulate the media?

FROM THESE points of view, there is nobody like the Tibetans. They enjoy ideal conditions.

Fringed by the Himalayas, they are located in one of the most beautiful landscapes on earth. For centuries, just to get there was an adventure. Their unique religion arouses curiosity and sympathy. Its non-violence is very attractive and elastic enough to cover even the ugliest atrocities, like the recent pogrom. The exiled leader, the Dalai Lama, is a romantic figure, a media rock-star. The Chinese regime is hated by many - by capitalists because it is a Communist dictatorship, by Communists because it has become capitalist. It promotes a crass and ugly materialism, the very opposite of the spiritual Buddhist monks, who spend their time in prayer and meditation.

When China builds a railway to the Tibetan capital over a thousand inhospitable kilometers, the West does not admire the engineering feat, but sees (quite rightly) an iron monster that brings hundreds of thousands of Han-Chinese settlers to the occupied territory.

And of course, China is a rising power, whose economic success threatens America's hegemony in the world. A large part of the ailing American economy already belongs directly or indirectly to China. The huge American Empire is sinking hopelessly into debt, and China may soon be the biggest lender. American manufacturing industry is moving to China, taking millions of jobs with it.

Compared to these factors, what have the Basques, for example, to offer? Like the Tibetans, they inhabit a contiguous territory, most of it in Spain, some of it in France. They, too, are an ancient people with their own language and culture. But these are not exotic and do not attract special notice. No prayer wheels. No robed monks.

The Basques do not have a romantic leader, like Nelson Mandela or the Dalai Lama. The Spanish state, which arose from the ruins of Franco's detested dictatorship, enjoys great popularity around the world. Spain belongs to the European Union, which is more or less in the American camp, sometimes more, sometimes less.

The armed struggle of the Basque underground is abhorred by many and is considered "terrorism", especially after Spain has accorded the Basques a far-reaching autonomy. In these circumstances, the Basques have no chance at all of gaining world support for independence.

The Chechnyans should have been in a better position. They, too, are a separate people, who have for a long time been oppressed by the Czars of the Russian Empire, including Stalin and Putin. But alas, they are Muslims - and in the Western world, Islamophobia now occupies the place that had for centuries been reserved for anti-Semitism. Islam has turned into a synonym for terrorism, it is seen as a religion of blood and murder. Soon it will be revealed that Muslims slaughter Christian children and use their blood for baking Pitta. (In reality it is, of course, the religion of dozens of vastly different peoples, from Indonesia to Morocco and from Kosova to Zanzibar.

The US does not fear Moscow as it fears Beijing. Unlike China, Russia does not look like a country that could dominate the 21st century. The West has no interest in renewing the Cold War, as it has in renewing the Crusades against Islam. The poor Chechnyans, who have no charismatic leader or outstanding spokespersons, have been banished from the headlines. For all the world cares, Putin can hit them as much as he wants, kill thousands and obliterate whole towns.

That does not prevent Putin from supporting the demands of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for separation from Georgia, a country which infuriates Russia.

IF IMMANUEL KANT knew what's going on in Kosova, he would be scratching his head.

The province demanded its independence from Serbia, and I, for one, supported that with all my heart. This is a separate people, with a different culture (Albanian) and its own religion (Islam). After the popular Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, tried to drive them out of their country, the world rose and provided moral and material support for their struggle for independence.

The Albanian Kosovars make up 90% of the citizens of the new state, which has a population of two million. The other 10% are Serbs, who want no part of the new Kosova. They want the areas they live in to be annexed to Serbia. According to Kant's maxim, are they entitled to this?

I would propose a pragmatic moral principle: Every population that inhabits a defined territory and has a clear national character is entitled to independence. A state that wants to keep such a population must see to it that they feel comfortable, that they receive their full rights, enjoy equality and have an autonomy that satisfies their aspirations. In short: that they have no reason to desire separation.

That applies to the French in Canada, the Scots in Britain, the Kurds in Turkey and elsewhere, the various ethnic groups in Africa, the indigenous peoples in Latin America, the Tamils in Sri Lanka and many others. Each has a right to choose between full equality, autonomy and independence.

THIS LEADS us, of course, to the Palestinian issue.

In the competition for the sympathy of the world media, the Palestinians are unlucky. According to all the objective standards, they have a right to full independence, exactly like the Tibetans. They inhabit a defined territory, they are a specific nation, a clear border exists between them and Israel. One must really have a crooked mind to deny these facts.

But the Palestinians are suffering from several cruel strokes of fate: The people that oppress them claim for themselves the crown of ultimate victimhood. The whole world sympathizes with the Israelis because the Jews were the victims of the most horrific crime of the Western world. That creates a strange situation: the oppressor is more popular than the victim. Anyone who supports the Palestinians is automatically suspected of anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial.

Also, the great majority of the Palestinians are Muslims (nobody pays attention to the Palestinian Christians). Since Islam arouses fear and abhorrence in the West, the Palestinian struggle has automatically become a part of that shapeless, sinister threat, "international terrorism". And since the murders of Yasser Arafat and Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the Palestinians have no particularly impressive leader - neither in Fatah nor in Hamas.

The world media are shedding tears for the Tibetan people, whose land is taken from them by Chinese settlers. Who cares about the Palestinians, whose land is taken from them by our settlers?

In the world-wide tumult about Tibet, the Israeli spokespersons compare themselves - strange as it sounds - to the poor Tibetans, not to the evil Chinese. Many think this quite logical.

If Kant were dug up tomorrow and asked about the Palestinians, he would probably answer: "Give them what you think should be given to everybody, and don't wake me up again to ask silly questions."

A few days ago we published a similar opinion by Michael Collon at the Spanish version of our blog.

.... ... .

The Right to Independence

In his text called "Three cheers for Kosova!" published at Pakistan's Daily Times, Uri Avnery states this:

But a more general question arises: when does a national minority have the right to secede and establish a nation-state of its own? If the Kosovars have this right, why not the Basques in Spain? The Corsicans in France? The Tibetans in China? The Tamils in Sri Lanka? The Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria? The Luo in Kenya? The Darfurians in Sudan?

That is a subject best left to professors of political science. Reality has its own language. No one case is the same as another. There is no international tribunal to decide, according to established standards, who has this right — and who does not. The matter is decided in practice: when a particular population is determined to achieve independence at any cost, and when it is ready to fight and sacrifice for its independence — then they have the “right” to independence.

The aspirations of a minority depend also on the attitude of the majority. A nation that is wise enough to treat its national minorities with decency and accord them real equality will succeed in keeping the state intact. Countries like Canada and Belgium understand this and endeavour to prevent the breaking up of the state. But when the dominant people mistreat the minority — as the Serbs did in Kosovo and the Russians are doing in Chechnya — they reinforce the motivation to achieve independence.

