Powell's Kurdish Pickle

One of the main strategies by those who oppose the self determination of the nations without statehood is to deny they have their own identity. We hear it from the French and the Spaniards in regards of the Basques and the Catalonians, from the French in regards of the Corsicans and the Bretons, from the English in regards of the Welsh and the Scottish, from the Israelis in regards of the Palestinians (fascist Golda Mair and her infamous "a land with no people for a people without land) and so on and so forth.

On the other hand, whenever it is convenient for them, the main stream media applies the label "ethnic" when Washington dictates it, that is the way we get to hear about ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, ethnic Tibetans in China or ethnic Chechens in Russia.

Well, one of Aznar's buddies just acknowledged the ethnic identity of a people that has been denied everything, the Kurds. Here you have the note from Berria:

Powell wants to maintain Kurds' "historical identity"

United States Secretary of State said it was up to the "Iraqis" to sort out the Kurdistan situation

Juanma Sarasola

According to an old Kurdish saying the Kurds have no other friends apart from the mountains. The country divided up among five states (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Armenia) has over the years seen many promises broken and the support of many they believed to be their allies blown to the winds. Washington is one of those who have promised them help and who have turned their back on them many times after eating their words. Now it seems that the Iraqi Kurds have the United States of America on their side once again. Indeed, the day before yesterday Colin Powell, the White House Secretary of State, supported "their right to maintain their historical identity." Nevertheless, he made it clear that he would not support the "breaking up" of Iraq.

"The Kurds want to preserve their historical identity… but I think it is absolutely clear that that part of Iraq must remain a part of Iraq," said Powell. He explained that Washington's policy was that it was up to the "Iraqis" to find a solution in the future for the situation of the Kurds in the northern region of Iraq. The New York Times had said the day before that the decision of the United States had been to give the Iraqi Kurds a special statute to enable them to maintain their current semi-autonomy. The White House received many warnings against the decision both from Iraq and from the countries of the Middle East. In fact, many have requested that Iraq not be divided up along ethnic lines. Turkey has voiced the greatest concern
regarding an autonomous Kurdistan. As an ally of Washington and a NATO member Ankara does not view the consolidating of the Iraqi Kurds with a proper organisation favourably. Ankara feels that if this happened, the Kurds under Turkish domination might resume their armed struggle through the outlawed and actively persecuted KADEK, the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress. The Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan, is scheduled to meet with American President George W. Bush at the end of this month and the Kurdistan conflict will be one of the main items on their agenda.

Very well Colin, what about the "historical identity" of the Basques, you know, like the ones murdered during an air strike represented on a certain tapestry that was concealed behind a blue curtain when you were lying to the world about some inexistent WMD?

I guess Syria, Iran, Armenia and Turkey are not as important as Spain when it comes to getting support for a genocidal war.

.... ... .

Strasbourg and The Kurds

Now that Batasuna has been on the lime light due to the unsubstantiated accusations by the neo-Francoist government of José María Aznar (one of the Three Butchers of Iraq along with Bush and Blair), then ban against the pro-independence party and its inclusion in the US "terror organizations" list I would like to present to you this article from 1999.

Euro Court Condemns Turkey for Banning Kurd Group

Updated 11:37 AM ET December 8, 1999

STRASBOURG (Reuters) - The European Court of Human Rights on Wednesday found Turkey guilty of violating the right to free association for banning a pro-Kurdish political party.

Turkey's constitutional court outlawed the Freedom and Democracy Party (Ozdep) in July 1993, saying its advocacy of self-determination for Kurds defied the Turkish constitution.

The European Court delivered a unanimous verdict saying it could see nothing in the party's program that called for violence or rebellion and that could have legitimized the Turkish court's decision.

Turkey had defended its decision, saying Ozdep attacked the indivisibility of the nation and advocated ethnic discrimination.

The party's founder and president Mevlut Ilik was awarded 30,000 francs ($4,685) in damages and 40,000 francs costs.

The European court condemned Turkey in 1998 for disbanding a communist and a socialist party on the grounds that they referred to Kurdish self-determination.

A case against Turkey for banning the Islam-based Welfare party in 1998 is still before the European Court.

The resemblance between what the Turkish said against the Kurdish political party and what Batasuna is undegoing is quite remarkable. Kurds and Basques united by the same fate.

.... ... .

The Kurds and The Basques II

Here you have the second part of the essay published by Kurdish Media:

Challenge to the Transition and ETA’s Movement for the Basque Separatism

KurdishMedia.com - By Welat Lezgin
10/07/2002 00:00:00

Continued from

Until 1978, the problem of ethnic-nationalism not only remained unchallenged, but it was made worse by the policies of the Francoist regime which radically opposed to all the regional claims in favour of ‘centralism’ – which in fact was not a centralism of Castille or even Madrid, but of the State above the people. [1] According to Conversi, at the end of Francoism, not only was Francoism doomed but the very idea of the Spanish State was not legitimate in the Basque Country. This remained the case at least until the late 1980s, well after the Transition had run its course. [2] ETA’s violence during this period was at its peak. As Robert Clark puts it:

“The Basque region during these days was like a pressure cooker about to explode. Sentiments for change had been so sharply suppressed during the dictatorship of Franco that there had been little opportunity for the expression of dissent with dictator gone, Basques now sought to release the pressures built up over the preceding forty years.” [3]

