Living La Busy Life

Oops!

Sorry I have been way too busy to blog, but don't worry, I will get back to it as soon as I can.

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Catalunya Joins Call for Self Determination

This note comes to us via The Guardian:

Catalonia echoes Basque call for autonomy

Giles Tremlett in Madrid

Wednesday October 23, 2002
The Guardian

Spain entered a new and potentially critical phase of tension yesterday as Catalonia added its voice to demands from the Basque country for a fresh round of regional referendums over greater autonomy from Madrid.

The demands made in a historic speech by the new leader of Catalonia's ruling nationalists, Artur Mas, added pressure for an extensive rewrite of the rules that have governed Spain since the transition to democracy 25 years ago.

Mr Mas, who succeeds the Catalan regional premier Jordi Pujol as head of the nationalist Convergence and Union coalition, echoed demands from the Basque regional premier, Juan Jose Ibarretxe, when he called for "shared sovereignty" in Catalonia.

His proposals, which will form the backbone of the coalition's manifesto in regional polls next year, were a departure for the dominant party in Catalonia, going far beyond the sort of devolution experienced by Scotland and Wales.

Mr Mas called for a "single administration" in a Catalonia controlled by a regional government that would send its own representatives to the EU and other international bodies and would have the final word on the region's public finances.

Catalonia would also have to be formally recognised by the rest of Spain as "a nation", he said.

The demands were immediately criticised by the centre-right People's party government of prime minister Jose Maria Aznar.

"This is not a priority for Catalonia or for any other part of Spain," the deputy prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, said yesterday.

Mr Aznar's government, which has mounted a vigorous campaign against the Basque proposals for a referendum on self-determination, has suddenly found itself forced to fight on several fronts to maintain its centrist vision of Spain.

Mr Ibarretxe, meanwhile, held a long meeting with Arnaldo Otegi, head of the radical Basque separatist party Batasuna, a political ally of the armed separatist group Eta.

Although Batasuna has had its offices closed and bank accounts frozen while it is investigated for alleged collaboration with Eta - and while Mr Aznar's government prepares a separate court prosecution designed to ban it definitively - Mr Ibarretxe spent three hours discussing his controversial plan with Mr Otegi. These were deemed insufficient by Mr Otegi - once called "the Basque Gerry Adams".

"They are not enough to resolve the conflict," he said after the meeting.

Mr Ibarretxe has said that he would not call a referendum on the future of the Basque country unless Eta first gave up a 30-year campaign of violence - which has claimed 800 lives. Opponents call his proposals anti-constitutional.

Mr Mas' proposals were not quite as radical as those of Mr Ibarretxe and his non-violent Basque Nationalist party.

He called on the People's party and the opposition Socialists to negotiate with him a new statute that would replace the one which gave Catalonia semi-autonomy in 1979.

He held out the promise that, if Catalonia was given far greater autonomy then Convergence would also take up an invitation from Mr Aznar to join his central Spanish government in Madrid. But he also warned that his party would make life difficult for Mr Aznar if he did not play ball.

Catalonia's regional government already controls vast swathes of public administration, including education, health, culture and much policing.

Convergence and Union has won every Catalan election since 1980, allowing Mr Pujol to run the region for the past 22 years.

But Mr Mas faces a difficult battle against Barcelona's former Socialist mayor, Pascual Maragall, in the next regional elections - the first in which Mr Pujol will not stand.

Please take note of how the author of the article spouses Aznar's position regarding Batasuna, someone said long ago that journalists were supposed to be objective and unbiased.

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Erreala and Athletic : Ups and Downs

This article published at ESPN describes the current situation with two of Euskal Herrias football teams, Real Sociedad de San Sebastian and Athletic de Bilbao:

Basque ups and downs

By Phil Ball

Tuesday, October 22, 2002

Interesting to see Real Sociedad back at the top of the Spanish First Division after three angst-ridden seasons in its nether regions.

No-one was expecting this sudden turn-about of fortunes, least of all the club itself, accused a couple of years ago by ex-national manager Javier Clemente as 'lacking guts' and being 'natural pessimists'.

Clemente, now spending his days on the golf course, was controversially employed by the club three seasons ago when they sacked the German Bernd Krauss. Clemente made his name first as player and then as manager of Basque cousins Athletic Bilbao in the 1980s, and steered them to their last league title in 1984 - the last time that a Basque side won the Spanish championship.

Bilbao is the largest and most industrialised of the Basque cities and is in the Vizcayan region, whereas Real Sociedad hail from the more service-oriented region of Gipuzcoa. When Clemente was handed a contract by Real Sociedad, there was much muttering abroad, most of it concerning the signing of 'an enemy'.

The facile idea that the Basque Country is some sort of culturally homogenous homeland was nicely exposed by the suspicion of Sociedad's supporters towards the pugnacious little Clemente, and he only lasted just over a season. His cat-and-dog relationship with the Gipuzcoan press culminated in his accusation that the region was 'pessimistic' and cynical, whereas Vizcaya was more 'alegre' (happy) and forward-looking.

Fast forward to October 2002 and the nail-biting has shifted firmly from San Sebastian to Bilbao. Athletic, so keen on promoting themselves as the region's major club, find themselves down near the bottom of the table, surrounded by cousins Alavés and Osasuna, with Sociedad threatening to disappear over the horizon.

Of course, it's early days yet, and Raynald Denoueix's team will have to tighten up at the back if they seriously wish to aspire for the title, but it's strange the difference that a few summer months can make.

Three weeks ago, Jupp Heynckes, Bilbao's German manager in his second spell with the club, lost his temper with the local press after they complained of his tactical 'anarchy', responding with the unfortunate claim that he was a 'luxury' for the club, adding that they should appreciate the fact that they had such a distinguished manager at the helm.

He was forced to apologise three days later after the furore that his words caused, and he may yet live to regret his faux pas if the results continue to be poor.

Folks from Bilbao are famous for their special sense of identity and their often misplaced and overweening self-confidence - but the rest of Spain has a grudging sort of affection for them, especially Spanish football historians who know that the club was the country's dominant force up the Civil War in 1936.

Times have changed, but the club still regard themselves as special. The fact that Heynckes won a European Cup as manager of Real Madrid did not give him the right to patronise such an historically great club, and there remains a feeling that he will never be forgiven for his misjudgement.

The whole scene in the Basque Country is as fascinating as it is complex, and woe betide the visiting journalist who thinks he or she can get a quick-fix conclusion from a few day's analysis.

This season's major theme so far, apart from Sociedad's great start and Bilbao's internal doldrums, was the signing by the current leaders of Boris, a young Spanish defender from Oviedo.

Sociedad broke ranks with Bilbao back in the late 1980's when they signed John Aldridge from Liverpool, effectively closing the door on their own Basque-only policy. Since then, foreign players have arrived (and left) in cartloads, whilst Athletic Bilbao have doggedly pursued their century-old practice of only employing the sons of the region's fertile soil.

But the signing of Boris by Real is the first time that they have taken on a 'Spanish' player - foreign signings having been previously regarded as less politically awkward. A straw-poll amongst supporters last week revealed that only 7 per cent of the club's supporters were 'preoccupied' by the signing, but when you're top of Europe's best league, you can afford to be a bit more tolerant.

Boris made his debut as a first-choice defender in this weekend's 2-2 draw in the derby with Alavés, and the event seemed to pass by almost unnoticed. This comes as something of a relief, since the club's policy in the past has smacked of xenophobia towards Spain, as if the country's players were somehow racially and culturally unworthy of representing a Basque institution.

It's an awkward little issue, and one that has attracted occasional sideways glances at Bilbao's exclusionary policy which at first sight looks even more radical. Foreign managers like Heynckes and Howard Kendall have always been part of the scene, but the players have been Basque since time immemorial.

It looks like a cute piece of cultural heroism, standing firm and alone as the howling winds of European federalism and multi-ethnicity blow all around, but it rather depends which side of the fence you're standing.

