The Basque and Kurdish Issues

This article appeared at the website called Kurdish Aspect talks about the new political panorama in Turkey and what could represent for the Kurds in that country.

This is how it starts out:

Turkey at the Cross Roads

Kurdishaspect.com - By Handren Delan

Justice and Development Party, known by its initials AK, which gained landslide support from the Turkish voters on the July 22 election, finally forged its government. It is ironic that the new cabinet, unlike the previous one, comprises of members from AK with religious background and the seculars whose social lifestyles greatly differ from religious conservatives. If the composition of the new cabinet is any thing to go by, it must be indicative of the fact that Prime Minister Erdogan intends to make his new government more comprehensive and more representative so that it will re-shape the political map in Turkey.

Prime Minister Erodogan realizes the facts that even though AK received approximately 47 percent of the national vote in the election, the social and political cleavages in Turkey are to be taken into account.

Then, it leads us into familiar ground, the misconception around the world that democracy took hold of Spain in the aftermath of Franco's death:

It is nothing new that some circles in the Turkish political establishment are pre-occupied with the Spanish political structure. Reportedly, Tancu Cillar, the leader of True Path Party (1991-1997), the partner of the collation government led by the Welfare Party at the time, visited Madrid in 1996, and her visit, which received tacit support from the government, was aimed at exploring prospects for the resolution of ethnic conflicts in Turkey based on the post-Francoist political blueprint. Once the idea reached the pan-nationalists and the military circles, they out rightly scoffed at Cillar and other politicians voicing their support to her.

The Spanish model looks impressive for chiefly two reasons: heterogeneity of the Spanish make up; and a post-dictatorship political arrangement which resulted in the establishment of democratic institutions with effective checks and balances on the executive. Compared to other emerging democracies which are part of the third wave of democratization as titled in Samuel Huntington’s thesis, post-Francoist Spain is the most stable and well-established democracy.

Spain, in comparison with her sister western liberal democracies which took decades for the democratic institutions to take hold, made a painful and a hasty transition from authoritarianism into a democracy. Although the transition was painful for the elite who undertook the interval between the transition and consolidation period, it was smooth and quick (1975-1882).

The transition was painful for the elite?

Non of them were ever brought before a judge for their ghastly crimes against humankind, they still call the shots thanks to their political vehicle called Partido Popular.

Anyway, this of course leads to the Basque issue:

The country during the Francoist rein had a constitution with a centralized structure ruling over the periphery. The regions were not accorded with powers necessary to govern their regions, and the peripheral populations lagged behind in terms of economic development. In a more strict sense, the Basque and Catalonia, the two regions with distinct populations in social and cultural realms within the unitary state, were completely left at the mercy of the central government in Madrid.

The Spanish elite who emerged largely in the post-1975 rightly understood the nature of the problem their country faced, namely the ethnic challenge from the periphery.

The dictatorship of Francois like the predecessors of the AK government in Turkey employed the most repressive policy to undermine the groups holding aspirations for a degree of self-rule or outright independence. Identical to the founding fathers of modern Turkey, the Spanish national identity was imposed by repressive means, and as a result the concept of the Spanish-ness seemed less appealing for the population in the periphery.

The nature of the challenge the post-François elite encountered were twofold: on one hand, they had to retain the integrity of their unitary state; and on the other they had to build a cohesive national discourse which could encompass all population living within the Spanish territory, regardless of sectarian or ethnic background. In particular, the Basque region spelled a major challenge to the Post-Franco rulers since the secession of the region from Madrid would have had a serious repercussion for Spain and France, which has a significant Basque population. The Basques in France have their own grievances against Paris which almost terrorized and vanished their culture since the time aggressive nation-building was aggressively pursued by Napoleon, a post- France revolutionary leader, and in it’s aftermath in the 19th Century.

The underlying and far-reaching impact of the Basque secession would affect other national state borders Europe-wide beyond the borders of France and Spain. In other words, the fragmentation of the country along ethnic fault lines, to an extent, could have been a blueprint for other minorities living within national states in Europe. The daunting task in the years that followed 1975 was the writing of a new constitution which could introduce a new concept of citizenship and the recognition of nationalities with distinct cultural and social characteristics.