There are several reasons why the violence by ETA continued despite the historic changes in Spain. On several occasions ETA was convinced that the Basque Country was on the verge of national extinction, of being erased from the map of peoples, because its language and culture were slowly dying out and its customs were being replaced by the alien ones. [4] Hence, they saw a peremptory and urgent need to put an end to this progressive disappearance. To achieve this end, the establishment of an independent Basque country was pivotal. As Conversi puts it:

“The subordination of cultural to political goals is reflected in an eschatological vision of independence as a panacea for all problems of cultural identity, in particular the recovery of the language: ‘There is only one path to save Euskera: political independence for -Euzkadi’. [5]

But also by now, due to Franco’s harsh oppressive policies, ETA had become highly radicalised and had experienced extensive splits. In its earlier days ETA was a heterogeneous organisation, made up of an uncomfortable mix of nationalists, socialists, students, labour activists and rural Catholic youth. By the late 1960s ETA was being pulled in at least three ideological directions: (1) toward a new Left, proletarian tradition; (2) a guerrilla national front tradition; and (3) non-violent, ethically oriented, cultural tradition. This heterogeneity resulted in a series of splits. In 1966 – 1967, ETA split into ETA-Berri (New ETA) and ETA-Zarra (Old ETA); in 1970, it split into ETA-V (followers of the program of the Fifth Assembly) and ETA-VI (Sixth Assembly). The final split took place in 1974 between ETA (m) and ETA (pm) and ETA as we know it is ETA Militar, which continues to use violent methods to this day. [6]

Despite conflicts over the use of violence within the organisation, ETA’s military activities have continued unabated. The outcome of every internal dispute on the matter had been the expulsion or defection of the advocates of non-violent means. [7] In the 1970s a similar pattern in ETA’s evolution began to acquire a quicker tempo as the more experienced and mature leaders of ETA were killed or forced into exile, younger and more radical ones quickly replaced them in a process that currently continues. The Military front, composed predominantly of very young people, became more and more uncontrollable, while its autonomous initiatives provoked further conflict. Therefore violence has become, a self-generating mechanism, a vicious circle very difficult to stop. Violence also served to complement internal fragmentation. Since 1975, and as a result of many splits, ETA has become progressively dominated by groups who spend little time debating ideological issues and see military confrontation as the only way to achieve their goal of independence for Euzkadi. [8] What is interesting to note is that while Spain was being painfully transformed into a democratic and a devolved state, ETA had transformed in the opposite direction where moderates and those against the armed struggle had been eradicated from the organisation. [9]

To understand the continuation of violence and the ideological void of ETA we also need to look at ETA’s action/repression/action theory. According to this theory, attacks on the Francoist state would lead to universal repression, which would lead to greater popular anger, which would spiral into mass rebellion, eventually resulting in the civil war and the Basque secession. [10] As predicted by Fanon, the state violence as an indispensable ingredient in spreading a general ‘national awareness’ among the wider population instigated them to fight back. [11] In synthesis, the adoption of the Third Worldist models could not be realised without the state repression and this repression was the central part of the ‘theory of action/repression/action’ taken up by ETA. [12] This theory of violence as the only solution was obviously also determined by the prevailing internal condition of ruthless dictatorship in Spain. [13] What mattered to ETA was that the nation found itself in a lethal situation and that, in order to save her, it was urgent to adopt a series of drastic measures. As a consequence it considered the will of the Basque people to recover their national identity as the only valid element to save the nation. [14]

The role of state repression in cementing a common identity out of previous anthropological chaos should be emphasised here. While the police actions hampered the activities and mobilisation of ETA on various occasions, the indiscriminate repression of the Francoist regime generated a climate of understanding and support for ETA activists among the certain nationalist sectors and clandestine left-wing organisations. In the Basque Country political violence responded both to an internal logic (the need to foster unity in the organisation) and an external logic (the need to respond to the challenge of the state). However, at any moment of the stormy ideological debate within ETA, violent factions seized the initiative. This direct action, and not ideology or culture, showed the way to follow in order to achieve mass mobilisation and the public support. The hard-liners, with their attacks, overcame the ideological debate and demonstrated the simple reality that only direct action could achieve popular support and even extend mobilisation to the non-ethnic population of the Basque homeland.

During the Franco period, there were strands of shared meaning as to what it meant to be a “Basque”. There was (1) a myth, a shared understanding of an ancient Basque past (including the Fueros), (2) an awareness of the structural pressures for the extinction of the Basque culture, which increased the participative function of the Basque language, music, games, etc., and its capacity for symbolising solidarity and differentiability, and (3) anti-state violence, as an expression of the direct Basque action. Yet, the symbols perceived to be “Basque” – including the Fueros as well as the Basque language – were defined largely by their transgression from and rejection of the centralist regime. There was no consensus as to the nature of the new Basque identity in the post-Franco state, or even about how to define the Basque identity. The old method of the action-repression theory continued to hide such worries.