And when things start to go wrong at the 'Cathedral' - as Athletic's San Mamés ground has always been nicknamed, the club always seem to want to have it both ways.

Heynckes, a few days before his infamous 'luxury' speech, claimed that the team's bad start was a reflection of the fact that the club had an inadequate playing staff, limited as it was by the Basque-only policy. 'If Barcelona only had Catalans playing, ask yourself where they would be in the league' he protested.

This was a fair point, but ultimately an irrelevant one. Barcelona's claim to being the flagship of Catalan culture has a slightly hollow ring to it nowadays, but Athletic cannot slap themselves on the back when times are good, then complain about the slings and arrows when things go awry.

Their own often patronising attitude towards Real Sociedad's signing of foreigners ignores the fact that it was their own poaching of the all the best Basque talent that forced their cousins to open up the ethnic doors in the first place.

Complicated indeed - but to return to a purely football-based observation, Athletic's permanent presence in the top flight since La Liga was inaugurated in 1929 is nothing short of a miracle, and political correctness should never be allowed to detract from this fact.

Real Sociedad's great start has also had the papers singing their praises, several of them pointing to the fact that it is 21 years since they led the league table by one point or more - the very season (1981-82) when they won their second consecutive title.

They've scored 17 goals in 6 games, and seem to have discovered a new star in the speedy little Turkish forward Nihat, a player whom Toshack brought over from Besiktas last season. The Welshman was sacked soon after, but his eye for a player has proved as unerring as ever, and the Turk is attracting all sorts of plaudits.

# Elsewhere, the big boys were falling like flies. Barcelona, Celta, Deportivo and Real Madrid all lost games that they were expected to win - if such a phrase is really valid these days, and Madrid's defeat at Santander was particularly interesting, given that the home side's second goal was scored by local hero Pedro Munitis, currently loaned out by the team that he sunk.

Not only is he on loan from Madrid but they are also stumping up 70 per cent of his wages. There was some controversy during the week prior to the game, since there was no written agreement that Munitis would not turn out against his official employers - a legal loophole that Santander decided to exploit.

Madrid, as far as is known, did not object, and since Munitis was up for it (he claims that he was cold-shouldered by the club last season) they wrote him onto the teamsheet. Inevitably, he scored, and should Madrid lose the title by three points this season, little Munitis is unlikely to be returning to the capital in a hurry.

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To Sue Garzon

The BBC published this article about the decision by the government of the Basque Autonomous Community to sue Baltasar Garzon for his ban an Batasuna, here you have it:

Thursday, 17 October, 2002, 17:41 GMT 18:41 UK

Basques sue Spanish judge

The government in Spain's autonomous Basque region is suing the country's leading judge, Baltasar Garzon, over his ban on the radical separatist party, Batasuna.

A spokesman for the governing Nationalist Basque Party (PNV) said Mr Garzon, a prominent Supreme Court magistrate, had encroached on the competence of the Basque authorities and violated the right to freedom of assembly.

The widely trailed move follows Judge Garzon's decision to suspend Batasuna over its alleged links to the Basque guerrilla group, ETA.

The PNV also said the judge had lost all sense of balance when he announced he was investigating ETA for alleged ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

The Spanish authorities, who have imposed a separate ban on Batasuna, have accused the PNV of colluding with terrorists.

The Basque Government said last month it would sue Judge Garzon after he slapped a three-year ban on Batasuna, which the Spanish Government says is the political wing of the armed ETA group, and prohibited all subsequent protests against his ruling.

A Basque government spokesman last month called the decision unjust and excessive, saying it "incriminated the majority of the Basque population".

'Ethnic cleansing'

In a writ issued on Thursday, Judge Garzon alleged that Batasuna was also involved in low-level ethnic cleansing by driving non-nationalists from the Basque country.

He alleges that their aim is to ensure a vote in favour of independence should the region hold a referendum.

This so-called purification of a society would, in his view, constitute a crime against humanity under international law.

The judge has asked the Spanish and Basque authorities for a list of those professionals, policemen and journalists who have left the Basque country because of violence and intimidation by ETA.

The Spanish El Mundo newspaper, close to the government in Madrid, criticised the writ, saying: "Garzon anticipates the conclusions of his inquiry, then looks for arguments to corroborate them."

However, Spanish Vice-President Mariano Rajoy welcomed Judge Garzon's order as a suitable response to alleged human rights violations in the Basque province.

The launch of this inquiry underlines Baltasar Garzon's determination to see a final end both to Batasuna and to ETA, says BBC Madrid correspondent Clare Marshall.

You would think that a high profile judge like Baltasar Garzon would know what "ethnic cleansing" means, after all, he allegedly went to school.

This is the definition of "ethnic cleansing":

Ethnic cleansing is a euphemism referring to the persecution through imprisonment, expulsion, or killing of members of an ethnic minority by a majority to achieve ethnic homogeneity in majority-controlled territory. It is sometimes used interchangeably with the more connotatively severe term genocide.

In this case the ethnic majority are the Spaniards, Garzon belongs to it. The ethnic minority are the Basques who have been enduring a genocidal occupation of their land since 1512.

So he understands, "ethnic cleansing" is what Spain did on 1937 when it ordered the carpet bombing of the towns of Durango and Gernika.

What Francisco Franco did in the southern portion of Euskal Herria from 1936 up to 1975 is also considered "ethnic cleansing".

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A Basque Pilot in Estonia

This information comes to us thanks to Basque Diaspora:

Benito Agirre, the pilot that never was

It happens that there is a Basque plane pilot buried in a town in Estonia, and there is a street named after him in that town. But the grave and the street bear a false name. There was never a pilot named so... but, yes, there was a true Basque pilot buried there, just that he was named otherwise... He was a young man, named Inazio Agirregoikoa. He was a natural of my hometown, Eibar, and he died at the age of 21 fighting the nazis as a pilot of the Soviet Red Army.

This is his story. The story of a son of the Basque diaspora buried in the most unexpected of places...

---

It happens that I have a friend in Estonia. A country in the Baltic, independent from the USSR since 1991. This man, Peeter Päll, is a linguist and works in the division of placenames of the Estonian Language Institute, sort of official academy there.

He is an expert in the field, and has a degree of official responsabilities also. Many issues about what should or should not be the official placename of Estonian places come to his desk and he investigates and informs authorities about those issues.

One day, he came to me with an interesting query. There was a Spanish pilot buried in a town in eastern Estonia, in the town of Mustvee, and he had a street named after him. The name of the street was in a cyrillic and russian form, and due to law changes, it had to be officially converted to the latin alphabet. My friend Peeter suspected that the "spanish" name sounded Basque, and consulted me about if that was true, and, if that was the case, which could the correct spelling in a latin alphabet form be.

It seemed that the man buried was named Benito Aguirre or Ignacio Benito Aguirre. As it was written in Russian, a direct Russian --> Estonian transliteration would have given Benito Agirre. My friend wanted to know which could be the best form to recommend for the street, Benito Agirre or Benito Aguirre. I told my friend that, being Agirre a Basque name, spelled as Agirre would be more correct. However, I promised to investigate to find out who Ignacio Benito Aguirre was, if he was Basque or not, whatever I could find...

In the meantime, in November 1999, the story of Benito Agirre and his street appeared at a Estonian newspaper, the Postimees. It is still online.

As it is told in that article, this was a fighter pilot of Spanish origin recruited by the Red Army and based in Gdov (on the other side of the Lake Peipsi) who returned from a mission on 9 March 1944 and was shot down near Mustvee.

As he was chased by the local police (Estonia was then occupied by Germany) he shot himself and was buried on the Mustvee cemetery. In 1965 a local school activist rediscovered the story and proposed that his name be remembered by giving it to a new street in Mustvee. So it was done and it is still there, puzzling some of the local inhabitants.

By the way, this article brought also an angry response from another reader who reminded that just on 9 March, 1944 there had been a terrible bombing of Tallinn during which a third of the city was destroyed by the Soviet air force. But we do not know if Agirre had taken part in it.

