Wednesday, October 30, 2002

Spain's Fears

Here you have another Press Release by the Celtic League in support of the Basques' right to self determination:

SPAIN FEARS 'FREE STATE' OPTION FOR BASQUES

Spain's meddling in the Basque country has once again come unstuck with an overwhelming two thirds of the countries people indicating support for a plan by Basque premier, Jose Ibarretexe, to hold a referendum calling for a new constitutional status (A Free State) within a year.

The move by Ibarretexe is designed to offer an alternative to the hard-line stance by the Madrid government in the face of increased military actions by ETA.

The leader of the moderate PNV nationalist party is attempting to kick-start a peace process which might encourage more radical nationalists to call a cease-fire and embrace more fully the constitutional role.

Despite opposition from Madrid it seems that an overwhelming body of people in the Basque 'Region' favour the referendum and believe Madrid should abide by its outcome. Even the radical political party, Batasuna, whose members are currently being persecuted by the Spanish government and which faces a ban supports the referendum road.

The Celtic League has repeatedly called on Spain and the EU to allow the Basque people to decide their own future and this referendum could initiate that process. However, we are deeply sceptical that the Spanish government will respect the democratic wish of the Basque people and the coming months will probably see provocative actions by Spain in an attempt to derail the new consensus for peace.

Bernard Moffatt
Secretary General
Celtic League
29/10/02

The Celtic League has branches in the six Celtic Countries. It works to promote cooperation between these countries and campaigns on a broad range of political, cultural and environmental matters. It focuses on human rights abuse and civil liberty issues and also monitors the impact of military activity.


The Spaniards are fearful to let go of their genocidal and colonialist past. They are afraid the international community will finally figure out that Spain is today a totalitarian state just like in Francisco Franco's times.

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Tuesday, October 29, 2002

Basques Support Referendum

Here you have an update from The Guardian regarding Ibarretxe's proposal:

Basques back poll on free state

Giles Tremlett in Madrid

Monday October 28, 2002
The Guardian

The Spanish prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar, has suffered a blow to his attempt to prevent the Basque country voting on whether it should become "a freely associated state" by an opinion poll finding that two-thirds of the region's people support the planned referendum.

The Basque premier, Juan Jose Ibarretexe, of the Basque Nationalist Party, has said he plans to hold a referendum within a year.

The poll showed that four out of five Basques believe the Madrid government should respect whatever decision is made in the referendum. But a similar number said that they preferred that any new arrangement between the Basque country and Spain should to be agreed by them both.

A significant number were alarmed by Mr Ibarretxe's proposal. Critics have suggested say that his plan will lead to discrimination against people who have moved to the Basque country from other parts of Spain. One in five Basques said Mr Ibarretxe's plan made them "scared".

Support for the plan was not as enthusiastic as Mr Ibarretxe might have liked. Only 43% said they were "excited" by his the proposals, which are seen as a way of ending attempt to end more than 30 years of separatist violence by Eta, which has claimed 800 lives.

Fifty-two percent said that they should be allowed to have joint Spanish and Basque nationality, while 28% percent were opposed to the idea.

Nine out of 10 Basques felt that Eta should call a ceasefire first, if there was to be a referendum. Four fifths of supportingers of the radical separatist Batasuna party, which is in the process of being banned for supporting Eta - agreed that a ceasefire would be necessary.

The poll was criticised by Mr Aznar's People's party, which has accused Mr Ibarretxe of bowing to Eta's demands for independence.


I wonder if Giles will ever mention the thousands of Basques murdered by Spain.

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Monday, October 28, 2002

Book About DNA

One of the many lies you often hear about Basque nationalism is that it is a racist movement, Nothing farther from the truth. The modern Basque nationalism is built upon the right of a people to its self determination. A broader description of nation tells us that they are formed by a group of people with similar geographic, cultural, historic, religious and linguistic background. The ethnic composite may play a roll in some places, but not in the Basque Country, let us remember that the Basques call themselves "euskaldunak", the "Euskara speakers"... Euskara being the Basque language.

This is why I present to you this article from the Taipei Times:

Following DNA's footprints makes for a fascinating journey

Racial purity gets little encouragement in a book that sees humanity for all its diversity, as deriving from a primordial Eve

By Bradley Winterton
CONTRIBUTING REPORTER

Sunday, Oct 27, 2002, Page 18

Written history relates exactly how people of European ancestry came to be living in Australia or North America. But how did the Chinese come to be in China, the Indians in India, and the Australian Aborigines in Australia? This fascinating book, by deducing ancient human migration patterns from a study of the DNA of present populations, offers new answers to these old questions.

For over century, ethnographers seeking to understand the histories of different human groups relied on the evidence of old bones and pottery, together with what was shown by language. But for the last 20 years a molecular study of living people has provided a different kind of evidence. Central to such research are what are called "markers" in the Y-chromosomes carried by all males. These are mutations that have occurred at a particular point in time in a single male individual, and are subsequently passed down from father to son. They have been numbered, and a discussion of the significance of the M45, the M175 and so on, all nowadays very extensive, is at the heart of this intriguing book.

It was demonstrated a decade ago by the same means that, astonishing as it may seem, all human beings descend from a single woman, a primordial "Eve," who lived in Africa around 150,000 years ago. Now it is possible to trace the histories of the various human subgroups, and so piece together an understanding of when they migrated from Africa to where their core populations are still found today.

This line of research demonstrates, for instance, that Australia's Aborigines arrived in Australia along a route following the coast of southern Asia 60,000 years ago, long before the present inhabitants of most of Asia got to where they are.

The population of modern Europe, too, can be shown to have arrived, not by a seemingly direct route from Africa via the Middle East, but from Central Asia, and at a comparatively recent date.

The Chinese are shown to have almost certainly arrived in China in two streams, one north of the Himalayas, the other south. Chromosome marker differences can still be detected that separate many inhabitants of northern China from their southern counterparts.

As for the Native American populations, north and south of the equator, it's likely these arrived, crossing from Siberia to Alaska, in two waves. The first penetrated to the south, while the second was content to remain in the north. But neither population is likely to have been in the Americas longer than 15,000 years. And it is quite possible they all descend from a few dozen, or at most one or two hundred, founding individuals.

Many other things are demonstrated by this research. The successful extraction in 1997 of DNA sequences from Neanderthal remains, for instance, proves beyond doubt that this was a separate species from modern man. The claim that Europeans evolved separately, from part-Neanderthal ancestors, is here finally put to rest.

With regard to Europeans, the key marker here is the M137, dated as originating around 30,000 years ago. It is found with exceptional frequency in modern Irish and Basque populations, suggesting the earliest migrants moved, or were later pushed, furthest west.

Nineteenth century studies in language confirm this. Basque, for example, is unrelated to any other European language.

Ideas of "racial purity" get no encouragement from this book. Our common origin is in fact one of its central themes. But such ideas have a long history, and the Nazis were not the only people to embrace them. There was a strong push in 20th century China, for example, both Republican and Communist, to claim a specific Chinese racial identity and history. Rather than descending from African forebears, the Chinese, it was argued, may have evolved on their own direct from Homo Erectus, an earlier hominid whose remains have been found not far from Beijing.

This claim is entirely dismissed by DNA research. The Chinese are no more descended from a regional forebearer than Europeans are descended from a Neanderthal one. We all derive from ancestors who left Africa 10, 20, 40 or 50 thousand years ago.

These minute DNA variations are of outstanding value in the search for mankind's origins, but they have a dark side too. They mean, at least in theory, that DNA-specific biological weapons could be developed, fine-tuned to affect only people of a specific ethnicity. There is some evidence that this terrifying prospect may be only just round the corner.

In one current conflict zone such a weapon would be difficult to perfect, however. The DNA patterns of Arabs and the majority of Israelis are so close that researchers, however fiendish, would be hard pressed to target the other grouping exclusively.

As usual, there are some things to be said on one side and some things on the other. The way many nations see ethnic diversity as an impediment to unity, for example, can be deplored. Villagers are relocated, the language of the majority becomes compulsory in schools, and before long the young from these minorities actually feel embarrassed to admit to their heritage. This is a route on which minority cultures die, and with them all identifiable traces of humanity's diverse origins.

On the other hand, the ethnic mix that is already a feature of urban centers, and that the modern ease of mobility is certain to make more common, rather than being seen as lamentable (as exponents of racial purity would have it) can be viewed as highly desirable. Biological weapons targeted at a specific racial group could only be feasible when the ethnic groupings are separate and distinct. Inter-breeding of ethnicities makes biological weapons aimed at specific groups outdated before they are even a reality.

Such areas of thought, however, are not this book's main preoccupation. Human brotherhood is what it primarily demonstrates. Racial hatred, let alone inter-racial war, is something a contemplation of its contents ought to consign to the garbage collector's wagon.

The book is magnificently illustrated with photographs by Mark Read. What makes his pictures so special is that, rather than being of "tribal" peoples in the way we have become accustomed to in works of ethnography, they are of modern men -- in baseball caps worn back-to-front, broad-brimmed outback hats, or knitted rasta scull-caps. This makes the book's central statements as to who we are and where we came from even more relevant than, to anyone who thinks about it, they are already.

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Saturday, October 26, 2002

Living La Busy Life

Oops!