In general terms, a common feature of the insurgent nationalist guerrillas in various countries is their relation with, and even dependence on, the state repression. All over the world, a plethora of nationalities and former tribes are drawn into violent confrontation with the state as a result of decades of coercion by the central authorities which is largely illegitimate. The more recent the memories of suffering and horrors, the more acute the conflict seem to be, as ETA’s hold on the armed struggle shows. The principle of ‘retaliation’ as expressed in the theory of action/repression/action was the key one, which in practice remained constant for ETA throughout its long history of splits and mutations within the party itself. [15]

For the first time since the Civil War, political channels were open for the Basques to peacefully negotiate their legitimate rights. As explained above this dilemma was overcome by the emphasis on the continuation of the action/repression theory, which in return made the Spanish government respond to ETA attacks by anti-terrorist laws and police measures that reminded many Basques of some of the worst features of Francoism. [16] These anti-terrorist laws helped the survival of the perception of the state as a terrorist machine after the demise of the dictatorship but also kept ETA’s recruitment machine alive. Despite its external image as a “terrorist” organisation, ETA enjoyed significant popular support under Francoism (and indeed well until the 1980s.) in the Basque country. Most Basques felt more threatened by Spanish security forces than by ETA. Whereas ETA killed 6 people in the 12 months prior to Franco’s death, Spanish police and civil guards killed 22, and injured 105 a trend that continued well into the 1980s. [17] ETA was viewed in terms of “patriotic action”, rather than of (irrational) terrorism. [18] Basque nationalist parties alleged that repression continued unabated after Franco’s death. For instance, the anti-terrorist laws, some of which were later condemned as unconstitutional, resulted in arbitrary arrests and detentions. [19] Widespread opposition to the law was being expressed through popular demonstrations in several Spanish regions. Furthermore, the murder of Basque political exiles in France by the GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion) a self-styled ‘anti-terrorist’ commando group, provoked angry popular demonstrations, and revealed a political scandal. [20]

Instead of assisting and fighting for Basque rights (even the right to self-determination) through peaceful means, due to the reasons explained above, [21] ETA continued its violence and as Conversi explains:

“The intrinsic confrontational character of Basque mobilisations, a partial fulfilment of the ‘action/repression/action theory’ envisaged by ETA’s first theorists, has in many ways handicapped any peaceful solution of the conflict.” [22]

While ETA’s violent methods were the voice of the Basque people but also the voice of dissidence during the Franco years, with the transition to democracy, ETA’s violence almost resulted in the abrupt end of democracy with the attempted coup on February 23, 1981. [23] As democratic reforms progressed – and ETA violence increased – reactionary sectors of the armed forces grew more volatile. In addition to increasing skirmishes between ETA, the police and the army in the Basque country, between 1978 and 1982, five different plans for a coup d’etat against the democratic regime were uncovered. [24]

The 1988 inter-party agreement to condemn violence unreservedly and to marginalise those who refused to do so played a big role in the marginalisation of the support for ETA’s violence. Known as the Pact of Ajura Enea, it was signed by all significant players in Basque politics apart from ETA’s political wing HB (Herri Batasuna). HB has suffered steady erosion of its support, which reflects ETA’s political marginalisation. That is apparent also in another way. Ross, J. has argued that to a significant extent, support for HB is unconnected with regionalist sentiment. Instead, it comes from disoriented and disillusioned young people in a society particularly hard hit by social problems, who sympathise primarily with ETA’s anti-state violence. [25]

With the establishment of democracy in Spain, many formerly private and semi-clandestine initiatives passed into the public hands. The nationalist movement was formalised and became articulated in different political parties. As the political struggle became institutionalised, the civil society which was previously ETA’s only support, begun to lose its former role. [26] The advent of democracy and the arrival on the political scene of a greater number of political parties resulted in the emergence in the Basque Country of a political-party system similar to the one seen for so long in the Catalonia region. The Basques voted in favour of the Statue of Autonomy, which was negotiated on behalf of the Basque people by the PNV (‘Basque Nationalist Party’), and a majority of them chose the bourgeois nationalist parties over the revolutionary nationalist organisations in the electoral contests. The popular support for independence seemed to have diminished up to the present era and the legitimacy of ETA’s actions were questioned more seriously by its potential sources of support amongst the people of the Basque Country.

Conclusion

The right to self-determination and secession is one of the most controversial issues both in the European and the world political contexts. This is particularly the case since the division of political units concerns the nation-state, which is located in a strategically sensitive area in Europe. Since the attacks on the World Trade Centre in the United States on September the 11th, any attempt to achieve self-determination by violent means is doomed to face the label of terrorism. This current context is in contrast to the ongoing process of fragmentation as more independent States continue to emerge on the map of World Politics.

The emphasis on the preservation of the map of international relations and the view that the nation-state is the final political structure can be a flawed argument. Regionalism is one of the challenges to the Centralist thesis of the nation-state also both in the European and non-European contexts. It is important to put these two arguments, namely those of the nation-state as the ideal and ultimate political form as opposed to its further fragmentation, in a comparative perspective at a time when, as Harold Isaacs argues, ‘two thirds of the world has barely begun to emerge from pre-industrial era and before most of the world’s people could glean any advantages at all from industrialisation and modernisation’. [27]

In Europe the nation-state has become under heavy pressure both from above by the supranational organisation of the European Union and from below by the regional powers and separatist movements, such as ETA’s struggle for the Basque Country in Southern Europe. As Wallace puts it, ‘to a remarkable degree, the processes of government in Europe overlap and interlock: among different states, between different levels of governance below and above the old locus of sovereignty in the nation-state’. As a result of this, the continent where nationalism and the nation-state first emerged after the French Revolution is going through an historical process of devolution where the national States, regional sentiments, minority identities and ethnic-nationalisms aim to get the chance to bypass the traditional nation-state. Although this recent trend should not be exaggerated, it is encouraging at the same time as the Catalan case demonstrates.