The story caught my attention, and as I had promised to search for the identity of that Benito Agirre, I did so.

The search produced no results. I contacted the association of Veterans of Spanish refugees gone to the Soviet Union and there was no Benito Aguirre, neither Ignacio Benito Aguirre in the archives or people lists. Yet, it must be that name that the pilot must have at his grave, as it is the one given in the Mustvee street...

So, who was Benito Agirre?

As a matter of fact. There was never a Benito Agirre in Estonia. The man buried in Mustvee is Inazio Agirregoikoa. Full name in spanish spelling: Ignacio Aguirregoicoa Benito, being Benito the 2nd family name.

I searched some books and bibliography and finnally found the correct reference in a rather suspicious edition, a neofascist looking spanish book:

- Españoles en la II. Guerra Mundial, El Frente del Este - editor, Ricardo Recio Cardona; Ediciones Vandalia, Madrid, 1999 (ISBN 84-930581-0-6). - (Spaniards in
World War II, The Eastern Front)

The book lists a list of Spanish soldiers dead in the ranks of the Red Army during the war. And there he is, Ignacio Aguirregoicoa Benito, born in Eibar in 1923 and dead in Tallinn (sic) in 1944.

So, he was a natural of my hometown, Eibar. The book also mentions that he was part of the first pilot crew formed with spanish pilots. Other basques were with him at the crew, as for instance, another natural of Eibar, Jose Luis Larrañaga, also born in 1923 and also dead in combat.

Three other people from Eibar died also in the war, all three in the Leningrad front...

Estonians or Russians or whoever buried the pilot, not accustomed to double family names as they are used in the Basque Country or Spain, misspelled the name, cutting the long and unpronounceable Aguirregoicoa to Aguirre and converting the 2nd family name, Benito, into a given name, quite understandably, because this Spanish name was well known throughout all war fronts thanks to Benito Mussolini (who, in turn, was given this Spanish name, Benito, in honour of the Mexican revolutionary, Benito Juarez; you know, Mussolini's father was a pro-revolutionary leftist).

I collected the new information, and sent it back to Estonia to my friend Peeter. He contacted the same journalist that wrote for Postimees, Juhani Püttsepp. Now Püttsepp works for another paper, but he seems to have been interested in this... And so, he published it in the Ekspress, last Thursday. There it is, online.

Now they know in Mustvee, thanks to the article, that the man buried there is not Benito Agirre, but Inazio Agirregoikoa. Will they change the name of the street? I don't know.

Personally, I have promised my Estonian contacts that I will try to convince the Town Council of Eibar to do something about it. There were many people from Eibar that went as child refugees in the Soviet Union in 1937... Five of them died fighting the Nazis. One of them has a street named after him (despite being an incorrect name)... I think Agirregoikoa deserves a true lasting homage. That could be a symbol for many others.

In Eibar, nowadays, will anyone remember Inazio Agirregoikoa. I want to find out about him also... There´s no Agirregoikoa in the local phone guide... But other "child refugees" may well remember him.

We'll see what's the output of this. The adventure of Inazio Agirregoikoa hasn't ended yet. That article in Estonia was just another chapter. I wish we can give a nice final chapter to this story.

Luistxo
Eibar

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Victims of Colonialism

We found out a couple of days ago that some Kurds, desperate to extract at least the minimum of recognition from Turkey, think that everything is peachy for the Basques and that we should renounce to any further demands for self determination.

Well, this time it is a Palestinian the one that has some wrong impressions about the Basque struggle.

Check out this article published at Al Ahram Weekly, I highlighted the paragraphs were the author's knowledge of the Basque conflict fails:

A staring contest

The Arab-Israeli conflict is no longer about the Palestinian state; it now concerns the terms of its creation. Azmi Bishara* urges the Palestinians not to blink first

At a sizable demonstration recently held in London to protest against a war on Iraq, the Palestinian flag stood out amidst the sea of banners. Curiously enough, it attracted little attention, as though it were entirely normal for the Palestinian symbol to assume prominence at such an event. But such an occurrence is not commonplace -- not in Europe at least -- considering that Israel has gone out of its way since 11 September to associate the Palestinian cause with terror, and considering that US President George W Bush claims that the Palestinian leadership is the main obstacle to peace in the Middle East. Yet, here we are: a demonstration in London, about Iraq, and the Palestinian flag is the most visible symbol.

Those who have tried to reduce the Palestinian issue to a question of terrorism have failed because the Palestinians' cause is a just one. Theirs is a clear case of occupation, and it is the last remaining colonial set-up in modern times. Palestine is the Arabs' open wound, and it hurts other nations too, for it evokes bad memories. Even those who do not view the creation of Israel as a matter of colonialism concede that the 1967 occupation, with its continued settlers' activity and the apartheid it generates, bears the hallmarks of colonialism. There is no two ways about it.

This moral, widely recognised aspect of the Palestinian issue has given it the strength to survive accusations of terrorism. It is the wind that makes the Palestinian flag fly high, even when the flags of other Arab countries are nowhere to be seen, and even in demonstrations concerning other causes. The Palestinian flag is the flag of a just cause, even by European standards, and even in countries that are allied with Israel. Neither the United Kingdom, nor France, nor any other country with a colonialist past can deny that. And the peoples of there sympathise with those forced to live under occupation.

The Palestinian issue has become a byword for oppression and injustice. This did not happen overnight, nor was it easily accepted by the Western left, with its sympathy towards the Jews. However, since the first Intifada erupted the Palestinian cause has increasingly become a symbol of injustice. And it has ceded none of the moral ground it gained.

The Palestinian struggle is not about secession. Palestine is not Kurdistan, Chechnya, Kashmir or the Basque country. While we may have different views on those cases and debate the appropriateness and intricacies of self-determination in each situation, none of them are instance of colonialism. The national aspirations and cultural identity of the communities in the above cases need to be addressed, but there is always room for compromise. The Palestinians have no such room, for theirs is not a matter of separatism. Israel is not offering citizenship to the Palestinians of the West Bank -- it is not even offering a second-class status. The structure of relations between those Palestinians and Israel is relentlessly colonial. No one can claim otherwise, not even the Americans.

The United States will not suggest that the Palestinians be slaughtered, or even assimilated in the state that was built upon the ruins of their own, as was the case, for example, with the Native Americans. Even Washington has to deal with the Palestinian issue in terms of colonialism, liberation and independence. Wars may break out, battles may be won or lost, but nothing will change this.

Currently, the conflict is about the conditions for ending colonialism. The West, the United States, and even Israel have endorsed the Palestinian state in principle. Consequently, the conflict is now about the conditions for establishing that state. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, as he prepares for war against Iraq despite overwhelming domestic opposition, has recently felt obliged to call for the speedy creation of a Palestinian state. Forget it, Tony. There is no conflict over the creation of such a state, to start with. And the "speedy" part does not impress anyone, not to mention that Britain is in no position to do anything about it.

The Guardian, on 5 October, reported that Bush was angry with Blair over his remarks on a Palestinian state on the basis that priority should be given to the war against Iraq and the US president's view that there is no need to apologise constantly about Palestine. This is the Israeli position, verbatim. Yet, before some Palestinians welcome Blair's comments, it bears mentioning that the quarrel during and since Camp David is not about the Palestinian state as such, but about its borders, about Jerusalem being its capital and about the settlements. The issue of the refugees also remains unresolved. Whatever happens, one should not welcome statements that are designed to placate the public and divert attention from the war against Iraq, a war that has nothing to do with the suffering of the Iraqis at Saddam Hussein's hands.

Even if Blair made the comments in another context, they would still be irrelevant. What the United Kingdom and other influential countries should do is define their position on the borders of the Palestinian state, on settlements, on Jerusalem and on refugees. This is where the action is. Anything else is a waste of time.

The Palestinians have to keep this in mind, for they are likely to be told, exactly as during the Gulf War, that after America finishes with Iraq, it will pay more attention to them and hopefully give them a state.