Sorry I have been way too busy to blog, but don't worry, I will get back to it as soon as I can.

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Thursday, October 24, 2002

Catalunya Joins Call for Self Determination

This note comes to us via The Guardian:

Catalonia echoes Basque call for autonomy

Giles Tremlett in Madrid

Wednesday October 23, 2002
The Guardian

Spain entered a new and potentially critical phase of tension yesterday as Catalonia added its voice to demands from the Basque country for a fresh round of regional referendums over greater autonomy from Madrid.

The demands made in a historic speech by the new leader of Catalonia's ruling nationalists, Artur Mas, added pressure for an extensive rewrite of the rules that have governed Spain since the transition to democracy 25 years ago.

Mr Mas, who succeeds the Catalan regional premier Jordi Pujol as head of the nationalist Convergence and Union coalition, echoed demands from the Basque regional premier, Juan Jose Ibarretxe, when he called for "shared sovereignty" in Catalonia.

His proposals, which will form the backbone of the coalition's manifesto in regional polls next year, were a departure for the dominant party in Catalonia, going far beyond the sort of devolution experienced by Scotland and Wales.

Mr Mas called for a "single administration" in a Catalonia controlled by a regional government that would send its own representatives to the EU and other international bodies and would have the final word on the region's public finances.

Catalonia would also have to be formally recognised by the rest of Spain as "a nation", he said.

The demands were immediately criticised by the centre-right People's party government of prime minister Jose Maria Aznar.

"This is not a priority for Catalonia or for any other part of Spain," the deputy prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, said yesterday.

Mr Aznar's government, which has mounted a vigorous campaign against the Basque proposals for a referendum on self-determination, has suddenly found itself forced to fight on several fronts to maintain its centrist vision of Spain.

Mr Ibarretxe, meanwhile, held a long meeting with Arnaldo Otegi, head of the radical Basque separatist party Batasuna, a political ally of the armed separatist group Eta.

Although Batasuna has had its offices closed and bank accounts frozen while it is investigated for alleged collaboration with Eta - and while Mr Aznar's government prepares a separate court prosecution designed to ban it definitively - Mr Ibarretxe spent three hours discussing his controversial plan with Mr Otegi. These were deemed insufficient by Mr Otegi - once called "the Basque Gerry Adams".

"They are not enough to resolve the conflict," he said after the meeting.

Mr Ibarretxe has said that he would not call a referendum on the future of the Basque country unless Eta first gave up a 30-year campaign of violence - which has claimed 800 lives. Opponents call his proposals anti-constitutional.

Mr Mas' proposals were not quite as radical as those of Mr Ibarretxe and his non-violent Basque Nationalist party.

He called on the People's party and the opposition Socialists to negotiate with him a new statute that would replace the one which gave Catalonia semi-autonomy in 1979.

He held out the promise that, if Catalonia was given far greater autonomy then Convergence would also take up an invitation from Mr Aznar to join his central Spanish government in Madrid. But he also warned that his party would make life difficult for Mr Aznar if he did not play ball.

Catalonia's regional government already controls vast swathes of public administration, including education, health, culture and much policing.

Convergence and Union has won every Catalan election since 1980, allowing Mr Pujol to run the region for the past 22 years.

But Mr Mas faces a difficult battle against Barcelona's former Socialist mayor, Pascual Maragall, in the next regional elections - the first in which Mr Pujol will not stand.

Please take note of how the author of the article spouses Aznar's position regarding Batasuna, someone said long ago that journalists were supposed to be objective and unbiased.

.... ... .

Wednesday, October 23, 2002

Erreala and Athletic : Ups and Downs

This article published at ESPN describes the current situation with two of Euskal Herrias football teams, Real Sociedad de San Sebastian and Athletic de Bilbao:

Basque ups and downs

By Phil Ball

Tuesday, October 22, 2002

Interesting to see Real Sociedad back at the top of the Spanish First Division after three angst-ridden seasons in its nether regions.

No-one was expecting this sudden turn-about of fortunes, least of all the club itself, accused a couple of years ago by ex-national manager Javier Clemente as 'lacking guts' and being 'natural pessimists'.

Clemente, now spending his days on the golf course, was controversially employed by the club three seasons ago when they sacked the German Bernd Krauss. Clemente made his name first as player and then as manager of Basque cousins Athletic Bilbao in the 1980s, and steered them to their last league title in 1984 - the last time that a Basque side won the Spanish championship.

Bilbao is the largest and most industrialised of the Basque cities and is in the Vizcayan region, whereas Real Sociedad hail from the more service-oriented region of Gipuzcoa. When Clemente was handed a contract by Real Sociedad, there was much muttering abroad, most of it concerning the signing of 'an enemy'.

The facile idea that the Basque Country is some sort of culturally homogenous homeland was nicely exposed by the suspicion of Sociedad's supporters towards the pugnacious little Clemente, and he only lasted just over a season. His cat-and-dog relationship with the Gipuzcoan press culminated in his accusation that the region was 'pessimistic' and cynical, whereas Vizcaya was more 'alegre' (happy) and forward-looking.

Fast forward to October 2002 and the nail-biting has shifted firmly from San Sebastian to Bilbao. Athletic, so keen on promoting themselves as the region's major club, find themselves down near the bottom of the table, surrounded by cousins Alavés and Osasuna, with Sociedad threatening to disappear over the horizon.

Of course, it's early days yet, and Raynald Denoueix's team will have to tighten up at the back if they seriously wish to aspire for the title, but it's strange the difference that a few summer months can make.

Three weeks ago, Jupp Heynckes, Bilbao's German manager in his second spell with the club, lost his temper with the local press after they complained of his tactical 'anarchy', responding with the unfortunate claim that he was a 'luxury' for the club, adding that they should appreciate the fact that they had such a distinguished manager at the helm.

He was forced to apologise three days later after the furore that his words caused, and he may yet live to regret his faux pas if the results continue to be poor.

Folks from Bilbao are famous for their special sense of identity and their often misplaced and overweening self-confidence - but the rest of Spain has a grudging sort of affection for them, especially Spanish football historians who know that the club was the country's dominant force up the Civil War in 1936.

Times have changed, but the club still regard themselves as special. The fact that Heynckes won a European Cup as manager of Real Madrid did not give him the right to patronise such an historically great club, and there remains a feeling that he will never be forgiven for his misjudgement.

The whole scene in the Basque Country is as fascinating as it is complex, and woe betide the visiting journalist who thinks he or she can get a quick-fix conclusion from a few day's analysis.

This season's major theme so far, apart from Sociedad's great start and Bilbao's internal doldrums, was the signing by the current leaders of Boris, a young Spanish defender from Oviedo.

Sociedad broke ranks with Bilbao back in the late 1980's when they signed John Aldridge from Liverpool, effectively closing the door on their own Basque-only policy. Since then, foreign players have arrived (and left) in cartloads, whilst Athletic Bilbao have doggedly pursued their century-old practice of only employing the sons of the region's fertile soil.

But the signing of Boris by Real is the first time that they have taken on a 'Spanish' player - foreign signings having been previously regarded as less politically awkward. A straw-poll amongst supporters last week revealed that only 7 per cent of the club's supporters were 'preoccupied' by the signing, but when you're top of Europe's best league, you can afford to be a bit more tolerant.

Boris made his debut as a first-choice defender in this weekend's 2-2 draw in the derby with Alavés, and the event seemed to pass by almost unnoticed. This comes as something of a relief, since the club's policy in the past has smacked of xenophobia towards Spain, as if the country's players were somehow racially and culturally unworthy of representing a Basque institution.

It's an awkward little issue, and one that has attracted occasional sideways glances at Bilbao's exclusionary policy which at first sight looks even more radical. Foreign managers like Heynckes and Howard Kendall have always been part of the scene, but the players have been Basque since time immemorial.

It looks like a cute piece of cultural heroism, standing firm and alone as the howling winds of European federalism and multi-ethnicity blow all around, but it rather depends which side of the fence you're standing.

And when things start to go wrong at the 'Cathedral' - as Athletic's San Mamés ground has always been nicknamed, the club always seem to want to have it both ways.

Heynckes, a few days before his infamous 'luxury' speech, claimed that the team's bad start was a reflection of the fact that the club had an inadequate playing staff, limited as it was by the Basque-only policy. 'If Barcelona only had Catalans playing, ask yourself where they would be in the league' he protested.

This was a fair point, but ultimately an irrelevant one. Barcelona's claim to being the flagship of Catalan culture has a slightly hollow ring to it nowadays, but Athletic cannot slap themselves on the back when times are good, then complain about the slings and arrows when things go awry.

Their own often patronising attitude towards Real Sociedad's signing of foreigners ignores the fact that it was their own poaching of the all the best Basque talent that forced their cousins to open up the ethnic doors in the first place.

Complicated indeed - but to return to a purely football-based observation, Athletic's permanent presence in the top flight since La Liga was inaugurated in 1929 is nothing short of a miracle, and political correctness should never be allowed to detract from this fact.

Real Sociedad's great start has also had the papers singing their praises, several of them pointing to the fact that it is 21 years since they led the league table by one point or more - the very season (1981-82) when they won their second consecutive title.