Obviously, the issue of national minorities is not simply confined to Spain, but to most countries that made transitions into a democracy. Naturally, countries in transition from authoritarian systems into democratic forms of governance have a tough time passing through uncertainties. The role that the ruling elite play during the transitional era is vital. According to the studies conducted on the transitional countries in the post-Cold War Eastern Europe, there are three benchmarks which make the transition successful: cohesive leadership with ability to compromise; a vibrant economic structure; and decentralization of power in the societies with heterogeneous composition. Aside from cited benchmarks, in some cases, the charisma of a leader matters. For instance, the role Vaclav Havel played during the transition in the Czeech Republic significantly helped in bringing together the main political factions in the country and built a coherent national the consensus in aftermath of the secession of Slovakia. It is worthwhile to note that transitions do not lead to full-fledged democracies.

That last paragraph is what really applies to Spain, not the rosy outlook previously described. But what is must important, it details the real reason why the European Community turns a deaf ear towards the plea by the Basque society to its self determination. Yes, there is a new European map, one that contains new countries like Latvia, Slovakia, Macedonia and soon Kosovo. But the reality is that all these new countries have reshaped the map of the other Europe, the one that for a few decades was behind the Iron Curtain, but to allow for the Basque Country (or Catalunya, or Scotland, or Corsica for that matter) to break free would be a direct hit to the real Europe, the one conformed by the powerful mega-states, the one made up by old colonialist powers, the one that counts to the international community. Therein lies the double standard applied against the nations in Western Europe that long for statehood and international recognition, trapped withing the mega-states that control the European Community, an institution that ironically is supposed to encompass not the European states but the European peoples.

So finally, the author ties things up with the possible consequences for the Kurdish plea:

The smartest move taken by DTP (Democratic Society Party) was to escape from the 10 percent threshold regarded as a constitutional trap since early 1970s.

The members of DTP who fought in elections as independents landed the party in the Grand Assembly with 26 lawmakers. It is the first time since the inception of Republic that a party with particular Kurdish affiliation has presence in the Turkish Grand Assembly. The DTP must calculate carefully its policy options within a parliament with critical divisions between the forces of moderation and change, and forces with a mindset to maintain the status quo. The AK with significant majority in the Parliament still need the support of other parties for basically two reasons: the passage of certain legislations, according to the constitution, must enjoy an overall majority for which the support of at least 20 lawmakers is a must; and the seriousness of the current government to show that it’s policies enjoy wide support from forces in parliament other than the AK. DTP‘s support serves both purposes for government.

If Kurdish parliamentarians are keen to be a relevant force in parliament, they should make it clear which aspect of political spectrum they side with. The early indications do not paint an optimistic picture.

They already made a strategic error in not supporting Gul, AK’s presidential candidate and now president. Their abstaining vote does not serve any purpose in the long run. It is of the paramount importance for them to increase their political and diplomatic leverage with the ruling elite. Sticking to impractical policies renders them completely irrelevant. Given the present Turkish political context, the Kurdish interests, for the first time since the foundation of Republic, clearly lie with the policies of the government. There is enough room for the DTP to become the most relevant force in the newly emerged political setting.

Raising premature demands at this stage does not serve Kurdish long term interests. The representative of northern Kurdistan must with all subtlety weigh time and space for the AK to further institutionalize its political agenda: broadening of democratic reforms and consolidation of the democratic institutions.

Pragmatism based on long term visions must guide our brethren Kurds in Turkey. Northern Kurdistan is a sure winner of the consolidation of democratic institutions in the country. It will be a litmus test for DTP as an institutionalized party now, whether it advances the Kurdish interests or fail in this historic juncture.

Yes indeed, these last few paragraphs sound awfully familiar, they sum up the way the big bosses at the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) see things. Pragmatism is what keeps the Basque people divided in three different political entities, without an unified voice, without having their real demands heard in fear of making someone uncomfortable.

The result is there for all of us to see, Madrid continues to erode the political and social life of the Basque people refusing to resolve the problem knowing that Europe is all too happy to keep thing the way they are as spelled previously in this very same article.

Let us hope that the Kurds will learn from this lesson.

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