The fact is the weaker the Arabs are, the weaker the Palestinians are. This equation is at the heart of US policy. If the war against Iraq is successful, the American camp will find its voice. 'The Intifada is wreaking havoc on us', you'll hear them say. 'We should have accepted what we were offered at Camp David', they are likely to add. But the Palestinian people, who, through action and not words, have turned the state into a definite prospect, would continue to struggle for better terms. The American camp would harp on fears of transfer. Some people would try to scare the Palestinians, including Israel's Arabs, with the prospect of transfer. If you deny that Israel could take such an action, you appear to be defending Israel. If, alternatively, you admit the theoretical possibility, the conclusion some may draw is that the Palestinians have to accept what is on offer.

How low can one stoop for personal gains -- could this extend to ending the resistance or capitulating to US conditions, which is just what some Arabs want. Forget about the resistance, the United States, and the haggling involved. Israel cannot do anything it wants. And the Palestinian people are not sheep bound for the slaughter. The Palestinian cause is solid and fair, so much so that it lends its mantle to others who need support. Remember when Jewish militants entered Khan Yunis to terrorise its people, they had to commit a massacre. Now think, what would happen if they enter Palestinian areas to force its residents out? Would the Palestinian people, with memories of previous exoduses so bitterly vivid, turn tail? Transfer is not a word to be spoken lightly.

We have come to the end of the conflict over Palestinian rights. We are at the point of defining the terms for a lasting solution. And, hard as Sharon may stare into our eyes, we cannot afford to blink. Do not forget that the Israelis are also in a dilemma. They too are fighting for terms that suit them. They too are racing against time.

* The writer is a leading Palestinian political activist and member of the Knesset.

Dear Mr. Bishara, the Basque Country, then called Navarre, was invaded and later colonized by Castille (today Spain) in 1512. Thousands of Basques (Navarrese) were killed defending their land. Only in the Battle of Noain that took place in 1522 the death toll raised to 5,000 Basques killed in action.

But don't worry, you have the full support of the Basque people, Israel must withdraw and put an end to the genocidal war against the Palestinians.

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The Kurds and The Basques II

Here you have the second part of the essay published by Kurdish Media:

Challenge to the Transition and ETA’s Movement for the Basque Separatism

KurdishMedia.com - By Welat Lezgin
10/07/2002 00:00:00

Continued from

Until 1978, the problem of ethnic-nationalism not only remained unchallenged, but it was made worse by the policies of the Francoist regime which radically opposed to all the regional claims in favour of ‘centralism’ – which in fact was not a centralism of Castille or even Madrid, but of the State above the people. [1] According to Conversi, at the end of Francoism, not only was Francoism doomed but the very idea of the Spanish State was not legitimate in the Basque Country. This remained the case at least until the late 1980s, well after the Transition had run its course. [2] ETA’s violence during this period was at its peak. As Robert Clark puts it:

“The Basque region during these days was like a pressure cooker about to explode. Sentiments for change had been so sharply suppressed during the dictatorship of Franco that there had been little opportunity for the expression of dissent with dictator gone, Basques now sought to release the pressures built up over the preceding forty years.” [3]

There are several reasons why the violence by ETA continued despite the historic changes in Spain. On several occasions ETA was convinced that the Basque Country was on the verge of national extinction, of being erased from the map of peoples, because its language and culture were slowly dying out and its customs were being replaced by the alien ones. [4] Hence, they saw a peremptory and urgent need to put an end to this progressive disappearance. To achieve this end, the establishment of an independent Basque country was pivotal. As Conversi puts it:

“The subordination of cultural to political goals is reflected in an eschatological vision of independence as a panacea for all problems of cultural identity, in particular the recovery of the language: ‘There is only one path to save Euskera: political independence for -Euzkadi’. [5]

But also by now, due to Franco’s harsh oppressive policies, ETA had become highly radicalised and had experienced extensive splits. In its earlier days ETA was a heterogeneous organisation, made up of an uncomfortable mix of nationalists, socialists, students, labour activists and rural Catholic youth. By the late 1960s ETA was being pulled in at least three ideological directions: (1) toward a new Left, proletarian tradition; (2) a guerrilla national front tradition; and (3) non-violent, ethically oriented, cultural tradition. This heterogeneity resulted in a series of splits. In 1966 – 1967, ETA split into ETA-Berri (New ETA) and ETA-Zarra (Old ETA); in 1970, it split into ETA-V (followers of the program of the Fifth Assembly) and ETA-VI (Sixth Assembly). The final split took place in 1974 between ETA (m) and ETA (pm) and ETA as we know it is ETA Militar, which continues to use violent methods to this day. [6]

Despite conflicts over the use of violence within the organisation, ETA’s military activities have continued unabated. The outcome of every internal dispute on the matter had been the expulsion or defection of the advocates of non-violent means. [7] In the 1970s a similar pattern in ETA’s evolution began to acquire a quicker tempo as the more experienced and mature leaders of ETA were killed or forced into exile, younger and more radical ones quickly replaced them in a process that currently continues. The Military front, composed predominantly of very young people, became more and more uncontrollable, while its autonomous initiatives provoked further conflict. Therefore violence has become, a self-generating mechanism, a vicious circle very difficult to stop. Violence also served to complement internal fragmentation. Since 1975, and as a result of many splits, ETA has become progressively dominated by groups who spend little time debating ideological issues and see military confrontation as the only way to achieve their goal of independence for Euzkadi. [8] What is interesting to note is that while Spain was being painfully transformed into a democratic and a devolved state, ETA had transformed in the opposite direction where moderates and those against the armed struggle had been eradicated from the organisation. [9]

To understand the continuation of violence and the ideological void of ETA we also need to look at ETA’s action/repression/action theory. According to this theory, attacks on the Francoist state would lead to universal repression, which would lead to greater popular anger, which would spiral into mass rebellion, eventually resulting in the civil war and the Basque secession. [10] As predicted by Fanon, the state violence as an indispensable ingredient in spreading a general ‘national awareness’ among the wider population instigated them to fight back. [11] In synthesis, the adoption of the Third Worldist models could not be realised without the state repression and this repression was the central part of the ‘theory of action/repression/action’ taken up by ETA. [12] This theory of violence as the only solution was obviously also determined by the prevailing internal condition of ruthless dictatorship in Spain. [13] What mattered to ETA was that the nation found itself in a lethal situation and that, in order to save her, it was urgent to adopt a series of drastic measures. As a consequence it considered the will of the Basque people to recover their national identity as the only valid element to save the nation. [14]

The role of state repression in cementing a common identity out of previous anthropological chaos should be emphasised here. While the police actions hampered the activities and mobilisation of ETA on various occasions, the indiscriminate repression of the Francoist regime generated a climate of understanding and support for ETA activists among the certain nationalist sectors and clandestine left-wing organisations. In the Basque Country political violence responded both to an internal logic (the need to foster unity in the organisation) and an external logic (the need to respond to the challenge of the state). However, at any moment of the stormy ideological debate within ETA, violent factions seized the initiative. This direct action, and not ideology or culture, showed the way to follow in order to achieve mass mobilisation and the public support. The hard-liners, with their attacks, overcame the ideological debate and demonstrated the simple reality that only direct action could achieve popular support and even extend mobilisation to the non-ethnic population of the Basque homeland.

During the Franco period, there were strands of shared meaning as to what it meant to be a “Basque”. There was (1) a myth, a shared understanding of an ancient Basque past (including the Fueros), (2) an awareness of the structural pressures for the extinction of the Basque culture, which increased the participative function of the Basque language, music, games, etc., and its capacity for symbolising solidarity and differentiability, and (3) anti-state violence, as an expression of the direct Basque action. Yet, the symbols perceived to be “Basque” – including the Fueros as well as the Basque language – were defined largely by their transgression from and rejection of the centralist regime. There was no consensus as to the nature of the new Basque identity in the post-Franco state, or even about how to define the Basque identity. The old method of the action-repression theory continued to hide such worries.