But the paradox is that a small state, even a medium-sized state cannot maintain real independence in a world that is inevitably moving towards globalisation. States like Germany and France are compelled to transfer large chunks of their sovereign powers to regional super-states, like the European Union. The French economy and the German army are subject to Brussels more than to Paris and Berlin. So what is the sense in creating even smaller states?

The answer lies with the power of nationalism, which is not decreasing, but rather the opposite. One hundred or two hundred years ago, Corsica could not defend itself. To be secure, it had to be part of the French kingdom. The Basque homeland could not sustain an independent economy and needed to be part of a larger economic unit, like Spain. But today, when decisions are made in Brussels, why should Corsicans and Basques not have their own states and be separate members of the EU?

That is a world-wide tendency. Separate nations do not unite in new states, but on the contrary, existing states break up into national components. Anyone who believes that Israelis and Palestinians will unite tomorrow in one state does not live in the real world. The slogan “two states for two peoples” is relevant today more than ever.

So Israel, approaching its own 60th anniversary, should recognise the Republic of Kosova and wish it well.

I do not agree with his statement regarding Euskal Herria not being able to sustain itself in the past, after all, it was both Euskal Herria and Catalunya's economies the ones that maintained Spain afloat for the longest time.

One more thing, if you read the entire article you will find that Tito and the Serbs aided the Jewish during WWII, just like the Basques did.

You will also read about how Serbia lost its right over Kosovo the day Milosevic unleashed an ethnic cleansing campaign against the Albanians, just like Francisco Franco did against the Basques.

.... ... .

The Balkanization of France

Well, seems like Paris has decided to say yes to independent movements in Europe, lets see when they start negotiations with Euskal Herria, Corsica and Brittany in order to provide these nations with the same rights given to Kosovo.

Here you have the note from Yahoo News:

France recognizes Kosovo, after hours of suspense

By Douglas Hamilton 30 minutes ago

France recognized the independence of Kosovo on Monday, ending hours of suspense after Prime Minister Hashim Thaci assured the new republic that Western recognition would come "any minute."

The announcement by Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, at an EU foreign ministers meeting in Brussels, was a relief for Pristina.

The smooth response Thaci had expected from the European Union and the United States was tripped up earlier, when EU member Spain broke ranks to say 'No'.

Then U.S. President George W. Bush appeared to jump the gun ahead of his own State Department.

In a television interview during his tour of Africa, Bush said the people of Kosovo "are now independent." The remark was flashed in Kosovo as meaning U.S. recognition but White House spokeswoman Dana Perino said: "He didn't announce that."

"What he meant by that is that the Kosovars have declared their independence," Perino said, making clear it was the job of the U.S. State Department to officially declare recognition.

Bush was due to make a statement about Kosovo on Tuesday, in line with the original script which calls for the EU to go first in announcing its policy on what the West insists is a "European issue" that Serb ally Russia should not interfere in.

But the first word from Brussels was a disappointment.

"The government of Spain will not recognize the unilateral act proclaimed yesterday by the assembly of Kosovo," Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos told reporters.

"We will not recognize because we consider ... this does not respect international law," said the minister, whose country is grappling with separatist movements of its own.

Cyprus, Greece, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania have indicated they too are not keen to recognize Kosovo.

Afghanistan officially greeted the new Balkan state, but Vietnam and Azerbaijan said they would not recognize it.

The thumbs-up Kosovo confidently expects from London, Rome, Berlin and up to 100 other governments was still in the pipeline.

London is next?

Well, that is peachy news for Ireland, Wales and Scotland.

.... ... .

Tough Questions

500 hundred years ago Europe plunged into a maelstrom of violence against nations around the world. The colonialist powers deprived others of their sovereignty up and down Europe, America, Africa, Asia and Oceania.

Well, the time has come for those colonialist powers to shed what stops them from being true democratic states, and that can only take place when they finally let go of their remaining colonies.

This is why, surrounding Kosovo's push for independence, tough questions are being asked.

Check out this note appeared at the International Herald Tribune:

Kosovo's looming independence raises question: Why not Scotland or Vermont?

The Associated Press
Friday, February 15, 2008

Sean Connery thinks a Scottish nation is a bonnie notion. How about Spain's Basque country becoming a REAL country? And what's wrong with a People's Republic of Vermont?

Kosovo's looming independence raises all those questions and more. For starters: Why is statehood OK for some people but frowned on for others? After all, isn't the right to self-determination the essence of democracy itself?

There are at least two dozen secessionist movements active in Europe alone, and scores of others agitating for sovereignty around the globe. All of them, experts warn, will be emboldened by Sunday's expected proclamation of the Republic of Kosovo.

"We live in a world which is based around states," said Florian Bieber, a professor of politics and international relations at England's University of Kent.

"The United Nations is based on states. The European Union is based on states," he said. "It's going to continue to happen. New states will emerge, and states will disappear, like East Germany."

Not all independence movements are created equal.

Some are quirky, such as Second Vermont Republic — Thomas Naylor's small but spirited campaign to break off his corner of northern New England and make it a nation.

With his spectacles, bald spot and long white hair, the retired Duke University economics professor looks like Benjamin Franklin and quotes Thomas Jefferson. He believes that if Kosovo can become a country, so can Vermont, which was independent until it joined the Union in 1791 as the 14th state.

Yet Naylor concedes: "It's a tough sell. This is not kid stuff. Secession is a radical act of rebellion driven by anger and fear."

Thousands have died in long-running quests for statehood mounted by the Palestinians in the occupied territories, and by rebels fighting to gain Kashmir's independence from India and Pakistan.

The Basques have achieved sweeping autonomy from Spain, but militants continue to fight for full independence. On the Mediterranean island of Corsica, birthplace of Napoleon, nationalists still set off bombs to press for independence from France.

There are also many strictly nonviolent movements willing to settle for autonomy rather than secession. And sometimes new states are born by mutual consent, such as Slovakia and the Czech Republic — Czechoslovakia until they split in 1993.

Kosovo formally remains part of Serbia, but it's been run by the U.N. since 1999, when NATO intervened to stop Slobodan Milosevic's brutal crackdown on ethnic Albanian separatists.

Although the U.S. and key allies including Britain, France and Germany support its bid, Serbia and Russia fiercely oppose it.

Russian President Vladimir Putin insists that if Kosovo gains independence without U.N. approval, it will set a dangerous precedent for secessionists in Chechnya, Georgia, Azerbaijan and further afield.

Trouble is, there's no internationally accepted standard for independence, said Marc Plattner, co-editor of the Washington-based Journal of Democracy, which analyzes movements worldwide.