They've scored 17 goals in 6 games, and seem to have discovered a new star in the speedy little Turkish forward Nihat, a player whom Toshack brought over from Besiktas last season. The Welshman was sacked soon after, but his eye for a player has proved as unerring as ever, and the Turk is attracting all sorts of plaudits.

# Elsewhere, the big boys were falling like flies. Barcelona, Celta, Deportivo and Real Madrid all lost games that they were expected to win - if such a phrase is really valid these days, and Madrid's defeat at Santander was particularly interesting, given that the home side's second goal was scored by local hero Pedro Munitis, currently loaned out by the team that he sunk.

Not only is he on loan from Madrid but they are also stumping up 70 per cent of his wages. There was some controversy during the week prior to the game, since there was no written agreement that Munitis would not turn out against his official employers - a legal loophole that Santander decided to exploit.

Madrid, as far as is known, did not object, and since Munitis was up for it (he claims that he was cold-shouldered by the club last season) they wrote him onto the teamsheet. Inevitably, he scored, and should Madrid lose the title by three points this season, little Munitis is unlikely to be returning to the capital in a hurry.

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Friday, October 18, 2002

To Sue Garzon

The BBC published this article about the decision by the government of the Basque Autonomous Community to sue Baltasar Garzon for his ban an Batasuna, here you have it:

Thursday, 17 October, 2002, 17:41 GMT 18:41 UK

Basques sue Spanish judge

The government in Spain's autonomous Basque region is suing the country's leading judge, Baltasar Garzon, over his ban on the radical separatist party, Batasuna.

A spokesman for the governing Nationalist Basque Party (PNV) said Mr Garzon, a prominent Supreme Court magistrate, had encroached on the competence of the Basque authorities and violated the right to freedom of assembly.

The widely trailed move follows Judge Garzon's decision to suspend Batasuna over its alleged links to the Basque guerrilla group, ETA.

The PNV also said the judge had lost all sense of balance when he announced he was investigating ETA for alleged ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

The Spanish authorities, who have imposed a separate ban on Batasuna, have accused the PNV of colluding with terrorists.

The Basque Government said last month it would sue Judge Garzon after he slapped a three-year ban on Batasuna, which the Spanish Government says is the political wing of the armed ETA group, and prohibited all subsequent protests against his ruling.

A Basque government spokesman last month called the decision unjust and excessive, saying it "incriminated the majority of the Basque population".

'Ethnic cleansing'

In a writ issued on Thursday, Judge Garzon alleged that Batasuna was also involved in low-level ethnic cleansing by driving non-nationalists from the Basque country.

He alleges that their aim is to ensure a vote in favour of independence should the region hold a referendum.

This so-called purification of a society would, in his view, constitute a crime against humanity under international law.

The judge has asked the Spanish and Basque authorities for a list of those professionals, policemen and journalists who have left the Basque country because of violence and intimidation by ETA.

The Spanish El Mundo newspaper, close to the government in Madrid, criticised the writ, saying: "Garzon anticipates the conclusions of his inquiry, then looks for arguments to corroborate them."

However, Spanish Vice-President Mariano Rajoy welcomed Judge Garzon's order as a suitable response to alleged human rights violations in the Basque province.

The launch of this inquiry underlines Baltasar Garzon's determination to see a final end both to Batasuna and to ETA, says BBC Madrid correspondent Clare Marshall.

You would think that a high profile judge like Baltasar Garzon would know what "ethnic cleansing" means, after all, he allegedly went to school.

This is the definition of "ethnic cleansing":

Ethnic cleansing is a euphemism referring to the persecution through imprisonment, expulsion, or killing of members of an ethnic minority by a majority to achieve ethnic homogeneity in majority-controlled territory. It is sometimes used interchangeably with the more connotatively severe term genocide.


In this case the ethnic majority are the Spaniards, Garzon belongs to it. The ethnic minority are the Basques who have been enduring a genocidal occupation of their land since 1512.

So he understands, "ethnic cleansing" is what Spain did on 1937 when it ordered the carpet bombing of the towns of Durango and Gernika.

What Francisco Franco did in the southern portion of Euskal Herria from 1936 up to 1975 is also considered "ethnic cleansing".

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Tuesday, October 15, 2002

A Basque Pilot in Estonia

This information comes to us thanks to Basque Diaspora:

Benito Agirre, the pilot that never was

It happens that there is a Basque plane pilot buried in a town in Estonia, and there is a street named after him in that town. But the grave and the street bear a false name. There was never a pilot named so... but, yes, there was a true Basque pilot buried there, just that he was named otherwise... He was a young man, named Inazio Agirregoikoa. He was a natural of my hometown, Eibar, and he died at the age of 21 fighting the nazis as a pilot of the Soviet Red Army.

This is his story. The story of a son of the Basque diaspora buried in the most unexpected of places...

---

It happens that I have a friend in Estonia. A country in the Baltic, independent from the USSR since 1991. This man, Peeter Päll, is a linguist and works in the division of placenames of the Estonian Language Institute, sort of official academy there.

He is an expert in the field, and has a degree of official responsabilities also. Many issues about what should or should not be the official placename of Estonian places come to his desk and he investigates and informs authorities about those issues.

One day, he came to me with an interesting query. There was a Spanish pilot buried in a town in eastern Estonia, in the town of Mustvee, and he had a street named after him. The name of the street was in a cyrillic and russian form, and due to law changes, it had to be officially converted to the latin alphabet. My friend Peeter suspected that the "spanish" name sounded Basque, and consulted me about if that was true, and, if that was the case, which could the correct spelling in a latin alphabet form be.

It seemed that the man buried was named Benito Aguirre or Ignacio Benito Aguirre. As it was written in Russian, a direct Russian --> Estonian transliteration would have given Benito Agirre. My friend wanted to know which could be the best form to recommend for the street, Benito Agirre or Benito Aguirre. I told my friend that, being Agirre a Basque name, spelled as Agirre would be more correct. However, I promised to investigate to find out who Ignacio Benito Aguirre was, if he was Basque or not, whatever I could find...

In the meantime, in November 1999, the story of Benito Agirre and his street appeared at a Estonian newspaper, the Postimees. It is still online.

As it is told in that article, this was a fighter pilot of Spanish origin recruited by the Red Army and based in Gdov (on the other side of the Lake Peipsi) who returned from a mission on 9 March 1944 and was shot down near Mustvee.

As he was chased by the local police (Estonia was then occupied by Germany) he shot himself and was buried on the Mustvee cemetery. In 1965 a local school activist rediscovered the story and proposed that his name be remembered by giving it to a new street in Mustvee. So it was done and it is still there, puzzling some of the local inhabitants.

By the way, this article brought also an angry response from another reader who reminded that just on 9 March, 1944 there had been a terrible bombing of Tallinn during which a third of the city was destroyed by the Soviet air force. But we do not know if Agirre had taken part in it.

The story caught my attention, and as I had promised to search for the identity of that Benito Agirre, I did so.

The search produced no results. I contacted the association of Veterans of Spanish refugees gone to the Soviet Union and there was no Benito Aguirre, neither Ignacio Benito Aguirre in the archives or people lists. Yet, it must be that name that the pilot must have at his grave, as it is the one given in the Mustvee street...

So, who was Benito Agirre?

As a matter of fact. There was never a Benito Agirre in Estonia. The man buried in Mustvee is Inazio Agirregoikoa. Full name in spanish spelling: Ignacio Aguirregoicoa Benito, being Benito the 2nd family name.

I searched some books and bibliography and finnally found the correct reference in a rather suspicious edition, a neofascist looking spanish book:

- Españoles en la II. Guerra Mundial, El Frente del Este - editor, Ricardo Recio Cardona; Ediciones Vandalia, Madrid, 1999 (ISBN 84-930581-0-6). - (Spaniards in
World War II, The Eastern Front)

The book lists a list of Spanish soldiers dead in the ranks of the Red Army during the war. And there he is, Ignacio Aguirregoicoa Benito, born in Eibar in 1923 and dead in Tallinn (sic) in 1944.

So, he was a natural of my hometown, Eibar. The book also mentions that he was part of the first pilot crew formed with spanish pilots. Other basques were with him at the crew, as for instance, another natural of Eibar, Jose Luis Larrañaga, also born in 1923 and also dead in combat.

Three other people from Eibar died also in the war, all three in the Leningrad front...

Estonians or Russians or whoever buried the pilot, not accustomed to double family names as they are used in the Basque Country or Spain, misspelled the name, cutting the long and unpronounceable Aguirregoicoa to Aguirre and converting the 2nd family name, Benito, into a given name, quite understandably, because this Spanish name was well known throughout all war fronts thanks to Benito Mussolini (who, in turn, was given this Spanish name, Benito, in honour of the Mexican revolutionary, Benito Juarez; you know, Mussolini's father was a pro-revolutionary leftist).

I collected the new information, and sent it back to Estonia to my friend Peeter. He contacted the same journalist that wrote for Postimees, Juhani Püttsepp. Now Püttsepp works for another paper, but he seems to have been interested in this... And so, he published it in the Ekspress, last Thursday. There it is, online.

Now they know in Mustvee, thanks to the article, that the man buried there is not Benito Agirre, but Inazio Agirregoikoa. Will they change the name of the street? I don't know.