The Basque citizens have gained a broad-ranging Autonomy Statute over the course of the recent decades and an unprecedented level of self-government not enjoyed by any other European region. At the same European level, the nation-states can show a greater understanding for the self-government of the regional identities for their autonomous development as a democratic-constitutional necessity against the political manifestations of separatist ethnic nationalism. The right for the preservation and representation of ethnic identity, culture and language is a democratic right, which should not be seen as a threat to the ‘unity’ of the nation-state. As this essay has demonstrated, the repression of ethnic nationalism without any consideration of these basic rights and freedoms helps its growth and mobilisation across the society.

The dilemma between Centralist repression and unlimited political freedom has been at the centre stage of ETA’s separatist campaign and the Spanish government’s response increasingly after the end of the oppressive Franco regime. Democratic transition has brought into question the legitimacy of the Basques’ armed struggle both in the eyes of the Spanish public and within the organisation itself. At the same time, for many within ETA, the transition represented an opportunity to use violence to force Madrid to concede Basque independence. It is perfectly possible for ethnic minorities to succeed in their language and identity revival and national survival within a democratic nation-state. The possibility of national co-existence and the possession of multiple-identities can help to overcome the challenge of regional separatism as long as the essential element of a strong democratic context and self-government gain the upper hand.

Footnotes:

1. Maries, J. (1990) Understanding Spain. San Juan: University of Puerto Rico Press. p. 413

2. Conversi, D. (1997) p. 141.

3. Clark, R. P. (1984) The Basque Insurgents. ETA, 1952-1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. p. 90

4. Conversi, D. (1997) p. 241. An ETA document produced in 1979 reveals to us the importance of the Basque language in defining the Basque identity: “Since the times of Machiavelli [language] is an extremely well-known political counsel, and one which works infallibly, that to kill a pueblo there is nothing more deadly than to kill its language. A pueblo which stops speaking its language is a pueblo which has died. A pueblo which changes its language for that of its neighbour, is a pueblo which changes its soul for that of its neighbour.” See, ETA (1979), Documentos, 18 vols. San Sebastian quoted in: MacClancy, J. ‘Bilingualism and Multinationalism in the Basque Country’ in: Mar-Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (Eds.) (1996) Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities. Oxford: Berg. p. 211.

5. Conversi, D. (1997).

6. Zirakzadeh, C. (1991) A rebellious people. Reno. University of Nevada Press. p. 143.

7. Jauregui, B. (1981) Ideologia y estrategia politica de ETA. Madrid Siglo XXI. Cited in: Medrano, J. D. (1995) Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia. London: Cornell University Press. p. 149.

8. Ibid. p. 149.

9. On internal killings within ETA see: States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1 program on ETA, dated December 1st 1993.

10. Clark, R. P. (1990) Negotiating with ETA. Reno. University of Nevada. p. 8-9.

11. See: Fanon, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin Books.

12. Conversi, D. (1997). p. 244.

13. It is important to keep in mind that, at its inception, ETA did not advocate violence as a method of achieving political change, but was forced onto this road by the tactics of the Franco regime and its gratuitous physical suppression of any visible symbol of Basque national identity. See: Moxon-Brown, E. (1989). Political Change in Spain. London: Routledge. p.52

14. Jauregui, B. G. (1981) Ideologia y estrategia politica de ETA. Analisis de su evolucion entre 1958 y 1968. Madrid: Siglo XXI. p.151. Quoted in: Conversi, D. (1997). p.240.

15. A survey carried out by Irvin, L. C. which shows the distribution of ideologues, radicals and politicos in Herri Batasuna by the period in which they became active, supports the argument that regime repression, unless extremely severe, serves as a stimulus rather then a brake on the general recruitment of activists into militant nationalist organisations. See: Irvin, L. C. (1999) Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. p.199-200.

16. Clark, R. P. (1984). p. 103-105, 252.

17. Sullivan, J. (1988). ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euzkadi, 1890-1986. London: Routledge. p. 94.

18. According to a poll conducted in 1979, over half the Basques surveyed thought that ETA militants were “patriots” or “idealists” and only 14 percent considered them “madmen” or “criminals”. See: Desfor Edles, L. (1998) Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.128.

19. Clark, R. P. (1991).

20. GAL, a death squad created to wage a dirty war against ETA resulted in a major scandal that damaged the credibility of the Spanish State and the democratic transition. While GAL’s ruthless killings of ETA leaders dealt a big blow to ETA, these acts at the same time helped ETA’s recruitment activities as GAL had shown a darker side of the Spanish State. The GAL scandal uncovered by El Mundo revealed that top leaders including the Minister of the Interior, Jose Barrionuevo, were allegedly directly involved and that GAL mercenaries were paid with public funds. The scandal grew as rumours suggested as many as nine of the GAL’s twenty-seven victims may have had nothing to do with terrorism. See: Woodworth, P. (2001) Dirty War Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy. Cork: Cork University Press. The issue is also extensively examined in: States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1 on 01 December 1993.