You can let the people decide, he says, but first you have to decide: Who are the people?

"This is the great hole in democratic theory," Plattner said. "There isn't a sound theoretical or moral answer. One simply looks at the individual case."

Skeptics say the increasing flow of cash, goods and information across national boundaries has taken the shine off statehood.

Others wonder if the already unwieldy EU and U.N. can handle much more. The 27-nation EU already has 23 official languages, and many doubt it could cope if it had to add Albanian and Welsh to the mix.

"At a time when borders are coming down in the EU, freeing up the markets and trade, it makes no sense to put them up here," said Angus MacGregor, an insurance broker in Scotland, whose nationalist minority government is pressing to break away from Britain.

The Scottish National Party has promised to hold a referendum on independence by 2010. Although a vote looks unlikely, it's not for lack of trying.

After 700 years of struggle dating back to William Wallace and Robert the Bruce, Scotland's latest "Braveheart" is Connery.

"All of my life experience tells me that an independent Scotland will be successful," the "James Bond" actor said in TV spots aired last year.

Belgium could be the next country to face a big breakup: A nasty rift between Dutch-speaking Flanders to the north and French-speaking southern Wallonia to the south has raised speculation that the kingdom may split in two.

Other movements have been around for decades.

There's the drive to gain independence for Biafra in Nigeria's oil-rich east, and the fringe Puerto Rican Independence Party, still seeking to wrest back the island the U.S. seized in 1898 at the end of the Spanish-American War.

The United Kingdom looks pretty disunited, too, and not just because of Scotland.

Some in Northern Ireland still advocate unification with Ireland. The Party of Wales wants an independent Welsh state. And in southwestern England, a boisterous secessionist group is trying to carve a country out of Cornwall.

In the U.S., separatist movements advocate independence for Alaska, Texas and the southern states.

And more obscure groups abound.

Ex-Soviet Moldova, just half the size of West Virginia, already has one breakaway republic, Trans-Dniester. But there's also Gagauzia, an autonomous no man's land. Though it doesn't have a prayer of gaining independence, it still sports a flag featuring a snarling red wolf's head.

Other "stateless nations" range from the Veps — people of Baltic Finn extraction in northwestern Russia — to the Sorbs, a Slavonic people who occupy parts of the Czech Republic, Germany and Poland.

"One thing's for sure," said Vermont's Naylor. "We didn't start this. We're just continuing the process."

___

Associated Press Writer Ben McConville in Edinburgh, Scotland, contributed to this report.

.... ... .

About the Match in San Mamés

In just a few minutes the national teams representing Euskal Herria and Catalunya will appear on the field of Athletic de Bilbao's San Mamés stadium to play a friendly match as a means to call attention to their plea of official international recognition.

Here you have an article titled "Euskal Herria vs Catalonia" at a blog called "Football Articles":

Tomorrow evening will see Catalonia play the Basque Country, in San Mames, in a match that takes place between the sides over the Spanish Leagues Christmas off-season period. As always controversy has surrounded this game as both federations suggest that their 'national team' be given official status and recognised by FIFA as separate entities from the Spanish national side.

Previously the Basque country had always been known as Euskadi in such events. However, this time they are lining up under the name of Euskal Herria. The difference between these names is that Euskadi is solely the region of Northern Spain whilst Euskal Herria is suggesting that part of France and the region Navarra in Spain are also part of a 'Basque nation'. This change of name has angered the French Federation in particular.

Catalonia existed as a country before Spain came into existence. Within Spain exists regional identities and strong nationalistic movements for these regions to breakaway from Spain and exist as separate entities. Catalonia was a country with a proud sea heritage, even before the country of Spain was created. This only happened when the houses of Aragon and Castille came together after the marriage of Ferdinand II and Isabella I in 1469.

Both the Catalan and Basque football federations have been appealing to UEFA and FIFA for a number of years now - in the hope of gaining official status for their teams - in order for them to play in Euro Championships and World Cups. European football's governing body UEFA has delayed a controversial decision to grant membership to Gibraltar -- despite being ordered to do so by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The FEF (Spanish Federation) are getting really worried now - as if Gibraltar are granted membership - Catalonia and The Basque Country have made it clear they will push to even harder to be recognized by UEFA.

Gibraltar is a tiny place - if they are granted membership they will not compete at any serious level but with the Faroe Islands already there - whilst remaining attached to Denmark - it is hypocritical to deny them their right to take part. If the Spanish regions gained membership, you might find Corsica applying, and Russian Republics like Chechnya, Dagestan and North Ossetia aswell. However, Catalonia and Euskadi are pushing for a change in the Spanish Constitution - to have more of a federal system, whereas they would technically still remain as part of Spain, but they will be seen and recognized as independent states in their own right. - Some in Spain's ruling Socialist Government as well as the usual nationalist parties are in favour of it. Again though, despite the fact that Germany is a federated state you don't see the likes of Bavaria applying for their own team! Although this is different since Bavaria and other German states haven't got the independence movements that they have in Catalonia and Euskadi.

This internal regional conflict is often a reason given for the poor performances at major tournaments by the Spanish national side. However to use this as an excuse for the Spanish National sides' failures shouldn't it mean that Italy with Sicilia, Sardegna, the Mezzo Giorno and the North in permanent conflict that they too shouldn't win anything? Perhaps a Catalan is not as comfortable or less susceptible to giving his all for Spain and the regionalised side could go on and outperform the Spain side of present.

Continues...

Just a comment to DF, Euskal Herria also existed as a country long before Spain came into existence, only that then it was called Navarre.

~ ~ ~

The "Bad Guys"

It is funny, the Washington sponsored push for Kosovo's independence (including the training and funding of the Kosovo Liberation Army by the CIA) has elicited some estrange reactions in Europe, this one was published at RIA Novosti, a Russian media outlet.

The article provides the who's who list of independence driven movements in Europe, the "bad guys" of the movie. Here it is:

Hotbeds of separatism in modern Europe
22:59 | 19/ 12/ 2007

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti) - The Kosovo issue has been forwarded to the UN Security Council. The Russian Foreign Ministry suggests that Belgrade and Pristina should have another chance to come to terms. A decision on Kosovo's cessation from Serbia will create a precedent and violate international law.

Today, Europe is the venue of both integration and separatist processes. Experts have calculated that in the 21st century more than 10 new states may emerge in Europe.

Basque Country is the most traditional example of European separatism. In Spain, about two million Basques live in three provinces of what is called Basque Country. It has broader powers than other Spanish regions; the living standards are above the average; and Basque is recognized as an official language. But despite this devolution deal, the advocates of secession from Spain (to be merged with the Basque-populated part of France) are not going to stop at that.