In general terms, a common feature of the insurgent nationalist guerrillas in various countries is their relation with, and even dependence on, the state repression. All over the world, a plethora of nationalities and former tribes are drawn into violent confrontation with the state as a result of decades of coercion by the central authorities which is largely illegitimate. The more recent the memories of suffering and horrors, the more acute the conflict seem to be, as ETA’s hold on the armed struggle shows. The principle of ‘retaliation’ as expressed in the theory of action/repression/action was the key one, which in practice remained constant for ETA throughout its long history of splits and mutations within the party itself. [15]

For the first time since the Civil War, political channels were open for the Basques to peacefully negotiate their legitimate rights. As explained above this dilemma was overcome by the emphasis on the continuation of the action/repression theory, which in return made the Spanish government respond to ETA attacks by anti-terrorist laws and police measures that reminded many Basques of some of the worst features of Francoism. [16] These anti-terrorist laws helped the survival of the perception of the state as a terrorist machine after the demise of the dictatorship but also kept ETA’s recruitment machine alive. Despite its external image as a “terrorist” organisation, ETA enjoyed significant popular support under Francoism (and indeed well until the 1980s.) in the Basque country. Most Basques felt more threatened by Spanish security forces than by ETA. Whereas ETA killed 6 people in the 12 months prior to Franco’s death, Spanish police and civil guards killed 22, and injured 105 a trend that continued well into the 1980s. [17] ETA was viewed in terms of “patriotic action”, rather than of (irrational) terrorism. [18] Basque nationalist parties alleged that repression continued unabated after Franco’s death. For instance, the anti-terrorist laws, some of which were later condemned as unconstitutional, resulted in arbitrary arrests and detentions. [19] Widespread opposition to the law was being expressed through popular demonstrations in several Spanish regions. Furthermore, the murder of Basque political exiles in France by the GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion) a self-styled ‘anti-terrorist’ commando group, provoked angry popular demonstrations, and revealed a political scandal. [20]

Instead of assisting and fighting for Basque rights (even the right to self-determination) through peaceful means, due to the reasons explained above, [21] ETA continued its violence and as Conversi explains:

“The intrinsic confrontational character of Basque mobilisations, a partial fulfilment of the ‘action/repression/action theory’ envisaged by ETA’s first theorists, has in many ways handicapped any peaceful solution of the conflict.” [22]

While ETA’s violent methods were the voice of the Basque people but also the voice of dissidence during the Franco years, with the transition to democracy, ETA’s violence almost resulted in the abrupt end of democracy with the attempted coup on February 23, 1981. [23] As democratic reforms progressed – and ETA violence increased – reactionary sectors of the armed forces grew more volatile. In addition to increasing skirmishes between ETA, the police and the army in the Basque country, between 1978 and 1982, five different plans for a coup d’etat against the democratic regime were uncovered. [24]

The 1988 inter-party agreement to condemn violence unreservedly and to marginalise those who refused to do so played a big role in the marginalisation of the support for ETA’s violence. Known as the Pact of Ajura Enea, it was signed by all significant players in Basque politics apart from ETA’s political wing HB (Herri Batasuna). HB has suffered steady erosion of its support, which reflects ETA’s political marginalisation. That is apparent also in another way. Ross, J. has argued that to a significant extent, support for HB is unconnected with regionalist sentiment. Instead, it comes from disoriented and disillusioned young people in a society particularly hard hit by social problems, who sympathise primarily with ETA’s anti-state violence. [25]

With the establishment of democracy in Spain, many formerly private and semi-clandestine initiatives passed into the public hands. The nationalist movement was formalised and became articulated in different political parties. As the political struggle became institutionalised, the civil society which was previously ETA’s only support, begun to lose its former role. [26] The advent of democracy and the arrival on the political scene of a greater number of political parties resulted in the emergence in the Basque Country of a political-party system similar to the one seen for so long in the Catalonia region. The Basques voted in favour of the Statue of Autonomy, which was negotiated on behalf of the Basque people by the PNV (‘Basque Nationalist Party’), and a majority of them chose the bourgeois nationalist parties over the revolutionary nationalist organisations in the electoral contests. The popular support for independence seemed to have diminished up to the present era and the legitimacy of ETA’s actions were questioned more seriously by its potential sources of support amongst the people of the Basque Country.

Conclusion

The right to self-determination and secession is one of the most controversial issues both in the European and the world political contexts. This is particularly the case since the division of political units concerns the nation-state, which is located in a strategically sensitive area in Europe. Since the attacks on the World Trade Centre in the United States on September the 11th, any attempt to achieve self-determination by violent means is doomed to face the label of terrorism. This current context is in contrast to the ongoing process of fragmentation as more independent States continue to emerge on the map of World Politics.

The emphasis on the preservation of the map of international relations and the view that the nation-state is the final political structure can be a flawed argument. Regionalism is one of the challenges to the Centralist thesis of the nation-state also both in the European and non-European contexts. It is important to put these two arguments, namely those of the nation-state as the ideal and ultimate political form as opposed to its further fragmentation, in a comparative perspective at a time when, as Harold Isaacs argues, ‘two thirds of the world has barely begun to emerge from pre-industrial era and before most of the world’s people could glean any advantages at all from industrialisation and modernisation’. [27]

In Europe the nation-state has become under heavy pressure both from above by the supranational organisation of the European Union and from below by the regional powers and separatist movements, such as ETA’s struggle for the Basque Country in Southern Europe. As Wallace puts it, ‘to a remarkable degree, the processes of government in Europe overlap and interlock: among different states, between different levels of governance below and above the old locus of sovereignty in the nation-state’. As a result of this, the continent where nationalism and the nation-state first emerged after the French Revolution is going through an historical process of devolution where the national States, regional sentiments, minority identities and ethnic-nationalisms aim to get the chance to bypass the traditional nation-state. Although this recent trend should not be exaggerated, it is encouraging at the same time as the Catalan case demonstrates.

The Basque citizens have gained a broad-ranging Autonomy Statute over the course of the recent decades and an unprecedented level of self-government not enjoyed by any other European region. At the same European level, the nation-states can show a greater understanding for the self-government of the regional identities for their autonomous development as a democratic-constitutional necessity against the political manifestations of separatist ethnic nationalism. The right for the preservation and representation of ethnic identity, culture and language is a democratic right, which should not be seen as a threat to the ‘unity’ of the nation-state. As this essay has demonstrated, the repression of ethnic nationalism without any consideration of these basic rights and freedoms helps its growth and mobilisation across the society.

The dilemma between Centralist repression and unlimited political freedom has been at the centre stage of ETA’s separatist campaign and the Spanish government’s response increasingly after the end of the oppressive Franco regime. Democratic transition has brought into question the legitimacy of the Basques’ armed struggle both in the eyes of the Spanish public and within the organisation itself. At the same time, for many within ETA, the transition represented an opportunity to use violence to force Madrid to concede Basque independence. It is perfectly possible for ethnic minorities to succeed in their language and identity revival and national survival within a democratic nation-state. The possibility of national co-existence and the possession of multiple-identities can help to overcome the challenge of regional separatism as long as the essential element of a strong democratic context and self-government gain the upper hand.

Footnotes:

1. Maries, J. (1990) Understanding Spain. San Juan: University of Puerto Rico Press. p. 413

2. Conversi, D. (1997) p. 141.

3. Clark, R. P. (1984) The Basque Insurgents. ETA, 1952-1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. p. 90

4. Conversi, D. (1997) p. 241. An ETA document produced in 1979 reveals to us the importance of the Basque language in defining the Basque identity: “Since the times of Machiavelli [language] is an extremely well-known political counsel, and one which works infallibly, that to kill a pueblo there is nothing more deadly than to kill its language. A pueblo which stops speaking its language is a pueblo which has died. A pueblo which changes its language for that of its neighbour, is a pueblo which changes its soul for that of its neighbour.” See, ETA (1979), Documentos, 18 vols. San Sebastian quoted in: MacClancy, J. ‘Bilingualism and Multinationalism in the Basque Country’ in: Mar-Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (Eds.) (1996) Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities. Oxford: Berg. p. 211.