21. Besides, as a proof for total belief in violence to reach their aims, Spanish democracy is seen by ETA as a “sham bourgeois democracy” to be used as a tool but not as an aim as a matter of fact. The following extract reveals this: “It is necessary to participate in the legal framework of bourgeois democracy . . . However, . . . a revolutionary strategy cannot limit it self to this path . . . . . to fall into electoralism is to suppress political principles for the sake of securing a certain number of votes . . . . Experience teaches us that it is utopian to believe that in playing the game we will receive any real advantages; and little is it possible to use those institutions as a tribunal in which to denounce them because we are there.” See, ETA (Commandos Autonomous), internal discussion document (1979) p. 275. Also see Paddy Bolger, interview in IRIS, 7 (November 1983): 7. Cited in Irvin, L. C. (2001). p.6.

22. Ibid. p.158.

23. On 23 February 1981 a session of the Spanish parliament was interrupted by a group of Civil guards led by Colonel Antonio Tejero, who seized the assembly and held the MPs prisoner for more than a day. A providential intervention by the King prevented the attempted coup. This coup attempt had long-lasting and damaging implications for the young democracy and halted further democratic progress, especially in matters of regional devolution. See: Aguero, F. (1995) Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. London: Johns Hopkins University Press. p.161-180.

24. Gilmour, D. (1985) The Transformation of Spain. London: Quartet Books. p. 230.

25. Ross, J. C. (1997) Contemporary Spain: A Handbook. London: Arnold. p.93.

26. What happened to ETA is not very different from what happened to the PSUC in Catalonia, or the Spanish Communist Party. Despite their having led the opposition to Franco during the 1960 and 1970s, all of them were defeated in elections by more moderate parties. The fact that this happened reveals that the role of political capital and the logic of mobilisation in shaping political structures are constrained by socio-economic structural conditions, which in the end determine what is and what is not politically possible.

27. Isaacs, H. R. (1989). Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. p.215

28. Wallace, W. 1999. ‘The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox’, in Political Studies. Vol. 47. p.503.

Sources:

Aguero, F. (1995) Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Clark, R. P. (1990) Negotiating with ETA. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Clark, R. P. (1984) The Basque Insurgents. ETA, 1952 - 1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Desfor Edles, L. (1998) Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fanon, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin Books.

Gilmour, D. (1985) The Transformation of Spain. London: Quartet Books.

Heywood, P. (ed.) (1999) Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Irvin, L. C. (1999) Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Isaacs, H. R. (1989). Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Maries, J. (1990) Understanding Spain. San Juan: University of Puerto Rico Press.

Mar-Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (Eds.) (1996) Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities. Oxford: Berg.

Medrano, J. D. (1995) Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia. London: Cornell University Press.

Moxon-Brown, E. (1989). Political Change in Spain. London: Routledge.

Ross, J. C. (1997) Contemporary Spain: A Handbook. London: Arnold.

Sullivan, J. (1988). ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euzkadi, 1890-1986. London: Routledge.

Woodworth, P. (2001) Dirty War Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy. Cork: Cork University Press.

Zirakzadeh, C. (1991) A rebellious people. Reno. University of Nevada Press.

Wallace, W. 1999. ‘The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox’. Political Studies. Vol. 47.

States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1, 01/12/93.

The Basques will forever support the right to the self determination of the Kurdish people, no matter what the Turkish nor the Syrians nor the Iraqis nor the Iranians nor the Armenians have to say about it, citing their own constitutions and their laws.

This is the link to the first part.

.... ... .

The Kurds and The Basques

Here you have this interesting essay published by Kurdish Media:

Democratic Transition within the Spanish Constitutional Framework: The Case of the Basque Country

KurdishMedia.com - By Welat Lezgin
10/07/2002 00:00:00

There are many similarities between the opressed Basque and Kurdish ethnic-nationalisms. Both the Basque and the Kurdish issues are heavily influenced by the global changes and are trans-national. Although this essay concentrates specifically on the Basque question, Kurds can draw some useful conclusions from it.

However, there is one thing that should be kept in mind when reading this essay. The process of the erosion of the nation-state, and in paralell to that the rise of regionalism, which has been gaining pace in Europe, has not reached the states that control Kurdistan. The states that occupy Kurdish territories manage their Kurds with the same policies as Franco managed its Basque population during his ruthless reign. The biggest difference is that while the oppressive regime of Franco is long gone leaving his place to a vibrant Spanish civil and democratic society, unfortunately the Kurds are still heavily oppressed, probably by the most backward regimes this planet has ever seen.

Introduction

During the past decade we have witnessed intensifying ethnic conflicts, serious suffering and loss of lives from Bosnia, Kosovo and Kurdistan to Chechenya and beyond in many conflict areas around the world. As Anthony Smith argues, ‘it has become commonplace to recognise the 1990s as the decade of recrudescent ethno-nationalism’.[1] With the development of modernisation through industrialisation, liberal democracy, capitalist economy and universal literacy, nationalism emerged and nation-states were established in the 18th and 19th Century European politics as one of the historical consequences of the French Revolution. Later on, in the wider world through colonial expansion and incorporation, the extension of nationalism and the international system brought together various population groups within the same political units.