Personally, I have promised my Estonian contacts that I will try to convince the Town Council of Eibar to do something about it. There were many people from Eibar that went as child refugees in the Soviet Union in 1937... Five of them died fighting the Nazis. One of them has a street named after him (despite being an incorrect name)... I think Agirregoikoa deserves a true lasting homage. That could be a symbol for many others.

In Eibar, nowadays, will anyone remember Inazio Agirregoikoa. I want to find out about him also... There´s no Agirregoikoa in the local phone guide... But other "child refugees" may well remember him.

We'll see what's the output of this. The adventure of Inazio Agirregoikoa hasn't ended yet. That article in Estonia was just another chapter. I wish we can give a nice final chapter to this story.

Luistxo
Eibar


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Thursday, October 10, 2002

Victims of Colonialism

We found out a couple of days ago that some Kurds, desperate to extract at least the minimum of recognition from Turkey, think that everything is peachy for the Basques and that we should renounce to any further demands for self determination.

Well, this time it is a Palestinian the one that has some wrong impressions about the Basque struggle.

Check out this article published at Al Ahram Weekly, I highlighted the paragraphs were the author's knowledge of the Basque conflict fails:
A staring contest

The Arab-Israeli conflict is no longer about the Palestinian state; it now concerns the terms of its creation. Azmi Bishara* urges the Palestinians not to blink first

At a sizable demonstration recently held in London to protest against a war on Iraq, the Palestinian flag stood out amidst the sea of banners. Curiously enough, it attracted little attention, as though it were entirely normal for the Palestinian symbol to assume prominence at such an event. But such an occurrence is not commonplace -- not in Europe at least -- considering that Israel has gone out of its way since 11 September to associate the Palestinian cause with terror, and considering that US President George W Bush claims that the Palestinian leadership is the main obstacle to peace in the Middle East. Yet, here we are: a demonstration in London, about Iraq, and the Palestinian flag is the most visible symbol.

Those who have tried to reduce the Palestinian issue to a question of terrorism have failed because the Palestinians' cause is a just one. Theirs is a clear case of occupation, and it is the last remaining colonial set-up in modern times. Palestine is the Arabs' open wound, and it hurts other nations too, for it evokes bad memories. Even those who do not view the creation of Israel as a matter of colonialism concede that the 1967 occupation, with its continued settlers' activity and the apartheid it generates, bears the hallmarks of colonialism. There is no two ways about it.

This moral, widely recognised aspect of the Palestinian issue has given it the strength to survive accusations of terrorism. It is the wind that makes the Palestinian flag fly high, even when the flags of other Arab countries are nowhere to be seen, and even in demonstrations concerning other causes. The Palestinian flag is the flag of a just cause, even by European standards, and even in countries that are allied with Israel. Neither the United Kingdom, nor France, nor any other country with a colonialist past can deny that. And the peoples of there sympathise with those forced to live under occupation.

The Palestinian issue has become a byword for oppression and injustice. This did not happen overnight, nor was it easily accepted by the Western left, with its sympathy towards the Jews. However, since the first Intifada erupted the Palestinian cause has increasingly become a symbol of injustice. And it has ceded none of the moral ground it gained.

The Palestinian struggle is not about secession. Palestine is not Kurdistan, Chechnya, Kashmir or the Basque country. While we may have different views on those cases and debate the appropriateness and intricacies of self-determination in each situation, none of them are instance of colonialism. The national aspirations and cultural identity of the communities in the above cases need to be addressed, but there is always room for compromise. The Palestinians have no such room, for theirs is not a matter of separatism. Israel is not offering citizenship to the Palestinians of the West Bank -- it is not even offering a second-class status. The structure of relations between those Palestinians and Israel is relentlessly colonial. No one can claim otherwise, not even the Americans.

The United States will not suggest that the Palestinians be slaughtered, or even assimilated in the state that was built upon the ruins of their own, as was the case, for example, with the Native Americans. Even Washington has to deal with the Palestinian issue in terms of colonialism, liberation and independence. Wars may break out, battles may be won or lost, but nothing will change this.

Currently, the conflict is about the conditions for ending colonialism. The West, the United States, and even Israel have endorsed the Palestinian state in principle. Consequently, the conflict is now about the conditions for establishing that state. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, as he prepares for war against Iraq despite overwhelming domestic opposition, has recently felt obliged to call for the speedy creation of a Palestinian state. Forget it, Tony. There is no conflict over the creation of such a state, to start with. And the "speedy" part does not impress anyone, not to mention that Britain is in no position to do anything about it.

The Guardian, on 5 October, reported that Bush was angry with Blair over his remarks on a Palestinian state on the basis that priority should be given to the war against Iraq and the US president's view that there is no need to apologise constantly about Palestine. This is the Israeli position, verbatim. Yet, before some Palestinians welcome Blair's comments, it bears mentioning that the quarrel during and since Camp David is not about the Palestinian state as such, but about its borders, about Jerusalem being its capital and about the settlements. The issue of the refugees also remains unresolved. Whatever happens, one should not welcome statements that are designed to placate the public and divert attention from the war against Iraq, a war that has nothing to do with the suffering of the Iraqis at Saddam Hussein's hands.

Even if Blair made the comments in another context, they would still be irrelevant. What the United Kingdom and other influential countries should do is define their position on the borders of the Palestinian state, on settlements, on Jerusalem and on refugees. This is where the action is. Anything else is a waste of time.

The Palestinians have to keep this in mind, for they are likely to be told, exactly as during the Gulf War, that after America finishes with Iraq, it will pay more attention to them and hopefully give them a state.

The fact is the weaker the Arabs are, the weaker the Palestinians are. This equation is at the heart of US policy. If the war against Iraq is successful, the American camp will find its voice. 'The Intifada is wreaking havoc on us', you'll hear them say. 'We should have accepted what we were offered at Camp David', they are likely to add. But the Palestinian people, who, through action and not words, have turned the state into a definite prospect, would continue to struggle for better terms. The American camp would harp on fears of transfer. Some people would try to scare the Palestinians, including Israel's Arabs, with the prospect of transfer. If you deny that Israel could take such an action, you appear to be defending Israel. If, alternatively, you admit the theoretical possibility, the conclusion some may draw is that the Palestinians have to accept what is on offer.

How low can one stoop for personal gains -- could this extend to ending the resistance or capitulating to US conditions, which is just what some Arabs want. Forget about the resistance, the United States, and the haggling involved. Israel cannot do anything it wants. And the Palestinian people are not sheep bound for the slaughter. The Palestinian cause is solid and fair, so much so that it lends its mantle to others who need support. Remember when Jewish militants entered Khan Yunis to terrorise its people, they had to commit a massacre. Now think, what would happen if they enter Palestinian areas to force its residents out? Would the Palestinian people, with memories of previous exoduses so bitterly vivid, turn tail? Transfer is not a word to be spoken lightly.

We have come to the end of the conflict over Palestinian rights. We are at the point of defining the terms for a lasting solution. And, hard as Sharon may stare into our eyes, we cannot afford to blink. Do not forget that the Israelis are also in a dilemma. They too are fighting for terms that suit them. They too are racing against time.

* The writer is a leading Palestinian political activist and member of the Knesset.


Dear Mr. Bishara, the Basque Country, then called Navarre, was invaded and later colonized by Castille (today Spain) in 1512. Thousands of Basques (Navarrese) were killed defending their land. Only in the Battle of Noain that took place in 1522 the death toll raised to 5,000 Basques killed in action.

But don't worry, you have the full support of the Basque people, Israel must withdraw and put an end to the genocidal war against the Palestinians.

.... ... .

Tuesday, October 08, 2002

The Kurds and The Basques II

Here you have the second part of the essay published by Kurdish Media:

Challenge to the Transition and ETA’s Movement for the Basque Separatism

KurdishMedia.com - By Welat Lezgin
10/07/2002 00:00:00

Continued from

Until 1978, the problem of ethnic-nationalism not only remained unchallenged, but it was made worse by the policies of the Francoist regime which radically opposed to all the regional claims in favour of ‘centralism’ – which in fact was not a centralism of Castille or even Madrid, but of the State above the people. [1] According to Conversi, at the end of Francoism, not only was Francoism doomed but the very idea of the Spanish State was not legitimate in the Basque Country. This remained the case at least until the late 1980s, well after the Transition had run its course. [2] ETA’s violence during this period was at its peak. As Robert Clark puts it:

“The Basque region during these days was like a pressure cooker about to explode. Sentiments for change had been so sharply suppressed during the dictatorship of Franco that there had been little opportunity for the expression of dissent with dictator gone, Basques now sought to release the pressures built up over the preceding forty years.” [3]

There are several reasons why the violence by ETA continued despite the historic changes in Spain. On several occasions ETA was convinced that the Basque Country was on the verge of national extinction, of being erased from the map of peoples, because its language and culture were slowly dying out and its customs were being replaced by the alien ones. [4] Hence, they saw a peremptory and urgent need to put an end to this progressive disappearance. To achieve this end, the establishment of an independent Basque country was pivotal. As Conversi puts it:

“The subordination of cultural to political goals is reflected in an eschatological vision of independence as a panacea for all problems of cultural identity, in particular the recovery of the language: ‘There is only one path to save Euskera: political independence for -Euzkadi’. [5]