Francisco Franco was responsible for the growth of separatism - the Basques were not allowed to publish books and newspapers; conduct instruction in Basque (native name - euskara); give children Basque names or put out their national flag. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or ETA (Basque for "Basque Homeland and Freedom") was set up in 1959 as an anti-Franco party. Franco has long been dead and the Basque country has received the autonomous status, but this does not prevent the Basque terrorists from fighting. More than 900 people have fallen victim to the struggle for "independence."

Catalonia, an autonomous province in the north-east of Spain is also a headache for Madrid. Having their own language and culture, the Catalans have always stressed their separate identity in Spain. Their province enjoys extensive autonomy in Spain, a constitutional monarchy. Relations with the central government in Madrid are being regulated by a separate charter. In 2005, the new version of the charter said that the Catalans are a separate nation. However, there are dozens of parties and public organizations in the region, mostly left-wing, which are advocating cessation from Spain. Their goal is to hold a referendum on independence until 2014.

Another Spanish province, Valencia, received a new autonomous status in July 2007.

France has a long-standing experience of resisting separatism and extremism on its territory, above all in the Mediterranean island of Corsica. The Corsican national groups clashed with the French army in the middle 1970s. The Corsican Nationalist Union and the Movement for Self-Determination are the biggest and most influential among these groups. Both have combat units. In the last 25 years, the island's status was upgraded twice - in 1982 and 1990 the local authorities were given increasingly broad powers in the economy, agriculture, energy industry, transportation, education, and culture. Several years ago, French parliament recognized the existence of the Corsican nation. This decision was later cancelled as contradicting the Constitution of the French Republic.

The Breton Revolutionary Army (BRA) has operated in Bretagne, a north-western French province, since the early 1970s. The descendants of the Celts, who once came from the British Isles, do not identify themselves fully with the French, or consider themselves special among other French citizens. During censuses, many of them call themselves Bretons although put French as their native tongue. The BRA (apparently named by analogy with the Irish Republican Army - IRA) belongs to the extremist wing of the nationalist movement Emgann, which is fighting against the "French oppressors."

In Italy, the separatist attitudes are strong in the industrially advanced northern regions. The influential League of the North has so far given up its demand of secession and insists on Italy becoming a federation. There are also people wishing to see South Tirol, which Italy received after WWI, reunited with Austria.

Belgium may separate into northern Flanders (whose residents speak Dutch and are leaning towards the Netherlands) and southern French-speaking Wallonia. This confrontation between Belgium's two linguistic communities is rooted in the beginning of Belgium's independent history when the Walloons and the Flemish formed a union against the Netherlands. Having once united in the name of freedom, they have been trying to break apart for almost two centuries. Appeals for independence are growing stronger and stronger - the economically advanced Flanders does not want to "feed" the Walloon Region. The polls show that more than 60% of the Flemish and over 40% of the Walloons believe that Belgium may disintegrate.

In Britain, the separatist attitudes have moved from Ulster to Scotland. The recent Scottish parliamentary elections were won by the supporters of the formation of a new independent state from the Scottish National Party (SNP). The head of the Scottish government Alex Salmond declared that Scotland may become independent within a decade. So far, only 23% of Scots support the idea of their independence (as compared with 30% a year ago). However, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown (the current British Prime Minister) warned in the press that Britain would be threatened with "Balkanization" if the 300 year-long union between England and Scotland continued weakening.

Denmark's Faeroe Islands are a semi-autonomous territory, living on the government's subsidies of almost $170 million a year. This fact is a restraint for the local separatists, although five years ago they tried to conduct a referendum on independence.

Quiet Switzerland also has its own separatists. The Front for the Liberation of Yura has been demanding this canton's independence from the confederation for over 30 years. At one time, Yura inhabited by French-speaking Catholics was transferred to the canton of Bern with its predominantly German-speaking Protestant population. The Front's leaders admit that their chances of success are minimal.

Vojvodina is a Serbian autonomous region located some 35 km (22 miles) away from Belgrade. The Alliance of Vojvodina's Magyars, whose representatives control almost 70% of the region's territory, demand a republican status for the region, a referendum on secession from Serbia and a confederation with Hungary. Late last March, the Association asked the European Union to send a mission to study the situation. Hungarians now account for more than 40% of the region's population.

A similar scenario is developing in Romanian Transylvania (in 1940-1945 it belonged to Hungary; in 1919-1939 to Romania; and before that to Austria-Hungary). The percentage of Hungarians there already exceeds 45%. The Union for the Revival of Hungarian Transylvania, set up under Ceausescu, has already held referendums on territorial autonomy in three Transylvanian districts late last March. The local Hungarians expressed themselves for the maximal autonomy from Bucharest and independent relations with Budapest.

The "anti-colonial" raids have become more frequent in Italian Sardinia, and in the Austrian provinces of Stiria and particularly Carinthia, mostly populated by the Croatians and Slovenians. The South Albanian Greeks and the residents of the Portuguese Azores have also become increasingly active in demanding autonomy.

I do not like the bias in the text, but at least it presents a list of all the independentist movements in Europe which in turn chips away from Spain's propaganda campaign which dictates that the Basques are the only Europeans not happy with belonging to a monolithic state-nation.

One can easily understand the reason for the strong feelings in Russia against self-determination movements across Europe for they too lost their colonialist grip of European states like Moldavia, Latvia, Ukraine and many others, not even going to mention the republics in Central Asia.

~ ~ ~

Propaganda Games

Time to time I run into an article obviously written by a Basque-phobe. Well, this time the honor goes to an anonymous writer at the English publication The Economist.

It is just so darn juicy that I am gonna piece it apart paragraph by paragraph, here we go:

Spain and its regions
Autonomy games

Sep 20th 2007 | MADRID
From The Economist print edition

Tensions with the regions ahead of next March's general election in Spain

POLITICIANS can be more loved when they give up power than when they have it. This seems true of Josu Jon Imaz, leader of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). His decision to quit has provoked laments all round, including from the prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Mr Imaz's party won only 1.6% of the vote in the 2004 general election. But, like the Basque country, the PNV punches above its weight. It has dominated Basque politics for 30 years, leading every regional government since 1980, including that of the current premier, Juan José Ibarretxe. And it runs a region that has more autonomy than just about any other in Europe.

Yes, you can see that this magazine is published in London, a city where the political class is having to swallow the bitter pill of the Scottish push for independence. Therein lies the reason about the editorial decision to parrot whatever comes out from Madrid's propaganda ministry.

Of course Zapatero decries Imaz's resignation, after the excellent job he did to derail the peace process now Zapatero faces a future without a high profile traitor within the ranks of the Basque Nationalist Party.