For some of these political units the historical progress has not been easy, however. In those countries both in Europe and beyond, where the state-building process has been problematic, the dominant or colonising ethno-nations either supplanted or absorbed the subordinate ethno-nations through a structural assimilation process. They created a system of exploitation by their exclusionist policies, forced assimilation and the denial of civil rights for the other nationalities. This oppression and inequality of citizenship rights contribute to the development of a collective political consciousness and ethno-nationalism by the subordinate ethno-national communities. The denial of identity and ethnic differences, as it happened during the Franco regime in Spain the consequences of which will be examined in detail here, create a political ground for the suppressed communities to seek their self-determination by ousting the foreign rulers and by trying to reshape the states’ despotic political structures, in the case of the Basque Country after the 1978 Spanish constitution for example.[2]

Some ethnic identities with their own distinctive cultures and identity feel on the verge of extinction and aim to save their political future. The regionalist movements can choose violent methods and carry out an armed struggle to establish a more independent political future for themselves, as it has happened in the case of the emergence and continuation of the ETA movement for the same example we study here. Even beyond this European context in the international world, ethnic violence and the regionalist autonomy movements created a system where the modern wars have become intra-, rather than inter-, state since the end of the Second World War.[3] Although it is hoped that the advent of a global culture will inspire peace, prosperity and a general lessening of conflicts, it is not easy to achieve this as a quick glance at the world map of ethnic conflicts would show.[4]

The Basque Autonomy and the 1978 Spanish Constitution

In relation to nationalism in Spain, as Conversi argued, and in parallel with the explanation we gave earlier about the reasons for ethnic conflict, modernity replaces the traditional markers of ethnicity through the subsequent processes of nationalism, namely state centralisation, assimilation of the local elites, and finally the mass migration.[5] In many other cases as well as in the Spanish context, this erosion of traditional societies has created difficult historical memories and caused the development of the aim of independence, despite the cultural assimilation attempts we referred to above. Taken together, these changes in the cultural and political life of the nations give rise to ethnic conflicts, further nationalist mobilisation and the separatist regional movements.[6]

Since we aim to examine the Basque case, we first need to look at the state response for the recognition of the Basque identity in detail here. We will specifically concentrate on the current Spanish Constitution and discuss the position of the minorities, and the Basques in particular. In this context, we will argue that support for secession and independence can diminish if there is a genuine democratic transformation, if the regional ethnic identity is well represented and an advanced level of self-government is allowed.

The landmark 1978 Spanish Constitution was the product of the consensus achieved between the main political parties, which arose out of the fall of the Franco regime. One of the important problems to tackle there was the issue of ethno-nationalism. It is not surprising, therefore, to see in the Constitution that nearly one-tenth of the text is specifically concerned with the regional issues.[7] Also, during the sixteen months of constitutional debates, the autonomy issue for the Basque country became by far the most controversial topic for the discussions.[8]

A key point in this constitutional discussion was the respect for regional languages and the provision for the public awareness of linguistic diversities in the country. The acceptance of this fact, as well as the formal State language, can be seen in the Article 3 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, which stipulates that:

“Castillian is the official language of the State. All Spaniards have a duty to know it and the right to use it. The other Spanish languages will also be official in their respective Autonomous Communities according to their own Statues. The richness of the distinct linguistic modalities of Spain represents a patrimony, which will be the object of special respect and protection.”

The Constitution also stipulated the national integrity of Span and it warned against any possible misinterpretations in this respect. According to the Article 2:

“The Constitution is based on the indivisible unity of the Spanish Nation, common and indivisible fatherland of all the Spaniards. It acknowledges and guarantees the right to Autonomy of the nationalities and regions, which form it and the solidarity among them.”[9]

An important note for the above stipulation of Article 2 can also be found in the Article 145 of the Constitution, which explains that no federation between Autonomous Communities can be permitted under any circumstances.[10] The most fundamental aspect of the Constitution was its acknowledgement of the existence of other ‘nationalities’ only within the boundaries of one and indivisible Spanish ‘nation’. The three other nationalities, not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, were Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. But the obvious difficulty was to extend decentralisation to most other regions and, using Conversi’s word, ‘relativising’ the potential impact of the Basque and Catalan autonomies.[11]

In one way or another, a balance had to be struck between the parties of the Right and the autonomist movement to overcome the fear that any reference to the nationalities of Spain and the preference of the Left for a federal-type solution represented a threat to the national unity. The need to obtain the support of the both sides generated endless discussions in the writing of the constitution and it contributed to the lack of precision and incoherence in some parts of the text, especially in the sections regarding the historical nationalities. Nevertheless, in the end of this process, and for the first time in the nation’s history, Spain would have a constitution which was not the consequence of the opposition of any significant political force against the others. No one agreed with the entire constitutional text, but almost no one felt it was absolutely unacceptable, either.[12] . More importantly, the fascist character of Spanish nationalism defended by Francoism was seriously questioned by the 1978 Constitution, which not only aimed at the transformation of Spain into a democratic state, but also admitted the existence of national minorities within its territory as a crucial part of this democratisation process.