But also by now, due to Franco’s harsh oppressive policies, ETA had become highly radicalised and had experienced extensive splits. In its earlier days ETA was a heterogeneous organisation, made up of an uncomfortable mix of nationalists, socialists, students, labour activists and rural Catholic youth. By the late 1960s ETA was being pulled in at least three ideological directions: (1) toward a new Left, proletarian tradition; (2) a guerrilla national front tradition; and (3) non-violent, ethically oriented, cultural tradition. This heterogeneity resulted in a series of splits. In 1966 – 1967, ETA split into ETA-Berri (New ETA) and ETA-Zarra (Old ETA); in 1970, it split into ETA-V (followers of the program of the Fifth Assembly) and ETA-VI (Sixth Assembly). The final split took place in 1974 between ETA (m) and ETA (pm) and ETA as we know it is ETA Militar, which continues to use violent methods to this day. [6]

Despite conflicts over the use of violence within the organisation, ETA’s military activities have continued unabated. The outcome of every internal dispute on the matter had been the expulsion or defection of the advocates of non-violent means. [7] In the 1970s a similar pattern in ETA’s evolution began to acquire a quicker tempo as the more experienced and mature leaders of ETA were killed or forced into exile, younger and more radical ones quickly replaced them in a process that currently continues. The Military front, composed predominantly of very young people, became more and more uncontrollable, while its autonomous initiatives provoked further conflict. Therefore violence has become, a self-generating mechanism, a vicious circle very difficult to stop. Violence also served to complement internal fragmentation. Since 1975, and as a result of many splits, ETA has become progressively dominated by groups who spend little time debating ideological issues and see military confrontation as the only way to achieve their goal of independence for Euzkadi. [8] What is interesting to note is that while Spain was being painfully transformed into a democratic and a devolved state, ETA had transformed in the opposite direction where moderates and those against the armed struggle had been eradicated from the organisation. [9]

To understand the continuation of violence and the ideological void of ETA we also need to look at ETA’s action/repression/action theory. According to this theory, attacks on the Francoist state would lead to universal repression, which would lead to greater popular anger, which would spiral into mass rebellion, eventually resulting in the civil war and the Basque secession. [10] As predicted by Fanon, the state violence as an indispensable ingredient in spreading a general ‘national awareness’ among the wider population instigated them to fight back. [11] In synthesis, the adoption of the Third Worldist models could not be realised without the state repression and this repression was the central part of the ‘theory of action/repression/action’ taken up by ETA. [12] This theory of violence as the only solution was obviously also determined by the prevailing internal condition of ruthless dictatorship in Spain. [13] What mattered to ETA was that the nation found itself in a lethal situation and that, in order to save her, it was urgent to adopt a series of drastic measures. As a consequence it considered the will of the Basque people to recover their national identity as the only valid element to save the nation. [14]

The role of state repression in cementing a common identity out of previous anthropological chaos should be emphasised here. While the police actions hampered the activities and mobilisation of ETA on various occasions, the indiscriminate repression of the Francoist regime generated a climate of understanding and support for ETA activists among the certain nationalist sectors and clandestine left-wing organisations. In the Basque Country political violence responded both to an internal logic (the need to foster unity in the organisation) and an external logic (the need to respond to the challenge of the state). However, at any moment of the stormy ideological debate within ETA, violent factions seized the initiative. This direct action, and not ideology or culture, showed the way to follow in order to achieve mass mobilisation and the public support. The hard-liners, with their attacks, overcame the ideological debate and demonstrated the simple reality that only direct action could achieve popular support and even extend mobilisation to the non-ethnic population of the Basque homeland.

During the Franco period, there were strands of shared meaning as to what it meant to be a “Basque”. There was (1) a myth, a shared understanding of an ancient Basque past (including the Fueros), (2) an awareness of the structural pressures for the extinction of the Basque culture, which increased the participative function of the Basque language, music, games, etc., and its capacity for symbolising solidarity and differentiability, and (3) anti-state violence, as an expression of the direct Basque action. Yet, the symbols perceived to be “Basque” – including the Fueros as well as the Basque language – were defined largely by their transgression from and rejection of the centralist regime. There was no consensus as to the nature of the new Basque identity in the post-Franco state, or even about how to define the Basque identity. The old method of the action-repression theory continued to hide such worries.

In general terms, a common feature of the insurgent nationalist guerrillas in various countries is their relation with, and even dependence on, the state repression. All over the world, a plethora of nationalities and former tribes are drawn into violent confrontation with the state as a result of decades of coercion by the central authorities which is largely illegitimate. The more recent the memories of suffering and horrors, the more acute the conflict seem to be, as ETA’s hold on the armed struggle shows. The principle of ‘retaliation’ as expressed in the theory of action/repression/action was the key one, which in practice remained constant for ETA throughout its long history of splits and mutations within the party itself. [15]

For the first time since the Civil War, political channels were open for the Basques to peacefully negotiate their legitimate rights. As explained above this dilemma was overcome by the emphasis on the continuation of the action/repression theory, which in return made the Spanish government respond to ETA attacks by anti-terrorist laws and police measures that reminded many Basques of some of the worst features of Francoism. [16] These anti-terrorist laws helped the survival of the perception of the state as a terrorist machine after the demise of the dictatorship but also kept ETA’s recruitment machine alive. Despite its external image as a “terrorist” organisation, ETA enjoyed significant popular support under Francoism (and indeed well until the 1980s.) in the Basque country. Most Basques felt more threatened by Spanish security forces than by ETA. Whereas ETA killed 6 people in the 12 months prior to Franco’s death, Spanish police and civil guards killed 22, and injured 105 a trend that continued well into the 1980s. [17] ETA was viewed in terms of “patriotic action”, rather than of (irrational) terrorism. [18] Basque nationalist parties alleged that repression continued unabated after Franco’s death. For instance, the anti-terrorist laws, some of which were later condemned as unconstitutional, resulted in arbitrary arrests and detentions. [19] Widespread opposition to the law was being expressed through popular demonstrations in several Spanish regions. Furthermore, the murder of Basque political exiles in France by the GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion) a self-styled ‘anti-terrorist’ commando group, provoked angry popular demonstrations, and revealed a political scandal. [20]

Instead of assisting and fighting for Basque rights (even the right to self-determination) through peaceful means, due to the reasons explained above, [21] ETA continued its violence and as Conversi explains:

“The intrinsic confrontational character of Basque mobilisations, a partial fulfilment of the ‘action/repression/action theory’ envisaged by ETA’s first theorists, has in many ways handicapped any peaceful solution of the conflict.” [22]

While ETA’s violent methods were the voice of the Basque people but also the voice of dissidence during the Franco years, with the transition to democracy, ETA’s violence almost resulted in the abrupt end of democracy with the attempted coup on February 23, 1981. [23] As democratic reforms progressed – and ETA violence increased – reactionary sectors of the armed forces grew more volatile. In addition to increasing skirmishes between ETA, the police and the army in the Basque country, between 1978 and 1982, five different plans for a coup d’etat against the democratic regime were uncovered. [24]

The 1988 inter-party agreement to condemn violence unreservedly and to marginalise those who refused to do so played a big role in the marginalisation of the support for ETA’s violence. Known as the Pact of Ajura Enea, it was signed by all significant players in Basque politics apart from ETA’s political wing HB (Herri Batasuna). HB has suffered steady erosion of its support, which reflects ETA’s political marginalisation. That is apparent also in another way. Ross, J. has argued that to a significant extent, support for HB is unconnected with regionalist sentiment. Instead, it comes from disoriented and disillusioned young people in a society particularly hard hit by social problems, who sympathise primarily with ETA’s anti-state violence. [25]

With the establishment of democracy in Spain, many formerly private and semi-clandestine initiatives passed into the public hands. The nationalist movement was formalised and became articulated in different political parties. As the political struggle became institutionalised, the civil society which was previously ETA’s only support, begun to lose its former role. [26] The advent of democracy and the arrival on the political scene of a greater number of political parties resulted in the emergence in the Basque Country of a political-party system similar to the one seen for so long in the Catalonia region. The Basques voted in favour of the Statue of Autonomy, which was negotiated on behalf of the Basque people by the PNV (‘Basque Nationalist Party’), and a majority of them chose the bourgeois nationalist parties over the revolutionary nationalist organisations in the electoral contests. The popular support for independence seemed to have diminished up to the present era and the legitimacy of ETA’s actions were questioned more seriously by its potential sources of support amongst the people of the Basque Country.

Conclusion

The right to self-determination and secession is one of the most controversial issues both in the European and the world political contexts. This is particularly the case since the division of political units concerns the nation-state, which is located in a strategically sensitive area in Europe. Since the attacks on the World Trade Centre in the United States on September the 11th, any attempt to achieve self-determination by violent means is doomed to face the label of terrorism. This current context is in contrast to the ongoing process of fragmentation as more independent States continue to emerge on the map of World Politics.