Fortunately the author gives us a comic relief when he mentions that the PNV got the 1.6% vote in the general elections in Spain, my goodness one would think that a fella who writes about "Spain regions" would know that the PNV's area of political influence is reduced to the Basque Autonomous Community and Navarre, they are really not that interested on presenting the Spaniards with a Basque Prime Minister option.

Oh and what a relief to read the "Autonomy Mantra" right off the bat. Anonymous should know that autonomy can be reduced if that move fits the political strategy of the power that grants such autonomy, independence on the other side can not be reduced or increased by a foreign state unless of course in the case of war, something that allegedly could never happen again in advanced Europe.

Let us continue:

It is not, however, its administrative and legislative power over 2.1m Basques that makes the PNV so important to Mr Zapatero. He cares about two other things. The first is the PNV's role as the engine driving what is often the pushiest region in Spain. Where the Basques lead, others (especially Catalonia but also Galicia) try to follow. The second is the party's attitude to, and fraught relationship with, the terrorist group ETA. The PNV would be a vital contributor to any possible peace settlement with ETA; ETA formally ended its ceasefire in June, although (thanks mainly to good police work) it has not since staged any big terrorist outrages.

It is so weird to read how a mouth piece for a government that so willingly tried to starve to death the entire Irish people, a government that bestowed its best honors to pirates, a government that engaged in war crimes like the airborne bombing of unarmed civilians in what is today know as Iraq; calls an armed group by the term of terrorist to then link it with a Basque political party, what is funny is to see that after all the efforts by Ibarretxe, Anasagasti, Imaz and Balza to play by the Spanish rules Madrid and London still consider the PNV as much part of ETA as Batasuna.

Meaning, for Madrid and London (and Paris for that matter) all Basques are terrorists, period.

But there is more:

The PNV is divided both over how hard to press Madrid and over how friendly to be to ETA. Mr Imaz is a moderate “pactist” who wants to be tough on ETA and not too pushy with Madrid. His opponents, the “sovereigntists”, want to be more aggressive with Madrid and gentler on ETA. Mr Imaz's narrow leadership victory four years ago showed how balanced the two factions are. His sovereigntist rival, Joseba Egibar, came within a whisker of victory.

No comments, clear as water.

Now, a plain out lie:

Mr Imaz is against the go-it-alone referendum that has been suggested by the regional government, to ask Basques to decide for themselves what relationship they want with the rest of Spain. The referendum, originally Mr Ibarretxe's idea, is probably illegal under the Spanish constitution. It would certainly trigger a clash with Madrid. But Mr Imaz failed to block a watered-down plan for a referendum in the PNV national council.

No sir, referendums are legal both under Spanish and under European Union precepts. And if that was not enough, referendums are enshrined by the UN Charter. Shall I remind you how did Montenegro, Slovakia and the Czech Republic obtained their statehood?

Back to the article:

By walking away from the leadership, he claimed, there would be no recurrence of the old PNV nightmare: a permanent split. A rival nationalist party, Eusko Alkartasuna, spun off in 1987. And young PNV malcontents helped to create ETA in 1959. The party's future direction now depends on who takes over as leader. Inigo Urkullu, a pactist, is the strongest candidate. But one of the sovereigntists may yet run.

The Basque country is, as ever, being watched intently in Catalonia, which is both bigger and stronger. With a population of 7.1m, Catalonia is home to almost one in six Spaniards. It has plenty of sovereigntists of its own, a few of whom burnt pictures of King Juan Carlos when he visited Barcelona recently. Catalans were also irritated when the Madrid parliament voted this week to bar sub-national sports teams from international competitions.

Not only Catalonia my dear, also Galiza, Brittany, Corsica, Wales and Scotland, which is why the English (and the French) are so worried about the outcome in Euskal Herria.

In Catalonia Mr Zapatero has, at least, done his homework by securing a new autonomy deal that Catalans approved in a referendum last year. He hopes that the new deal has sorted out Catalonia for a generation—and that if a moderate wins the PNV leadership, a similar deal might even work with the Basques. Yet the sovereigntists are now getting noisier in Catalonia, ahead of next March's general election. Spain's regional tensions seem likely to continue for a while yet.

So, there you go, now you begin to understand why the European Union is so adamant about not trying harder to resolve the Basque issue, three of its most representative states are dealing with a push by the "sovereigntists" for eventual independence, this is why a magazine in London is so willing to publish rubbish against the Basques, because today they scratch the itch on the back of those who in the near future may be scratching in reciprocity.

~ ~ ~

The Basque and Kurdish Issues

This article appeared at the website called Kurdish Aspect talks about the new political panorama in Turkey and what could represent for the Kurds in that country.

This is how it starts out:

Turkey at the Cross Roads

Kurdishaspect.com - By Handren Delan

Justice and Development Party, known by its initials AK, which gained landslide support from the Turkish voters on the July 22 election, finally forged its government. It is ironic that the new cabinet, unlike the previous one, comprises of members from AK with religious background and the seculars whose social lifestyles greatly differ from religious conservatives. If the composition of the new cabinet is any thing to go by, it must be indicative of the fact that Prime Minister Erdogan intends to make his new government more comprehensive and more representative so that it will re-shape the political map in Turkey.

Prime Minister Erodogan realizes the facts that even though AK received approximately 47 percent of the national vote in the election, the social and political cleavages in Turkey are to be taken into account.

Then, it leads us into familiar ground, the misconception around the world that democracy took hold of Spain in the aftermath of Franco's death:

It is nothing new that some circles in the Turkish political establishment are pre-occupied with the Spanish political structure. Reportedly, Tancu Cillar, the leader of True Path Party (1991-1997), the partner of the collation government led by the Welfare Party at the time, visited Madrid in 1996, and her visit, which received tacit support from the government, was aimed at exploring prospects for the resolution of ethnic conflicts in Turkey based on the post-Francoist political blueprint. Once the idea reached the pan-nationalists and the military circles, they out rightly scoffed at Cillar and other politicians voicing their support to her.

The Spanish model looks impressive for chiefly two reasons: heterogeneity of the Spanish make up; and a post-dictatorship political arrangement which resulted in the establishment of democratic institutions with effective checks and balances on the executive. Compared to other emerging democracies which are part of the third wave of democratization as titled in Samuel Huntington’s thesis, post-Francoist Spain is the most stable and well-established democracy.

Spain, in comparison with her sister western liberal democracies which took decades for the democratic institutions to take hold, made a painful and a hasty transition from authoritarianism into a democracy. Although the transition was painful for the elite who undertook the interval between the transition and consolidation period, it was smooth and quick (1975-1882).

The transition was painful for the elite?

Non of them were ever brought before a judge for their ghastly crimes against humankind, they still call the shots thanks to their political vehicle called Partido Popular.