5. Conversi, D. (1997).

6. Zirakzadeh, C. (1991) A rebellious people. Reno. University of Nevada Press. p. 143.

7. Jauregui, B. (1981) Ideologia y estrategia politica de ETA. Madrid Siglo XXI. Cited in: Medrano, J. D. (1995) Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia. London: Cornell University Press. p. 149.

8. Ibid. p. 149.

9. On internal killings within ETA see: States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1 program on ETA, dated December 1st 1993.

10. Clark, R. P. (1990) Negotiating with ETA. Reno. University of Nevada. p. 8-9.

11. See: Fanon, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin Books.

12. Conversi, D. (1997). p. 244.

13. It is important to keep in mind that, at its inception, ETA did not advocate violence as a method of achieving political change, but was forced onto this road by the tactics of the Franco regime and its gratuitous physical suppression of any visible symbol of Basque national identity. See: Moxon-Brown, E. (1989). Political Change in Spain. London: Routledge. p.52

14. Jauregui, B. G. (1981) Ideologia y estrategia politica de ETA. Analisis de su evolucion entre 1958 y 1968. Madrid: Siglo XXI. p.151. Quoted in: Conversi, D. (1997). p.240.

15. A survey carried out by Irvin, L. C. which shows the distribution of ideologues, radicals and politicos in Herri Batasuna by the period in which they became active, supports the argument that regime repression, unless extremely severe, serves as a stimulus rather then a brake on the general recruitment of activists into militant nationalist organisations. See: Irvin, L. C. (1999) Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. p.199-200.

16. Clark, R. P. (1984). p. 103-105, 252.

17. Sullivan, J. (1988). ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euzkadi, 1890-1986. London: Routledge. p. 94.

18. According to a poll conducted in 1979, over half the Basques surveyed thought that ETA militants were “patriots” or “idealists” and only 14 percent considered them “madmen” or “criminals”. See: Desfor Edles, L. (1998) Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.128.

19. Clark, R. P. (1991).

20. GAL, a death squad created to wage a dirty war against ETA resulted in a major scandal that damaged the credibility of the Spanish State and the democratic transition. While GAL’s ruthless killings of ETA leaders dealt a big blow to ETA, these acts at the same time helped ETA’s recruitment activities as GAL had shown a darker side of the Spanish State. The GAL scandal uncovered by El Mundo revealed that top leaders including the Minister of the Interior, Jose Barrionuevo, were allegedly directly involved and that GAL mercenaries were paid with public funds. The scandal grew as rumours suggested as many as nine of the GAL’s twenty-seven victims may have had nothing to do with terrorism. See: Woodworth, P. (2001) Dirty War Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy. Cork: Cork University Press. The issue is also extensively examined in: States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1 on 01 December 1993.

21. Besides, as a proof for total belief in violence to reach their aims, Spanish democracy is seen by ETA as a “sham bourgeois democracy” to be used as a tool but not as an aim as a matter of fact. The following extract reveals this: “It is necessary to participate in the legal framework of bourgeois democracy . . . However, . . . a revolutionary strategy cannot limit it self to this path . . . . . to fall into electoralism is to suppress political principles for the sake of securing a certain number of votes . . . . Experience teaches us that it is utopian to believe that in playing the game we will receive any real advantages; and little is it possible to use those institutions as a tribunal in which to denounce them because we are there.” See, ETA (Commandos Autonomous), internal discussion document (1979) p. 275. Also see Paddy Bolger, interview in IRIS, 7 (November 1983): 7. Cited in Irvin, L. C. (2001). p.6.

22. Ibid. p.158.

23. On 23 February 1981 a session of the Spanish parliament was interrupted by a group of Civil guards led by Colonel Antonio Tejero, who seized the assembly and held the MPs prisoner for more than a day. A providential intervention by the King prevented the attempted coup. This coup attempt had long-lasting and damaging implications for the young democracy and halted further democratic progress, especially in matters of regional devolution. See: Aguero, F. (1995) Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. London: Johns Hopkins University Press. p.161-180.

24. Gilmour, D. (1985) The Transformation of Spain. London: Quartet Books. p. 230.

25. Ross, J. C. (1997) Contemporary Spain: A Handbook. London: Arnold. p.93.

26. What happened to ETA is not very different from what happened to the PSUC in Catalonia, or the Spanish Communist Party. Despite their having led the opposition to Franco during the 1960 and 1970s, all of them were defeated in elections by more moderate parties. The fact that this happened reveals that the role of political capital and the logic of mobilisation in shaping political structures are constrained by socio-economic structural conditions, which in the end determine what is and what is not politically possible.

27. Isaacs, H. R. (1989). Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. p.215

28. Wallace, W. 1999. ‘The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox’, in Political Studies. Vol. 47. p.503.

Sources:

Aguero, F. (1995) Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Clark, R. P. (1990) Negotiating with ETA. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Clark, R. P. (1984) The Basque Insurgents. ETA, 1952 - 1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Desfor Edles, L. (1998) Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fanon, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin Books.

Gilmour, D. (1985) The Transformation of Spain. London: Quartet Books.

Heywood, P. (ed.) (1999) Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Irvin, L. C. (1999) Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Isaacs, H. R. (1989). Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Maries, J. (1990) Understanding Spain. San Juan: University of Puerto Rico Press.

Mar-Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (Eds.) (1996) Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities. Oxford: Berg.

Medrano, J. D. (1995) Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia. London: Cornell University Press.

Moxon-Brown, E. (1989). Political Change in Spain. London: Routledge.

Ross, J. C. (1997) Contemporary Spain: A Handbook. London: Arnold.

Sullivan, J. (1988). ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euzkadi, 1890-1986. London: Routledge.

Woodworth, P. (2001) Dirty War Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy. Cork: Cork University Press.

Zirakzadeh, C. (1991) A rebellious people. Reno. University of Nevada Press.

Wallace, W. 1999. ‘The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox’. Political Studies. Vol. 47.

States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1, 01/12/93.

The Basques will forever support the right to the self determination of the Kurdish people, no matter what the Turkish nor the Syrians nor the Iraqis nor the Iranians nor the Armenians have to say about it, citing their own constitutions and their laws.

This is the link to the first part.

.... ... .

The Kurds and The Basques

Here you have this interesting essay published by Kurdish Media:

Democratic Transition within the Spanish Constitutional Framework: The Case of the Basque Country

KurdishMedia.com - By Welat Lezgin
10/07/2002 00:00:00

There are many similarities between the opressed Basque and Kurdish ethnic-nationalisms. Both the Basque and the Kurdish issues are heavily influenced by the global changes and are trans-national. Although this essay concentrates specifically on the Basque question, Kurds can draw some useful conclusions from it.

However, there is one thing that should be kept in mind when reading this essay. The process of the erosion of the nation-state, and in paralell to that the rise of regionalism, which has been gaining pace in Europe, has not reached the states that control Kurdistan. The states that occupy Kurdish territories manage their Kurds with the same policies as Franco managed its Basque population during his ruthless reign. The biggest difference is that while the oppressive regime of Franco is long gone leaving his place to a vibrant Spanish civil and democratic society, unfortunately the Kurds are still heavily oppressed, probably by the most backward regimes this planet has ever seen.

Introduction

During the past decade we have witnessed intensifying ethnic conflicts, serious suffering and loss of lives from Bosnia, Kosovo and Kurdistan to Chechenya and beyond in many conflict areas around the world. As Anthony Smith argues, ‘it has become commonplace to recognise the 1990s as the decade of recrudescent ethno-nationalism’.[1] With the development of modernisation through industrialisation, liberal democracy, capitalist economy and universal literacy, nationalism emerged and nation-states were established in the 18th and 19th Century European politics as one of the historical consequences of the French Revolution. Later on, in the wider world through colonial expansion and incorporation, the extension of nationalism and the international system brought together various population groups within the same political units.