Another positive point for the tolerance of the other ethnic groups was that at each stage of its approval large majorities supported the Constitution, which in the end created the belief that this was a Constitution ‘of all the people for all the people’. It is also important to note that when Spaniards went to the polls on 6 December 1978, the Constitution was approved by 87.8 percent of the voters. While the percentage of abstentions, 32 percent in Spain as a whole and 56 percent in parts of the Basque Country, gave the government and the major opposition parties some cause for concern, the Spanish people seemed to have voted convincingly to open a new democratic chapter in the country’s history.[13]

By emphasising the indissoluble unity of Spain, while recognising and guaranteeing the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions, the Constitution put forward a radically new model of the state, which rejected the Francoist centralism. But even more importantly, as we have seen earlier, the Article Two attempted to reconcile the two opposing conceptions of Spain, which were at stake during the Spanish Civil War. ‘Unity’ had to be preserved even though it was dramatically challenged by the recognition of the existence of ‘nationalities and regions’ within Spain. In this context, the reference to ‘the Spanish nation’ as the ‘common patria’ of all Spaniards seemed compatible with the existence of the other ‘little patrias’, such as Catalonia or the Basque Country.[14]

The Constitution also recognises and protects the right to ‘express and disseminate freely thoughts, ideas and opinions by word, in writing or any other means of reproduction’ (Article 20.1). In the following paragraph, the Article 20.2 forbids any form of prior censorship, something that was widely practised during the greater part of the Franco regime. Article 20.3, in a highly significant statement, ensures that the means of communication belonging to the state or other public entities shall be subject to parliamentary control and that access shall be guaranteed to all the social and political groups by ‘respecting the pluralism of society and the various languages of Spain’. On the right of assembly, which is another critical issue for the tolerance of ethno-nationalist differences, the Article 21.2 recognises the right of assembly provided that it is peaceful and it does not involve the use of violence. Assemblies in the public places and demonstrations require the permission of the authorities but can only be forbidden when there is a serious risk to public order or to the safety of the people and property.

Finally, on the right of association, the Article 22 recognises the right of association for all organisations, except for those whose objectives include activities declared to be of a criminal nature. Secret or paramilitary organisations are also banned in the same provision, which has particular relevance to political parties and workers’ organisations and trade unions. Over the last century the groups in Spain, as well as in other European countries, have waged an often one-sided battle to have these political and economic rights recognised. This development in Spanish history was also significant since it came after forty years of illegality for any organisation which did not conform in its aims and ideology to the narrow views of Franco’s National Movement.[15]

Overall, the 1978 Constitution rejects exclusive nationalism, whether it is the Spanish nationalism to the exclusion of the other group rights, or peripheral nationalism which rejects the State sovereignty with the probable inclusion of the other communities against the Central State nationalism on the basis of their claim to difference. But all the seventeen autonomous communities are now subject not only to the Constitution but also their own statues of autonomy, which govern all aspects of political life at regional level. In effect, they constitute regional constitutions. At the simplest level, a statue enables a region to organise its own institutions of self-government and establish the parameters of its own particular relationship with the central authorities.

It is interesting to note that, although these statues have many features in common, because each is the result of a long process of political negotiation, they all have individual features which reflect their own special relationship with Madrid. The Basque Statue, enshrines the restoration of the economic agreements, involving certain tax-raising privileges, while the Catalan Statute grants the region considerable freedom in matters related to education, culture and language. In common with the federal systems, with which the structure of the state had so much in common, the autonomous communities were granted the right of legislation and to execute and administer the laws through their provincial delegations. With this establishment of Autonomous Communities, the Basque and the Catalan regions also received the right to establish autonomous education systems, separate police forces and independent television networks. Additionally, the Basque and Catalan languages gained an official status alongside the Castillian in their own regions.[16]

These steps were taken to ensure a smooth democratic transition for all the peoples of Spain after the Second World War and its aftermath. However, given the expectations surrounding this programme of regionalism amongst the historic nationalities, and the economic climate for any territorial settlement in the 1970s and 1980s, it became inevitable that the reforms would fail to satisfy all the national and regional interest groups in the Spanish territory. The process of devolution has often been muddled and indecisive, although by the late 1980s major reforms had been implemented. Overall, this historic decentralisation process was probably unparalleled in terms of speed and scale elsewhere in the Western Europe.

Authentic autonomy also required the control of the financial resources. Article 156 of the Constitution recognised the right of the autonomous communities to financial autonomy, which is guaranteed in the Statues of Autonomy. The regional governments have been granted considerable freedom in spending and drawing up their own budgets, but were also subjected to strict limitations for levying their own taxes (or to share the taxes levied by the state). Over the past decade (in the 1990s), the regional governments had to take responsibility for increasingly large budgets and they managed substantial human, material and financial resources.[17]

On the issue of funds, while fifteen of the autonomous communities rely largely on the state to transfer funds in their direction, the Basque Country and Navarre enjoy the benefits of their historic rights (fueros). The Basque populated provinces (Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya) and the single province of Navarre, have the right to levy and collect all taxes, except for the custom duties and the taxes on petroleum products and tobacco. Furthermore, with respect to public security, Article 149 allowed fully autonomous regions to create their own regional police forces. The first region to take advantage of this was the Basque Country, which in 1980 created its own force, the Ertzaintza.