Anyway, this of course leads to the Basque issue:

The country during the Francoist rein had a constitution with a centralized structure ruling over the periphery. The regions were not accorded with powers necessary to govern their regions, and the peripheral populations lagged behind in terms of economic development. In a more strict sense, the Basque and Catalonia, the two regions with distinct populations in social and cultural realms within the unitary state, were completely left at the mercy of the central government in Madrid.

The Spanish elite who emerged largely in the post-1975 rightly understood the nature of the problem their country faced, namely the ethnic challenge from the periphery.

The dictatorship of Francois like the predecessors of the AK government in Turkey employed the most repressive policy to undermine the groups holding aspirations for a degree of self-rule or outright independence. Identical to the founding fathers of modern Turkey, the Spanish national identity was imposed by repressive means, and as a result the concept of the Spanish-ness seemed less appealing for the population in the periphery.

The nature of the challenge the post-François elite encountered were twofold: on one hand, they had to retain the integrity of their unitary state; and on the other they had to build a cohesive national discourse which could encompass all population living within the Spanish territory, regardless of sectarian or ethnic background. In particular, the Basque region spelled a major challenge to the Post-Franco rulers since the secession of the region from Madrid would have had a serious repercussion for Spain and France, which has a significant Basque population. The Basques in France have their own grievances against Paris which almost terrorized and vanished their culture since the time aggressive nation-building was aggressively pursued by Napoleon, a post- France revolutionary leader, and in it’s aftermath in the 19th Century.

The underlying and far-reaching impact of the Basque secession would affect other national state borders Europe-wide beyond the borders of France and Spain. In other words, the fragmentation of the country along ethnic fault lines, to an extent, could have been a blueprint for other minorities living within national states in Europe. The daunting task in the years that followed 1975 was the writing of a new constitution which could introduce a new concept of citizenship and the recognition of nationalities with distinct cultural and social characteristics.

Obviously, the issue of national minorities is not simply confined to Spain, but to most countries that made transitions into a democracy. Naturally, countries in transition from authoritarian systems into democratic forms of governance have a tough time passing through uncertainties. The role that the ruling elite play during the transitional era is vital. According to the studies conducted on the transitional countries in the post-Cold War Eastern Europe, there are three benchmarks which make the transition successful: cohesive leadership with ability to compromise; a vibrant economic structure; and decentralization of power in the societies with heterogeneous composition. Aside from cited benchmarks, in some cases, the charisma of a leader matters. For instance, the role Vaclav Havel played during the transition in the Czeech Republic significantly helped in bringing together the main political factions in the country and built a coherent national the consensus in aftermath of the secession of Slovakia. It is worthwhile to note that transitions do not lead to full-fledged democracies.

That last paragraph is what really applies to Spain, not the rosy outlook previously described. But what is must important, it details the real reason why the European Community turns a deaf ear towards the plea by the Basque society to its self determination. Yes, there is a new European map, one that contains new countries like Latvia, Slovakia, Macedonia and soon Kosovo. But the reality is that all these new countries have reshaped the map of the other Europe, the one that for a few decades was behind the Iron Curtain, but to allow for the Basque Country (or Catalunya, or Scotland, or Corsica for that matter) to break free would be a direct hit to the real Europe, the one conformed by the powerful mega-states, the one made up by old colonialist powers, the one that counts to the international community. Therein lies the double standard applied against the nations in Western Europe that long for statehood and international recognition, trapped withing the mega-states that control the European Community, an institution that ironically is supposed to encompass not the European states but the European peoples.

So finally, the author ties things up with the possible consequences for the Kurdish plea:

The smartest move taken by DTP (Democratic Society Party) was to escape from the 10 percent threshold regarded as a constitutional trap since early 1970s.

The members of DTP who fought in elections as independents landed the party in the Grand Assembly with 26 lawmakers. It is the first time since the inception of Republic that a party with particular Kurdish affiliation has presence in the Turkish Grand Assembly. The DTP must calculate carefully its policy options within a parliament with critical divisions between the forces of moderation and change, and forces with a mindset to maintain the status quo. The AK with significant majority in the Parliament still need the support of other parties for basically two reasons: the passage of certain legislations, according to the constitution, must enjoy an overall majority for which the support of at least 20 lawmakers is a must; and the seriousness of the current government to show that it’s policies enjoy wide support from forces in parliament other than the AK. DTP‘s support serves both purposes for government.

If Kurdish parliamentarians are keen to be a relevant force in parliament, they should make it clear which aspect of political spectrum they side with. The early indications do not paint an optimistic picture.

They already made a strategic error in not supporting Gul, AK’s presidential candidate and now president. Their abstaining vote does not serve any purpose in the long run. It is of the paramount importance for them to increase their political and diplomatic leverage with the ruling elite. Sticking to impractical policies renders them completely irrelevant. Given the present Turkish political context, the Kurdish interests, for the first time since the foundation of Republic, clearly lie with the policies of the government. There is enough room for the DTP to become the most relevant force in the newly emerged political setting.

Raising premature demands at this stage does not serve Kurdish long term interests. The representative of northern Kurdistan must with all subtlety weigh time and space for the AK to further institutionalize its political agenda: broadening of democratic reforms and consolidation of the democratic institutions.

Pragmatism based on long term visions must guide our brethren Kurds in Turkey. Northern Kurdistan is a sure winner of the consolidation of democratic institutions in the country. It will be a litmus test for DTP as an institutionalized party now, whether it advances the Kurdish interests or fail in this historic juncture.

Yes indeed, these last few paragraphs sound awfully familiar, they sum up the way the big bosses at the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) see things. Pragmatism is what keeps the Basque people divided in three different political entities, without an unified voice, without having their real demands heard in fear of making someone uncomfortable.

The result is there for all of us to see, Madrid continues to erode the political and social life of the Basque people refusing to resolve the problem knowing that Europe is all too happy to keep thing the way they are as spelled previously in this very same article.

Let us hope that the Kurds will learn from this lesson.

~ ~ ~

The Basque World Congress

This is something I just learned about.

It comes to us via EITb:

50 Years Since World Basque Congress I

1956 Paris

09/23/2006

Today, it is 50 years since president Agirre´s dream, first World Basque Congress, became truth.

UPV's Contemporary History professor Ludger Mees, interviewed in radio programme "Mas que palabras" in Radio Euskadi, has declared that the event was extremely important in its times as 20th constitution anniversary of first Basque Government was also reminded. Such anniversary had a relevant importance in the field of contemporary Basque history and in the history of anti-Franco period movement in the Spanish State.

In the fifties, "Spanish and Basque republican anti-Franco years led by Agirre went into crisis after dictator Franco succeeded in coming out of the international isolation" when he signed agreements whose basis were set in U.S.. Such agreements triggered the anti-Franco period movement to be offside.