For some of these political units the historical progress has not been easy, however. In those countries both in Europe and beyond, where the state-building process has been problematic, the dominant or colonising ethno-nations either supplanted or absorbed the subordinate ethno-nations through a structural assimilation process. They created a system of exploitation by their exclusionist policies, forced assimilation and the denial of civil rights for the other nationalities. This oppression and inequality of citizenship rights contribute to the development of a collective political consciousness and ethno-nationalism by the subordinate ethno-national communities. The denial of identity and ethnic differences, as it happened during the Franco regime in Spain the consequences of which will be examined in detail here, create a political ground for the suppressed communities to seek their self-determination by ousting the foreign rulers and by trying to reshape the states’ despotic political structures, in the case of the Basque Country after the 1978 Spanish constitution for example.[2]

Some ethnic identities with their own distinctive cultures and identity feel on the verge of extinction and aim to save their political future. The regionalist movements can choose violent methods and carry out an armed struggle to establish a more independent political future for themselves, as it has happened in the case of the emergence and continuation of the ETA movement for the same example we study here. Even beyond this European context in the international world, ethnic violence and the regionalist autonomy movements created a system where the modern wars have become intra-, rather than inter-, state since the end of the Second World War.[3] Although it is hoped that the advent of a global culture will inspire peace, prosperity and a general lessening of conflicts, it is not easy to achieve this as a quick glance at the world map of ethnic conflicts would show.[4]

The Basque Autonomy and the 1978 Spanish Constitution

In relation to nationalism in Spain, as Conversi argued, and in parallel with the explanation we gave earlier about the reasons for ethnic conflict, modernity replaces the traditional markers of ethnicity through the subsequent processes of nationalism, namely state centralisation, assimilation of the local elites, and finally the mass migration.[5] In many other cases as well as in the Spanish context, this erosion of traditional societies has created difficult historical memories and caused the development of the aim of independence, despite the cultural assimilation attempts we referred to above. Taken together, these changes in the cultural and political life of the nations give rise to ethnic conflicts, further nationalist mobilisation and the separatist regional movements.[6]

Since we aim to examine the Basque case, we first need to look at the state response for the recognition of the Basque identity in detail here. We will specifically concentrate on the current Spanish Constitution and discuss the position of the minorities, and the Basques in particular. In this context, we will argue that support for secession and independence can diminish if there is a genuine democratic transformation, if the regional ethnic identity is well represented and an advanced level of self-government is allowed.

The landmark 1978 Spanish Constitution was the product of the consensus achieved between the main political parties, which arose out of the fall of the Franco regime. One of the important problems to tackle there was the issue of ethno-nationalism. It is not surprising, therefore, to see in the Constitution that nearly one-tenth of the text is specifically concerned with the regional issues.[7] Also, during the sixteen months of constitutional debates, the autonomy issue for the Basque country became by far the most controversial topic for the discussions.[8]

A key point in this constitutional discussion was the respect for regional languages and the provision for the public awareness of linguistic diversities in the country. The acceptance of this fact, as well as the formal State language, can be seen in the Article 3 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, which stipulates that:

“Castillian is the official language of the State. All Spaniards have a duty to know it and the right to use it. The other Spanish languages will also be official in their respective Autonomous Communities according to their own Statues. The richness of the distinct linguistic modalities of Spain represents a patrimony, which will be the object of special respect and protection.”

The Constitution also stipulated the national integrity of Span and it warned against any possible misinterpretations in this respect. According to the Article 2:

“The Constitution is based on the indivisible unity of the Spanish Nation, common and indivisible fatherland of all the Spaniards. It acknowledges and guarantees the right to Autonomy of the nationalities and regions, which form it and the solidarity among them.”[9]

An important note for the above stipulation of Article 2 can also be found in the Article 145 of the Constitution, which explains that no federation between Autonomous Communities can be permitted under any circumstances.[10] The most fundamental aspect of the Constitution was its acknowledgement of the existence of other ‘nationalities’ only within the boundaries of one and indivisible Spanish ‘nation’. The three other nationalities, not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, were Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. But the obvious difficulty was to extend decentralisation to most other regions and, using Conversi’s word, ‘relativising’ the potential impact of the Basque and Catalan autonomies.[11]

In one way or another, a balance had to be struck between the parties of the Right and the autonomist movement to overcome the fear that any reference to the nationalities of Spain and the preference of the Left for a federal-type solution represented a threat to the national unity. The need to obtain the support of the both sides generated endless discussions in the writing of the constitution and it contributed to the lack of precision and incoherence in some parts of the text, especially in the sections regarding the historical nationalities. Nevertheless, in the end of this process, and for the first time in the nation’s history, Spain would have a constitution which was not the consequence of the opposition of any significant political force against the others. No one agreed with the entire constitutional text, but almost no one felt it was absolutely unacceptable, either.[12] . More importantly, the fascist character of Spanish nationalism defended by Francoism was seriously questioned by the 1978 Constitution, which not only aimed at the transformation of Spain into a democratic state, but also admitted the existence of national minorities within its territory as a crucial part of this democratisation process.

Another positive point for the tolerance of the other ethnic groups was that at each stage of its approval large majorities supported the Constitution, which in the end created the belief that this was a Constitution ‘of all the people for all the people’. It is also important to note that when Spaniards went to the polls on 6 December 1978, the Constitution was approved by 87.8 percent of the voters. While the percentage of abstentions, 32 percent in Spain as a whole and 56 percent in parts of the Basque Country, gave the government and the major opposition parties some cause for concern, the Spanish people seemed to have voted convincingly to open a new democratic chapter in the country’s history.[13]

By emphasising the indissoluble unity of Spain, while recognising and guaranteeing the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions, the Constitution put forward a radically new model of the state, which rejected the Francoist centralism. But even more importantly, as we have seen earlier, the Article Two attempted to reconcile the two opposing conceptions of Spain, which were at stake during the Spanish Civil War. ‘Unity’ had to be preserved even though it was dramatically challenged by the recognition of the existence of ‘nationalities and regions’ within Spain. In this context, the reference to ‘the Spanish nation’ as the ‘common patria’ of all Spaniards seemed compatible with the existence of the other ‘little patrias’, such as Catalonia or the Basque Country.[14]

The Constitution also recognises and protects the right to ‘express and disseminate freely thoughts, ideas and opinions by word, in writing or any other means of reproduction’ (Article 20.1). In the following paragraph, the Article 20.2 forbids any form of prior censorship, something that was widely practised during the greater part of the Franco regime. Article 20.3, in a highly significant statement, ensures that the means of communication belonging to the state or other public entities shall be subject to parliamentary control and that access shall be guaranteed to all the social and political groups by ‘respecting the pluralism of society and the various languages of Spain’. On the right of assembly, which is another critical issue for the tolerance of ethno-nationalist differences, the Article 21.2 recognises the right of assembly provided that it is peaceful and it does not involve the use of violence. Assemblies in the public places and demonstrations require the permission of the authorities but can only be forbidden when there is a serious risk to public order or to the safety of the people and property.

Finally, on the right of association, the Article 22 recognises the right of association for all organisations, except for those whose objectives include activities declared to be of a criminal nature. Secret or paramilitary organisations are also banned in the same provision, which has particular relevance to political parties and workers’ organisations and trade unions. Over the last century the groups in Spain, as well as in other European countries, have waged an often one-sided battle to have these political and economic rights recognised. This development in Spanish history was also significant since it came after forty years of illegality for any organisation which did not conform in its aims and ideology to the narrow views of Franco’s National Movement.[15]

Overall, the 1978 Constitution rejects exclusive nationalism, whether it is the Spanish nationalism to the exclusion of the other group rights, or peripheral nationalism which rejects the State sovereignty with the probable inclusion of the other communities against the Central State nationalism on the basis of their claim to difference. But all the seventeen autonomous communities are now subject not only to the Constitution but also their own statues of autonomy, which govern all aspects of political life at regional level. In effect, they constitute regional constitutions. At the simplest level, a statue enables a region to organise its own institutions of self-government and establish the parameters of its own particular relationship with the central authorities.