The emphasis on the preservation of the map of international relations and the view that the nation-state is the final political structure can be a flawed argument. Regionalism is one of the challenges to the Centralist thesis of the nation-state also both in the European and non-European contexts. It is important to put these two arguments, namely those of the nation-state as the ideal and ultimate political form as opposed to its further fragmentation, in a comparative perspective at a time when, as Harold Isaacs argues, ‘two thirds of the world has barely begun to emerge from pre-industrial era and before most of the world’s people could glean any advantages at all from industrialisation and modernisation’. [27]

In Europe the nation-state has become under heavy pressure both from above by the supranational organisation of the European Union and from below by the regional powers and separatist movements, such as ETA’s struggle for the Basque Country in Southern Europe. As Wallace puts it, ‘to a remarkable degree, the processes of government in Europe overlap and interlock: among different states, between different levels of governance below and above the old locus of sovereignty in the nation-state’. As a result of this, the continent where nationalism and the nation-state first emerged after the French Revolution is going through an historical process of devolution where the national States, regional sentiments, minority identities and ethnic-nationalisms aim to get the chance to bypass the traditional nation-state. Although this recent trend should not be exaggerated, it is encouraging at the same time as the Catalan case demonstrates.

The Basque citizens have gained a broad-ranging Autonomy Statute over the course of the recent decades and an unprecedented level of self-government not enjoyed by any other European region. At the same European level, the nation-states can show a greater understanding for the self-government of the regional identities for their autonomous development as a democratic-constitutional necessity against the political manifestations of separatist ethnic nationalism. The right for the preservation and representation of ethnic identity, culture and language is a democratic right, which should not be seen as a threat to the ‘unity’ of the nation-state. As this essay has demonstrated, the repression of ethnic nationalism without any consideration of these basic rights and freedoms helps its growth and mobilisation across the society.

The dilemma between Centralist repression and unlimited political freedom has been at the centre stage of ETA’s separatist campaign and the Spanish government’s response increasingly after the end of the oppressive Franco regime. Democratic transition has brought into question the legitimacy of the Basques’ armed struggle both in the eyes of the Spanish public and within the organisation itself. At the same time, for many within ETA, the transition represented an opportunity to use violence to force Madrid to concede Basque independence. It is perfectly possible for ethnic minorities to succeed in their language and identity revival and national survival within a democratic nation-state. The possibility of national co-existence and the possession of multiple-identities can help to overcome the challenge of regional separatism as long as the essential element of a strong democratic context and self-government gain the upper hand.

Footnotes:

1. Maries, J. (1990) Understanding Spain. San Juan: University of Puerto Rico Press. p. 413

2. Conversi, D. (1997) p. 141.

3. Clark, R. P. (1984) The Basque Insurgents. ETA, 1952-1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. p. 90

4. Conversi, D. (1997) p. 241. An ETA document produced in 1979 reveals to us the importance of the Basque language in defining the Basque identity: “Since the times of Machiavelli [language] is an extremely well-known political counsel, and one which works infallibly, that to kill a pueblo there is nothing more deadly than to kill its language. A pueblo which stops speaking its language is a pueblo which has died. A pueblo which changes its language for that of its neighbour, is a pueblo which changes its soul for that of its neighbour.” See, ETA (1979), Documentos, 18 vols. San Sebastian quoted in: MacClancy, J. ‘Bilingualism and Multinationalism in the Basque Country’ in: Mar-Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (Eds.) (1996) Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities. Oxford: Berg. p. 211.

5. Conversi, D. (1997).

6. Zirakzadeh, C. (1991) A rebellious people. Reno. University of Nevada Press. p. 143.

7. Jauregui, B. (1981) Ideologia y estrategia politica de ETA. Madrid Siglo XXI. Cited in: Medrano, J. D. (1995) Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia. London: Cornell University Press. p. 149.

8. Ibid. p. 149.

9. On internal killings within ETA see: States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1 program on ETA, dated December 1st 1993.

10. Clark, R. P. (1990) Negotiating with ETA. Reno. University of Nevada. p. 8-9.

11. See: Fanon, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin Books.

12. Conversi, D. (1997). p. 244.

13. It is important to keep in mind that, at its inception, ETA did not advocate violence as a method of achieving political change, but was forced onto this road by the tactics of the Franco regime and its gratuitous physical suppression of any visible symbol of Basque national identity. See: Moxon-Brown, E. (1989). Political Change in Spain. London: Routledge. p.52

14. Jauregui, B. G. (1981) Ideologia y estrategia politica de ETA. Analisis de su evolucion entre 1958 y 1968. Madrid: Siglo XXI. p.151. Quoted in: Conversi, D. (1997). p.240.

15. A survey carried out by Irvin, L. C. which shows the distribution of ideologues, radicals and politicos in Herri Batasuna by the period in which they became active, supports the argument that regime repression, unless extremely severe, serves as a stimulus rather then a brake on the general recruitment of activists into militant nationalist organisations. See: Irvin, L. C. (1999) Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. p.199-200.

16. Clark, R. P. (1984). p. 103-105, 252.

17. Sullivan, J. (1988). ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euzkadi, 1890-1986. London: Routledge. p. 94.

18. According to a poll conducted in 1979, over half the Basques surveyed thought that ETA militants were “patriots” or “idealists” and only 14 percent considered them “madmen” or “criminals”. See: Desfor Edles, L. (1998) Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.128.

19. Clark, R. P. (1991).

20. GAL, a death squad created to wage a dirty war against ETA resulted in a major scandal that damaged the credibility of the Spanish State and the democratic transition. While GAL’s ruthless killings of ETA leaders dealt a big blow to ETA, these acts at the same time helped ETA’s recruitment activities as GAL had shown a darker side of the Spanish State. The GAL scandal uncovered by El Mundo revealed that top leaders including the Minister of the Interior, Jose Barrionuevo, were allegedly directly involved and that GAL mercenaries were paid with public funds. The scandal grew as rumours suggested as many as nine of the GAL’s twenty-seven victims may have had nothing to do with terrorism. See: Woodworth, P. (2001) Dirty War Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy. Cork: Cork University Press. The issue is also extensively examined in: States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1 on 01 December 1993.

21. Besides, as a proof for total belief in violence to reach their aims, Spanish democracy is seen by ETA as a “sham bourgeois democracy” to be used as a tool but not as an aim as a matter of fact. The following extract reveals this: “It is necessary to participate in the legal framework of bourgeois democracy . . . However, . . . a revolutionary strategy cannot limit it self to this path . . . . . to fall into electoralism is to suppress political principles for the sake of securing a certain number of votes . . . . Experience teaches us that it is utopian to believe that in playing the game we will receive any real advantages; and little is it possible to use those institutions as a tribunal in which to denounce them because we are there.” See, ETA (Commandos Autonomous), internal discussion document (1979) p. 275. Also see Paddy Bolger, interview in IRIS, 7 (November 1983): 7. Cited in Irvin, L. C. (2001). p.6.

22. Ibid. p.158.

23. On 23 February 1981 a session of the Spanish parliament was interrupted by a group of Civil guards led by Colonel Antonio Tejero, who seized the assembly and held the MPs prisoner for more than a day. A providential intervention by the King prevented the attempted coup. This coup attempt had long-lasting and damaging implications for the young democracy and halted further democratic progress, especially in matters of regional devolution. See: Aguero, F. (1995) Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. London: Johns Hopkins University Press. p.161-180.

24. Gilmour, D. (1985) The Transformation of Spain. London: Quartet Books. p. 230.

25. Ross, J. C. (1997) Contemporary Spain: A Handbook. London: Arnold. p.93.

26. What happened to ETA is not very different from what happened to the PSUC in Catalonia, or the Spanish Communist Party. Despite their having led the opposition to Franco during the 1960 and 1970s, all of them were defeated in elections by more moderate parties. The fact that this happened reveals that the role of political capital and the logic of mobilisation in shaping political structures are constrained by socio-economic structural conditions, which in the end determine what is and what is not politically possible.

27. Isaacs, H. R. (1989). Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. p.215

28. Wallace, W. 1999. ‘The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox’, in Political Studies. Vol. 47. p.503.

Sources:

Aguero, F. (1995) Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Clark, R. P. (1990) Negotiating with ETA. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Clark, R. P. (1984) The Basque Insurgents. ETA, 1952 - 1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Desfor Edles, L. (1998) Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fanon, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin Books.

Gilmour, D. (1985) The Transformation of Spain. London: Quartet Books.

Heywood, P. (ed.) (1999) Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Irvin, L. C. (1999) Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Isaacs, H. R. (1989). Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Maries, J. (1990) Understanding Spain. San Juan: University of Puerto Rico Press.

Mar-Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (Eds.) (1996) Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities. Oxford: Berg.

Medrano, J. D. (1995) Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia. London: Cornell University Press.

Moxon-Brown, E. (1989). Political Change in Spain. London: Routledge.

Ross, J. C. (1997) Contemporary Spain: A Handbook. London: Arnold.

Sullivan, J. (1988). ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euzkadi, 1890-1986. London: Routledge.

Woodworth, P. (2001) Dirty War Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy. Cork: Cork University Press.

Zirakzadeh, C. (1991) A rebellious people. Reno. University of Nevada Press.

Wallace, W. 1999. ‘The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox’. Political Studies. Vol. 47.

States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1, 01/12/93.


The Basques will forever support the right to the self determination of the Kurdish people, no matter what the Turkish nor the Syrians nor the Iraqis nor the Iranians nor the Armenians have to say about it, citing their own constitutions and their laws.