Nevertheless, few years before the summit Agirre decided "to recover the strength the movement previously had and to unify different Basque anti-Franco years factions in a large event where they could go beyond their differences" to show the unity of the movement, Mees explained.

According to Mees, every Anti-Franco period sector and entire Basque Government took part in the congress. Many of the attendants came from Latin America where they were in exile and about 60 succeeded to come from the State. Some attendants became important people in Basque politics posterior to Agirre's death.

"Though there were big frictions among anti-Franco period sectors, we have to underline that Agirre joined all of them in one single event that set up a highly important symbol". The historian emphasized.

By that time, Agirre had already seen that the allies' intervention against Franco had failed. Nonetheless, instead of becoming immersed in crisis he tried to find "another way: the European way. Approaching Europe that was being built, joining the continent as democrats, and isolating from Franco. He thought that the dictator would have to abdicate and ease the incorporation of not only the Basque Country but Spanish State too, to the emerging Europe".

However, what Agirre had planned did not come true. This is why Mees thinks that Agirre's main achievement was organizing first World Basque Congress. Finally, though he continued keeping in touch with Europe, first Basque president died in 1960 without being able to see his dreamt free and democratic Euskadi (Basque Country).

We should keep in mind that today, a pseudo-socialist government calls the shots in Spain, and Franco's followers still run amok. The violence against the Basques set in place by the Franco regime and its heirs, the members of the Partido Popular, has been strenghtened by the members of the PSOE, years ago with the creation of the GAL, and today, refusing to seat down and negotiate an end to the Spanish occupation of Euskal Herria even after six months of ETA's announcement of a cease fire.

All of this repression would not be possible if it was not for the quiet support by the other European nations, simply because many of them are also occupying other nations. Examples?

England occupies Scotland and Wales, also keeps an outpost in Ireland.

France occupies parts of the Basque Country, parts of Catalunya, Brittany and Corsica.

And so on and so forth.

~ ~ ~

I (Heart) That Map

Montenegro's independence has created a chain reaction according to several news outlets.

What seems to have been a measure by some Western powers to punish Slobodan Milosevic and Serbia may have backfired. Then, during the Balkan war, the USA and most of the European countries did little or nothing to aid the break away republics, with the possible exception of Germany's support of Slovenia.

And so we were all forced to witness the razing of Dubrovnik and the rape of Sarajevo.

After the first Balkan war, Slobodan made a huge mistake, he attacked the Kosovo Liberation Army formed by what the international media likes calling "ethnic" Albanians. What Slobo could not understand was just how powerful the Albanian lobby was in Washington, and soon NATO was dropping bombs all over what was left of Yugoslavia. And it was Belgrade's turn to be demolished.

Kosovo was not "liberated" by the NATO, but the Clinton administration seeing its failure managed to introduce a clause that would give Montenegro the chance to secede from the new version of Yugoslavia. That way, in a very sly way, the USA was providing Kosovo with an escape route. All this just to apparently punish Serbia for their refusal to let go of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia in a peaceful manner. In reality, the referendum clause was a way to satisfy the Albanian lobby.

Well, the USA and its NATO allies also made a mistake. They allowed Montenegro to gain its independence through a referendum, setting a legal precedent that they won't be able to deny to all the other nations without statehood in Europe and quite possibly around the world (Hawaii anyone?).

So, Times on Line published this piece about the issue:

The Times

June 02, 2006

Calls for freedom make the jigsaw of Europe more complicated than ever

By Jeremy Page and Richard Beeston, Diplomatic Editor

MOST people would struggle to point out Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika on a map, let alone pronounce it.

Those who can, know it as a hotbed of smuggling, the site of a vast Soviet-era weapons dump, or perhaps the home of Sheriff Tiraspol football club.

But this tiny sliver of land, known in English as Transdniestr, is the latest European enclave to make a bid for independence following Montenegro’s decision to declare statehood last month.

Igor Smirnov, Transdniestr’s “President”, has announced that its 550,000 people will vote in a referendum in September on whether to seek formal independence from Moldova.

“The recent example of Montenegro proves that a referendum is becoming a norm for solving conflicts,”, said Mr Smirnov, 64, a former metalworker.

In the unlikely event that Transdniestr wins independence, it would become Europe’s 19th new country since the collapse of communism in 1989, and the fragmentation goes on.

From the Basques of Spain to Turkey’s Kurds, there are minorities who yearn for a country of their own, and Montenegro’s example has kindled hopes that even tiny enclaves in Europe’s forgotten corners can still become viable states.

The fear is that declarations of independence by mini-states could spark fresh instability in already unstable regions.

In the Balkans, Montenegro’s independence drive is likely to be followed by Kosovo, a predominantly ethnic Albanian province of Serbia. That could spark fresh moves by the ethnic Serb Republika Srpska to break away from Bosnia, and Herceg-Bosna’s Croats to join Croatia.

In the Caucasus, Russia is still struggling to contain the separatist rebellion in Chechnya. Georgia is split by breakaway regions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There is still no resolution to Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed enclave in Azerbaijan that is controlled by Armenia.

Not even Western Europe is immune. Nationalists in Northern Ireland still seek a united Ireland. Scotland is in theory closer to independence that at any time since the Act of Union with England 300 years ago. Separatist movements are active in the Basque country, Corsica, Sardinia and Italy.

As for Europe’s newest would-be state, Transdniestr broke away from Moldova in 1990 and the two sides fought a war in 1992 that left more than 1,500 people dead. Although never recognised internationally, it has close ties to Russia, which helped the ethnic Russians in the war and has maintained 1,500 troops there.

Officially, they are there to keep the peace and guard a stockpile of 40,000 tonnes of weapons stored there in case of a Nato invasion. In reality, this remains Moscow’s westernmost strategic outpost — a bulwark against the expanding EU and Nato. It is also a haven for money-laundering, smuggling and illegal weapons sales.

Mr Smirnov runs it as a personal fiefdom, financed by local oligarchs and propped up by nostalgia for the Soviet Union. It has its own currency based on the old Soviet rouble, uses the old Soviet Moldovan flag, and stages annual Soviet-style military parades. Police wear uniforms bearing the hammer and sickle.

There is no direct telephone link to Moldova and no mobile network. Shop windows display tawdry goods from the 1970s and 1980s. The only redeeming feature is Moldova’s only FIFA-approved football stadium, which is home to the country’s top football club, Sheriff Tiraspol.

Peace talks, mediated by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, have stalled over Transdniestr’s refusal to accept autonomy within a Moldovan state. Russia has backed the referendum.

Karel De Gucht, the Belgian Foreign Minister and OSCE chairman, has said that there is no legal basis for a referendum and urged both sides to return to the negotiating table.