As it is seen in the examination above, the modern Spanish State has become highly de-centralised and extensive powers have been devolved to the regions, especially the Catalan and Basque regions due to their historical background and the level of ethnic consciousness. What we will be examining and discussing now is the development of Basque separatism and its continuation despite the democratic transition and the devolved powers for the region. What we are aiming to understand is how the democratic change has undermined the support for separatism and the armed struggle. We will also aim to explain why, despite the extensive devolution of power from the core to the peripheries, the radical Basque separatist organisation ETA (‘Basque Homeland and Freedom’) has been persistent in pursuing the political aim of creating an independent Basque Country by violent means.

Notes

Smith, A. 1999. ‘Ethnic election and national destiny: some religious origins of nationalist ideal’, Nations and Nationalism 5 (3), p.331-55. Ignatieff takes this further by arguing that ‘the key language of our age is ethnic-nationalism’. Ignatieff, M. (1994) Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Millennium. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. p. 5.

2 Smith, A. (1991) National Identity. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press.

3 This was pointed out by Wilson, R. ‘The politics of contemporary ethno-nationalist conflicts’, in Nations and Nationalism. 7 (3), 2001, p.368. The role of the state oppression is also important here as it helps to radicalise the movement of that specific identity.

4 For a general, global overview of ethnic conflicts, see Gurr, T. R. (1993). Minorities at Risk: A global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington. DC. United States Institute of Peace Press.

5 See the analysis in Conversi, D. (1997) The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation. London: Hurst & Company. p. 257.

6 The role of the nationalist elites has been to use such ‘slumbering’ human material and raise a set of popular myths and perceptions in the process. On this significance of the intellectuals for the nationalist interpretation of ethnic origins of nations, see Smith, A. (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations. London: Basil Blackwell.

7 The Spanish Constitution can be found online at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/sp00t___.html (the English translation) and at http://constitucion.rediris.es/CodigoConst/Codigo.html(the Spanish original).

8 Heywood, P. (1995). The Government and Politics of Spain: Comparative Government and Politics. London: Macmillan Press. p.143.

9 This basic principle is developed in detail in Section VIII of the Constitution entitled ‘The Territorial Organisation of the State’. Article 13.1 spells out this territorial integrity when the establishment of the self-governing regions becomes an issue: “Exercising the right to autonomy recognised in article 2 of the Constitution, adjoining provinces with common historical, cultural and economic characteristics, the islands and the provinces with a historical regional identity will be able to accede to self-government and form autonomous communities in accordance with the provisions of this section of the Constitution and of their respective statues.”

10 The aim of this article was to prevent the possibility of unification between the regions themselves. For example, the pan-Catalanism made reference to the importance of Valencia and the Balearic Islands, while the question of Navarre began to fuel nationalism in the Basque Country. (Conversi, p.144)

11 Conversi, D. (1997). p.144. There are now seventeen ‘Autonomous Communities’ on the official map, some entirely invented. Thus the modern Spanish State has become one of the most decentralised countries in Europe, as argued by Colomer, M. J. (1999), p.40

12 This was observed by Colomer, M. J. (1999). ‘The Spanish State of Autonomies: Non-Institutional Federalism’ in Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain. (Ed.) Paul Heywood. London: Frank Cass Publishers, p. 41 in particular. As Carr and Fusi put it at the time, this was the first Spanish constitution which was a result of ‘neither the unilateral imposition of a particular party nor the expression of a single ideology’. Carr, R. and Fusi, P. (1979) Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy. London: George Allen. p. 244.

13 The Basque nationalists urged their electorate to abstain from the constitutional referendum, arguing that the pre-existence of the Basque rights or fueros had not been clearly recognised. Michael T. Newton and Peter J. Donaghy (1997) Institutions of Modern Spain: A political and Economic Guide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 15-16.

14 Smith, G. (1995) ‘Federation: The multiethnic challenge’, in Montserrat Guibernau, Spain: Federation in the making? London: Longman.

15 Newton, T. M with Donaghy J. P. (1997) Institutions of Modern Spain: A political and Economic Guide. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 22.

16 These measures were particularly important in meeting the demands of the Catalans cultural autonomy. Del Rion, J. and Williams, A. (1999). ‘Regionalism in Iberia’ in Regionalism in the European Union. Peter Wagstaff (ed.) Exeter: Intellect. p. 179.

17 ibid. p.130.

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Heywood, P. (1995). The Government and Politics of Spain: Comparative Government and Politics. London: Macmillan Press.

Heywood, P. (ed.) (1999) Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

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Journals

Smith, A. 1999. ‘Ethnic election and national destiny: some religious origins of nationalist ideal’, Nations and Nationalism 5 (3).

Wallace, W. 1999. ‘The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox’. Political Studies. Vol. 47.

Wilson, R. ‘The politics of contemporary ethno-nationalist conflicts’. Nations and Nationalism. 7 (3), 2001

Other sources

Documentaries:

States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1, 01/12/93.

Internet:

http://constitucion.rediris.es/CodigoConst/Codigo.html

http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/sp00t.html

Is obvious that things are so bad for the Kurdish that when it comes to sovereignty, the crumbles that Spain has given to Euskal Herria seem like gold bars to them.

.... ... .