This is the link to the first part.

.... ... .

The Kurds and The Basques

Here you have this interesting essay published by Kurdish Media:

Democratic Transition within the Spanish Constitutional Framework: The Case of the Basque Country

KurdishMedia.com - By Welat Lezgin
10/07/2002 00:00:00

There are many similarities between the opressed Basque and Kurdish ethnic-nationalisms. Both the Basque and the Kurdish issues are heavily influenced by the global changes and are trans-national. Although this essay concentrates specifically on the Basque question, Kurds can draw some useful conclusions from it.

However, there is one thing that should be kept in mind when reading this essay. The process of the erosion of the nation-state, and in paralell to that the rise of regionalism, which has been gaining pace in Europe, has not reached the states that control Kurdistan. The states that occupy Kurdish territories manage their Kurds with the same policies as Franco managed its Basque population during his ruthless reign. The biggest difference is that while the oppressive regime of Franco is long gone leaving his place to a vibrant Spanish civil and democratic society, unfortunately the Kurds are still heavily oppressed, probably by the most backward regimes this planet has ever seen.

Introduction

During the past decade we have witnessed intensifying ethnic conflicts, serious suffering and loss of lives from Bosnia, Kosovo and Kurdistan to Chechenya and beyond in many conflict areas around the world. As Anthony Smith argues, ‘it has become commonplace to recognise the 1990s as the decade of recrudescent ethno-nationalism’.[1] With the development of modernisation through industrialisation, liberal democracy, capitalist economy and universal literacy, nationalism emerged and nation-states were established in the 18th and 19th Century European politics as one of the historical consequences of the French Revolution. Later on, in the wider world through colonial expansion and incorporation, the extension of nationalism and the international system brought together various population groups within the same political units.

For some of these political units the historical progress has not been easy, however. In those countries both in Europe and beyond, where the state-building process has been problematic, the dominant or colonising ethno-nations either supplanted or absorbed the subordinate ethno-nations through a structural assimilation process. They created a system of exploitation by their exclusionist policies, forced assimilation and the denial of civil rights for the other nationalities. This oppression and inequality of citizenship rights contribute to the development of a collective political consciousness and ethno-nationalism by the subordinate ethno-national communities. The denial of identity and ethnic differences, as it happened during the Franco regime in Spain the consequences of which will be examined in detail here, create a political ground for the suppressed communities to seek their self-determination by ousting the foreign rulers and by trying to reshape the states’ despotic political structures, in the case of the Basque Country after the 1978 Spanish constitution for example.[2]

Some ethnic identities with their own distinctive cultures and identity feel on the verge of extinction and aim to save their political future. The regionalist movements can choose violent methods and carry out an armed struggle to establish a more independent political future for themselves, as it has happened in the case of the emergence and continuation of the ETA movement for the same example we study here. Even beyond this European context in the international world, ethnic violence and the regionalist autonomy movements created a system where the modern wars have become intra-, rather than inter-, state since the end of the Second World War.[3] Although it is hoped that the advent of a global culture will inspire peace, prosperity and a general lessening of conflicts, it is not easy to achieve this as a quick glance at the world map of ethnic conflicts would show.[4]

The Basque Autonomy and the 1978 Spanish Constitution

In relation to nationalism in Spain, as Conversi argued, and in parallel with the explanation we gave earlier about the reasons for ethnic conflict, modernity replaces the traditional markers of ethnicity through the subsequent processes of nationalism, namely state centralisation, assimilation of the local elites, and finally the mass migration.[5] In many other cases as well as in the Spanish context, this erosion of traditional societies has created difficult historical memories and caused the development of the aim of independence, despite the cultural assimilation attempts we referred to above. Taken together, these changes in the cultural and political life of the nations give rise to ethnic conflicts, further nationalist mobilisation and the separatist regional movements.[6]

Since we aim to examine the Basque case, we first need to look at the state response for the recognition of the Basque identity in detail here. We will specifically concentrate on the current Spanish Constitution and discuss the position of the minorities, and the Basques in particular. In this context, we will argue that support for secession and independence can diminish if there is a genuine democratic transformation, if the regional ethnic identity is well represented and an advanced level of self-government is allowed.

The landmark 1978 Spanish Constitution was the product of the consensus achieved between the main political parties, which arose out of the fall of the Franco regime. One of the important problems to tackle there was the issue of ethno-nationalism. It is not surprising, therefore, to see in the Constitution that nearly one-tenth of the text is specifically concerned with the regional issues.[7] Also, during the sixteen months of constitutional debates, the autonomy issue for the Basque country became by far the most controversial topic for the discussions.[8]

A key point in this constitutional discussion was the respect for regional languages and the provision for the public awareness of linguistic diversities in the country. The acceptance of this fact, as well as the formal State language, can be seen in the Article 3 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, which stipulates that:

“Castillian is the official language of the State. All Spaniards have a duty to know it and the right to use it. The other Spanish languages will also be official in their respective Autonomous Communities according to their own Statues. The richness of the distinct linguistic modalities of Spain represents a patrimony, which will be the object of special respect and protection.”

The Constitution also stipulated the national integrity of Span and it warned against any possible misinterpretations in this respect. According to the Article 2:

“The Constitution is based on the indivisible unity of the Spanish Nation, common and indivisible fatherland of all the Spaniards. It acknowledges and guarantees the right to Autonomy of the nationalities and regions, which form it and the solidarity among them.”[9]

An important note for the above stipulation of Article 2 can also be found in the Article 145 of the Constitution, which explains that no federation between Autonomous Communities can be permitted under any circumstances.[10] The most fundamental aspect of the Constitution was its acknowledgement of the existence of other ‘nationalities’ only within the boundaries of one and indivisible Spanish ‘nation’. The three other nationalities, not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, were Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. But the obvious difficulty was to extend decentralisation to most other regions and, using Conversi’s word, ‘relativising’ the potential impact of the Basque and Catalan autonomies.[11]

In one way or another, a balance had to be struck between the parties of the Right and the autonomist movement to overcome the fear that any reference to the nationalities of Spain and the preference of the Left for a federal-type solution represented a threat to the national unity. The need to obtain the support of the both sides generated endless discussions in the writing of the constitution and it contributed to the lack of precision and incoherence in some parts of the text, especially in the sections regarding the historical nationalities. Nevertheless, in the end of this process, and for the first time in the nation’s history, Spain would have a constitution which was not the consequence of the opposition of any significant political force against the others. No one agreed with the entire constitutional text, but almost no one felt it was absolutely unacceptable, either.[12] . More importantly, the fascist character of Spanish nationalism defended by Francoism was seriously questioned by the 1978 Constitution, which not only aimed at the transformation of Spain into a democratic state, but also admitted the existence of national minorities within its territory as a crucial part of this democratisation process.

Another positive point for the tolerance of the other ethnic groups was that at each stage of its approval large majorities supported the Constitution, which in the end created the belief that this was a Constitution ‘of all the people for all the people’. It is also important to note that when Spaniards went to the polls on 6 December 1978, the Constitution was approved by 87.8 percent of the voters. While the percentage of abstentions, 32 percent in Spain as a whole and 56 percent in parts of the Basque Country, gave the government and the major opposition parties some cause for concern, the Spanish people seemed to have voted convincingly to open a new democratic chapter in the country’s history.[13]

By emphasising the indissoluble unity of Spain, while recognising and guaranteeing the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions, the Constitution put forward a radically new model of the state, which rejected the Francoist centralism. But even more importantly, as we have seen earlier, the Article Two attempted to reconcile the two opposing conceptions of Spain, which were at stake during the Spanish Civil War. ‘Unity’ had to be preserved even though it was dramatically challenged by the recognition of the existence of ‘nationalities and regions’ within Spain. In this context, the reference to ‘the Spanish nation’ as the ‘common patria’ of all Spaniards seemed compatible with the existence of the other ‘little patrias’, such as Catalonia or the Basque Country.[14]

The Constitution also recognises and protects the right to ‘express and disseminate freely thoughts, ideas and opinions by word, in writing or any other means of reproduction’ (Article 20.1). In the following paragraph, the Article 20.2 forbids any form of prior censorship, something that was widely practised during the greater part of the Franco regime. Article 20.3, in a highly significant statement, ensures that the means of communication belonging to the state or other public entities shall be subject to parliamentary control and that access shall be guaranteed to all the social and political groups by ‘respecting the pluralism of society and the various languages of Spain’. On the right of assembly, which is another critical issue for the tolerance of ethno-nationalist differences, the Article 21.2 recognises the right of assembly provided that it is peaceful and it does not involve the use of violence. Assemblies in the public places and demonstrations require the permission of the authorities but can only be forbidden when there is a serious risk to public order or to the safety of the people and property.