You won't find a whole lot of extra information in this article that what has already been published in other news outlets.

But wait, what about that map I said I love?

Well, at the bottom of the article they provide the link to two maps. This one:

And this one:

Darn, do I love the second map.

.... ... .

Irish Lessons

I would like to start out with this heartfelt post by Irish blogger Joe, who from Dublin publishes the blog "Inside the Ocean".

The post i'm refering to is called "Democracy", here you have it:

The last weekend we could see how the people from Montenegro gained their freedom. I think that would be a good question to all the people who believe that this is democracy : When will the UK allow for a referendum in Northern Ireland or Scotland or Wales? When will Spain or France allow for a referendum in Catalonia or in the Basque region? Or for instance, France in Corsica? Anyway congratulations to the people of Monenegro. A good lesson of democracy that som EU states should learn.

Why do I mentioned that I wanted to start out with Joe's post?

Well, this note published at BBC is making the rounds in the internet, and I thought this Dubliner's demand for answers was a good way to show just how commited to self determination the Irish are, wether is their own or that of any other nation in a similar situation, in this case, the Catalonyans.

Anyway, here it goes:

NI lessons for Catalan region

A Northern Ireland academic is to help set up a new peace institute in Spain's Catalan region.

Professor Gillian Robinson of the University of Ulster will use her expertise in conflict resolution to guide the Catalonian initiative.

She is director of INCORE, the UU's peace and conflict research centre.

Professor Robinson was invited by the Catalonian Ministry of Institutional Relations and Participation to share her expertise in the field.

The academic is to advise on a programme to develop a public policy of peace creation.

This includes a proposal to establish the International Catalan Institute for Peace.

'Supporting the government'

Northern Ireland had considerable expertise in both academic study and research into peace and conflict issues, said Professor Robinson.

"Policy makers and practitioners in Northern Ireland are also actively involved in many networks across Europe and beyond that seek to share best practice in relation to peace building," she said.

"We congratulate the Catalan government on its vision and commitment to the establishment of the proposed centre and we at INCORE look forward to supporting the government in its development and future work."

.... ... .

Pat on Self-Determination

Believe it or not, I'm quoting Pat Buchanan.

I simply need to do so, for this is a rare example of a right wing fella actually defending the right of the old nations to be what they want to be.

Pat goes the extra mile when he says that such thing is the way things are supposes to be.

Anyway, I learned about his column "The death of the nation-state" thanks to a blog called "European Ethnocentrism".

Here you have Pat's piece on what is going on in Europe:

The death of the nation-state

May 23, 2006

by Pat Buchanan

Yugoslavia is gone, forever. The country that emerged from World War I and Versailles as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, land of the South Slavs, has passed into history.

Sunday's vote in Montenegro, a tiny land of fewer people than the Washington, D.C., this writer grew up in, voted Sunday to secede from Belgrade, establish a nation and seek entry into the European Union.

In 1991, Macedonia peacefully seceded. Slovenia and Croatia fought their way out, and Bosnia broke free after a war marked by the massacre at Srbenica and NATO intervention. Bosnia is itself subdivided into a Serb and a Croat-Muslim sector.

After the 78-day U.S. bombing of Serbia by the United States, and the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from the province in the wake of the NATO war, Kosovo is 90 percent Muslim and Albanian. Loss of this land that was the cradle of the Serb nation seems an inevitability.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia, the second partition of Czechoslovakia and the breakup of the Soviet Union into 15 nations -- many of which had never before existed -- seem to confirm what Israeli historian Martin van Creveld and U.S. geostrategist William Lind have written.

The nation-state is dying. Men have begun to transfer their allegiance, loyalty and love from the older nations both upward to the new transnational regimes that are arising and downward to the sub-nations whence they came, the true nations, united by blood and soil, language, literature, history, faith, tradition and memory.

Imperial and ideological nations appear, for the foreseeable future, to be finished. The British and French, greatest of the Western Empires, are long gone. Throughout the 19th and early 20th century, the Irish, though its sons had fought to erect and maintain the Victorian "empire on which the sun never set" -- and defend it in World War I -- fought relentlessly to be free of it. They wanted, and in 1921 won, a small nation of their own, on their own small island.

The Irish preferred it to being part of the British Empire.

The call of ethnicity, nationalism, religion, faith and history pulled apart the greatest of all the ideological empires, the Soviet Empire, and the Soviet Union, that "prison house of nations."

Transnational institutions, the embryonic institutions of a new world government to which the elites of the West and Third World are transferring allegiance and power, include the United Nations, the EU, the World Trade Organization, the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, the International Seabed Authority, the Kyoto Protocol, the IMF and the World Bank.

The sub-nations, or ex-nations, struggling to be born or break free include Scotland, Catalonia and the Basque country of Spain, Corsica, northern Italy and Quebec in the West. Iraq, as we have seen, is a composite of peoples divided by tribe, ethnicity and faith -- as are Iran, Pakistan and India. Jordanians are Palestinian Arabs, with a minority of Bedouins.

Lind argues that not only are nations subdividing, losing their monopolies on the love and loyalty of their peoples, but they are being superseded by "non-state actors" that are challenging the monopoly on warfare enjoyed by the nation-state since the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War.

Among the more familiar non-state actors are the Crips and Bloods, Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13, the Mexican and Colombian drug cartels, the Zapatistas of Chiapas, the racial nationalists of MEChA, the white supremacists of Aryan Nations, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and Hezbollah, the Maoists of Nepal and the Tamil Tigers.

Among the central questions of our time is a central question of any time: Who owns the future?

Of late, the transnational vision has lost its allure. Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales and most of Latin America reject the NAFTA vision of Bush and Vicente Fox. French and Dutch voted down the EU Constitution, which now appears dead. The Doha round of world trade negotiations is headed for the rocks. Hostility is rising to bringing Turkey into the EU.

Arabs and Turks in Europe identify more and more with the Islamic faith they have in common and the countries whence they came, not the one in which they live and work.

So, too, do millions of illegal aliens in the United States. They march defiantly under Mexican flags in American streets demanding the rights of U.S. citizens -- while an intimidated political class rushes to accommodate and appease them, assuring itself this is but the latest reincarnation of Ellis Island.

As the Old Republic trudges to its death, less and less do we hear that incessant blather about the American Empire, "the world's last superpower" and "our unipolar moment."

Pat Buchanan is a founding editor of The American Conservative magazine, and the author of books such as The Great Betrayal, A Republic, Not an Empire, Neo-Conned, and Where the Right Went Wrong.

Whoa!

I'm telling you, I never ever thought I was going to be posting anything written by Pat Buchanan, but as it happens, I strongly agree with what he says about the way the European political landscape is being transformed as we speak.

.... ... .