Finally, on the right of association, the Article 22 recognises the right of association for all organisations, except for those whose objectives include activities declared to be of a criminal nature. Secret or paramilitary organisations are also banned in the same provision, which has particular relevance to political parties and workers’ organisations and trade unions. Over the last century the groups in Spain, as well as in other European countries, have waged an often one-sided battle to have these political and economic rights recognised. This development in Spanish history was also significant since it came after forty years of illegality for any organisation which did not conform in its aims and ideology to the narrow views of Franco’s National Movement.[15]

Overall, the 1978 Constitution rejects exclusive nationalism, whether it is the Spanish nationalism to the exclusion of the other group rights, or peripheral nationalism which rejects the State sovereignty with the probable inclusion of the other communities against the Central State nationalism on the basis of their claim to difference. But all the seventeen autonomous communities are now subject not only to the Constitution but also their own statues of autonomy, which govern all aspects of political life at regional level. In effect, they constitute regional constitutions. At the simplest level, a statue enables a region to organise its own institutions of self-government and establish the parameters of its own particular relationship with the central authorities.

It is interesting to note that, although these statues have many features in common, because each is the result of a long process of political negotiation, they all have individual features which reflect their own special relationship with Madrid. The Basque Statue, enshrines the restoration of the economic agreements, involving certain tax-raising privileges, while the Catalan Statute grants the region considerable freedom in matters related to education, culture and language. In common with the federal systems, with which the structure of the state had so much in common, the autonomous communities were granted the right of legislation and to execute and administer the laws through their provincial delegations. With this establishment of Autonomous Communities, the Basque and the Catalan regions also received the right to establish autonomous education systems, separate police forces and independent television networks. Additionally, the Basque and Catalan languages gained an official status alongside the Castillian in their own regions.[16]

These steps were taken to ensure a smooth democratic transition for all the peoples of Spain after the Second World War and its aftermath. However, given the expectations surrounding this programme of regionalism amongst the historic nationalities, and the economic climate for any territorial settlement in the 1970s and 1980s, it became inevitable that the reforms would fail to satisfy all the national and regional interest groups in the Spanish territory. The process of devolution has often been muddled and indecisive, although by the late 1980s major reforms had been implemented. Overall, this historic decentralisation process was probably unparalleled in terms of speed and scale elsewhere in the Western Europe.

Authentic autonomy also required the control of the financial resources. Article 156 of the Constitution recognised the right of the autonomous communities to financial autonomy, which is guaranteed in the Statues of Autonomy. The regional governments have been granted considerable freedom in spending and drawing up their own budgets, but were also subjected to strict limitations for levying their own taxes (or to share the taxes levied by the state). Over the past decade (in the 1990s), the regional governments had to take responsibility for increasingly large budgets and they managed substantial human, material and financial resources.[17]

On the issue of funds, while fifteen of the autonomous communities rely largely on the state to transfer funds in their direction, the Basque Country and Navarre enjoy the benefits of their historic rights (fueros). The Basque populated provinces (Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya) and the single province of Navarre, have the right to levy and collect all taxes, except for the custom duties and the taxes on petroleum products and tobacco. Furthermore, with respect to public security, Article 149 allowed fully autonomous regions to create their own regional police forces. The first region to take advantage of this was the Basque Country, which in 1980 created its own force, the Ertzaintza.

As it is seen in the examination above, the modern Spanish State has become highly de-centralised and extensive powers have been devolved to the regions, especially the Catalan and Basque regions due to their historical background and the level of ethnic consciousness. What we will be examining and discussing now is the development of Basque separatism and its continuation despite the democratic transition and the devolved powers for the region. What we are aiming to understand is how the democratic change has undermined the support for separatism and the armed struggle. We will also aim to explain why, despite the extensive devolution of power from the core to the peripheries, the radical Basque separatist organisation ETA (‘Basque Homeland and Freedom’) has been persistent in pursuing the political aim of creating an independent Basque Country by violent means.

Notes

Smith, A. 1999. ‘Ethnic election and national destiny: some religious origins of nationalist ideal’, Nations and Nationalism 5 (3), p.331-55. Ignatieff takes this further by arguing that ‘the key language of our age is ethnic-nationalism’. Ignatieff, M. (1994) Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Millennium. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. p. 5.

2 Smith, A. (1991) National Identity. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press.

3 This was pointed out by Wilson, R. ‘The politics of contemporary ethno-nationalist conflicts’, in Nations and Nationalism. 7 (3), 2001, p.368. The role of the state oppression is also important here as it helps to radicalise the movement of that specific identity.

4 For a general, global overview of ethnic conflicts, see Gurr, T. R. (1993). Minorities at Risk: A global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington. DC. United States Institute of Peace Press.

5 See the analysis in Conversi, D. (1997) The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation. London: Hurst & Company. p. 257.

6 The role of the nationalist elites has been to use such ‘slumbering’ human material and raise a set of popular myths and perceptions in the process. On this significance of the intellectuals for the nationalist interpretation of ethnic origins of nations, see Smith, A. (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations. London: Basil Blackwell.

7 The Spanish Constitution can be found online at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/sp00t___.html (the English translation) and at http://constitucion.rediris.es/CodigoConst/Codigo.html(the Spanish original).

8 Heywood, P. (1995). The Government and Politics of Spain: Comparative Government and Politics. London: Macmillan Press. p.143.

9 This basic principle is developed in detail in Section VIII of the Constitution entitled ‘The Territorial Organisation of the State’. Article 13.1 spells out this territorial integrity when the establishment of the self-governing regions becomes an issue: “Exercising the right to autonomy recognised in article 2 of the Constitution, adjoining provinces with common historical, cultural and economic characteristics, the islands and the provinces with a historical regional identity will be able to accede to self-government and form autonomous communities in accordance with the provisions of this section of the Constitution and of their respective statues.”

10 The aim of this article was to prevent the possibility of unification between the regions themselves. For example, the pan-Catalanism made reference to the importance of Valencia and the Balearic Islands, while the question of Navarre began to fuel nationalism in the Basque Country. (Conversi, p.144)

11 Conversi, D. (1997). p.144. There are now seventeen ‘Autonomous Communities’ on the official map, some entirely invented. Thus the modern Spanish State has become one of the most decentralised countries in Europe, as argued by Colomer, M. J. (1999), p.40

12 This was observed by Colomer, M. J. (1999). ‘The Spanish State of Autonomies: Non-Institutional Federalism’ in Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain. (Ed.) Paul Heywood. London: Frank Cass Publishers, p. 41 in particular. As Carr and Fusi put it at the time, this was the first Spanish constitution which was a result of ‘neither the unilateral imposition of a particular party nor the expression of a single ideology’. Carr, R. and Fusi, P. (1979) Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy. London: George Allen. p. 244.

13 The Basque nationalists urged their electorate to abstain from the constitutional referendum, arguing that the pre-existence of the Basque rights or fueros had not been clearly recognised. Michael T. Newton and Peter J. Donaghy (1997) Institutions of Modern Spain: A political and Economic Guide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 15-16.

14 Smith, G. (1995) ‘Federation: The multiethnic challenge’, in Montserrat Guibernau, Spain: Federation in the making? London: Longman.

15 Newton, T. M with Donaghy J. P. (1997) Institutions of Modern Spain: A political and Economic Guide. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 22.

16 These measures were particularly important in meeting the demands of the Catalans cultural autonomy. Del Rion, J. and Williams, A. (1999). ‘Regionalism in Iberia’ in Regionalism in the European Union. Peter Wagstaff (ed.) Exeter: Intellect. p. 179.

17 ibid. p.130.

Bibliography

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Carr, R. and Fusi, P. (1979). Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy. London: George Allen.

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Clark, R. P. (1984) The Basque Insurgents. ETA, 1952 - 1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Conversi, D. (1997) The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation. London: Hurst & Company.

Del Rion, J. and Williams, A. (1999). ‘Regionalism in Iberia’ in Regionalism in the European Union. Peter Wagstaff (ed.) Exeter: Intellect.

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Fanon, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin Books.

Guibernau, M. (1995) Spain: Federation in the making? London: Longman

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Heywood, P. (1995). The Government and Politics of Spain: Comparative Government and Politics. London: Macmillan Press.

Heywood, P. (ed.) (1999) Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Ignatieff, M. (1994) Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Millennium. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux.

Irvin, L. C. (1999) Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Isaacs, H. R. (1989). Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Mar-Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (Eds.) (1996) Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities. Oxford: Berg.

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Moxon-Brown, E. (1989). Political Change in Spain. London: Routledge.

Newton, T. M with Donaghy J. P. (1997) Institutions of Modern Spain: A political and Economic Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Ross, J. C. (1997) Contemporary Spain: A Handbook. London: Arnold.

Smith, A. (1991) National Identity. Reno, NV:University of Nevada Press.

Smith, A. (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations. London: Basil Blackwell.

Sullivan, J. (1988). ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euzkadi, 1890-1986. London: Routledge.

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Journals

Smith, A. 1999. ‘Ethnic election and national destiny: some religious origins of nationalist ideal’, Nations and Nationalism 5 (3).

Wallace, W. 1999. ‘The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox’. Political Studies. Vol. 47.

Wilson, R. ‘The politics of contemporary ethno-nationalist conflicts’. Nations and Nationalism. 7 (3), 2001

Other sources

Documentaries:

States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1, 01/12/93.

Internet:

http://constitucion.rediris.es/CodigoConst/Codigo.html

http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/sp00t.html

Is obvious that things are so bad for the Kurdish that when it comes to sovereignty, the crumbles that Spain has given to Euskal Herria seem like gold bars to them.

.... ... .