It is interesting to note that, although these statues have many features in common, because each is the result of a long process of political negotiation, they all have individual features which reflect their own special relationship with Madrid. The Basque Statue, enshrines the restoration of the economic agreements, involving certain tax-raising privileges, while the Catalan Statute grants the region considerable freedom in matters related to education, culture and language. In common with the federal systems, with which the structure of the state had so much in common, the autonomous communities were granted the right of legislation and to execute and administer the laws through their provincial delegations. With this establishment of Autonomous Communities, the Basque and the Catalan regions also received the right to establish autonomous education systems, separate police forces and independent television networks. Additionally, the Basque and Catalan languages gained an official status alongside the Castillian in their own regions.[16]

These steps were taken to ensure a smooth democratic transition for all the peoples of Spain after the Second World War and its aftermath. However, given the expectations surrounding this programme of regionalism amongst the historic nationalities, and the economic climate for any territorial settlement in the 1970s and 1980s, it became inevitable that the reforms would fail to satisfy all the national and regional interest groups in the Spanish territory. The process of devolution has often been muddled and indecisive, although by the late 1980s major reforms had been implemented. Overall, this historic decentralisation process was probably unparalleled in terms of speed and scale elsewhere in the Western Europe.

Authentic autonomy also required the control of the financial resources. Article 156 of the Constitution recognised the right of the autonomous communities to financial autonomy, which is guaranteed in the Statues of Autonomy. The regional governments have been granted considerable freedom in spending and drawing up their own budgets, but were also subjected to strict limitations for levying their own taxes (or to share the taxes levied by the state). Over the past decade (in the 1990s), the regional governments had to take responsibility for increasingly large budgets and they managed substantial human, material and financial resources.[17]

On the issue of funds, while fifteen of the autonomous communities rely largely on the state to transfer funds in their direction, the Basque Country and Navarre enjoy the benefits of their historic rights (fueros). The Basque populated provinces (Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya) and the single province of Navarre, have the right to levy and collect all taxes, except for the custom duties and the taxes on petroleum products and tobacco. Furthermore, with respect to public security, Article 149 allowed fully autonomous regions to create their own regional police forces. The first region to take advantage of this was the Basque Country, which in 1980 created its own force, the Ertzaintza.

As it is seen in the examination above, the modern Spanish State has become highly de-centralised and extensive powers have been devolved to the regions, especially the Catalan and Basque regions due to their historical background and the level of ethnic consciousness. What we will be examining and discussing now is the development of Basque separatism and its continuation despite the democratic transition and the devolved powers for the region. What we are aiming to understand is how the democratic change has undermined the support for separatism and the armed struggle. We will also aim to explain why, despite the extensive devolution of power from the core to the peripheries, the radical Basque separatist organisation ETA (‘Basque Homeland and Freedom’) has been persistent in pursuing the political aim of creating an independent Basque Country by violent means.

Notes

Smith, A. 1999. ‘Ethnic election and national destiny: some religious origins of nationalist ideal’, Nations and Nationalism 5 (3), p.331-55. Ignatieff takes this further by arguing that ‘the key language of our age is ethnic-nationalism’. Ignatieff, M. (1994) Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Millennium. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. p. 5.

2 Smith, A. (1991) National Identity. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press.

3 This was pointed out by Wilson, R. ‘The politics of contemporary ethno-nationalist conflicts’, in Nations and Nationalism. 7 (3), 2001, p.368. The role of the state oppression is also important here as it helps to radicalise the movement of that specific identity.

4 For a general, global overview of ethnic conflicts, see Gurr, T. R. (1993). Minorities at Risk: A global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington. DC. United States Institute of Peace Press.

5 See the analysis in Conversi, D. (1997) The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation. London: Hurst & Company. p. 257.

6 The role of the nationalist elites has been to use such ‘slumbering’ human material and raise a set of popular myths and perceptions in the process. On this significance of the intellectuals for the nationalist interpretation of ethnic origins of nations, see Smith, A. (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations. London: Basil Blackwell.

7 The Spanish Constitution can be found online at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/sp00t___.html (the English translation) and at http://constitucion.rediris.es/CodigoConst/Codigo.html(the Spanish original).

8 Heywood, P. (1995). The Government and Politics of Spain: Comparative Government and Politics. London: Macmillan Press. p.143.

9 This basic principle is developed in detail in Section VIII of the Constitution entitled ‘The Territorial Organisation of the State’. Article 13.1 spells out this territorial integrity when the establishment of the self-governing regions becomes an issue: “Exercising the right to autonomy recognised in article 2 of the Constitution, adjoining provinces with common historical, cultural and economic characteristics, the islands and the provinces with a historical regional identity will be able to accede to self-government and form autonomous communities in accordance with the provisions of this section of the Constitution and of their respective statues.”

10 The aim of this article was to prevent the possibility of unification between the regions themselves. For example, the pan-Catalanism made reference to the importance of Valencia and the Balearic Islands, while the question of Navarre began to fuel nationalism in the Basque Country. (Conversi, p.144)

11 Conversi, D. (1997). p.144. There are now seventeen ‘Autonomous Communities’ on the official map, some entirely invented. Thus the modern Spanish State has become one of the most decentralised countries in Europe, as argued by Colomer, M. J. (1999), p.40

12 This was observed by Colomer, M. J. (1999). ‘The Spanish State of Autonomies: Non-Institutional Federalism’ in Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain. (Ed.) Paul Heywood. London: Frank Cass Publishers, p. 41 in particular. As Carr and Fusi put it at the time, this was the first Spanish constitution which was a result of ‘neither the unilateral imposition of a particular party nor the expression of a single ideology’. Carr, R. and Fusi, P. (1979) Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy. London: George Allen. p. 244.

13 The Basque nationalists urged their electorate to abstain from the constitutional referendum, arguing that the pre-existence of the Basque rights or fueros had not been clearly recognised. Michael T. Newton and Peter J. Donaghy (1997) Institutions of Modern Spain: A political and Economic Guide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 15-16.

14 Smith, G. (1995) ‘Federation: The multiethnic challenge’, in Montserrat Guibernau, Spain: Federation in the making? London: Longman.

15 Newton, T. M with Donaghy J. P. (1997) Institutions of Modern Spain: A political and Economic Guide. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 22.

16 These measures were particularly important in meeting the demands of the Catalans cultural autonomy. Del Rion, J. and Williams, A. (1999). ‘Regionalism in Iberia’ in Regionalism in the European Union. Peter Wagstaff (ed.) Exeter: Intellect. p. 179.

17 ibid. p.130.

Bibliography

Aguero, F. (1995) Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Carr, R. and Fusi, P. (1979). Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy. London: George Allen.

Clark, R. P. (1990) Negotiating with ETA. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Clark, R. P. (1984) The Basque Insurgents. ETA, 1952 - 1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Conversi, D. (1997) The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation. London: Hurst & Company.

Del Rion, J. and Williams, A. (1999). ‘Regionalism in Iberia’ in Regionalism in the European Union. Peter Wagstaff (ed.) Exeter: Intellect.

Desfor Edles, L. (1998) Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fanon, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin Books.

Guibernau, M. (1995) Spain: Federation in the making? London: Longman

Gilmour, D. (1985) The Transformation of Spain. London: Quartet Books.

Gurr, T. R. (1993). Minorities at Risk: A global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington. DC. United States Institute of Peace Press.

Heywood, P. (1995). The Government and Politics of Spain: Comparative Government and Politics. London: Macmillan Press.

Heywood, P. (ed.) (1999) Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Ignatieff, M. (1994) Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Millennium. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux.

Irvin, L. C. (1999) Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Isaacs, H. R. (1989). Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Maries, J. (1990) Understanding Spain. San Juan: University of Puerto Rico Press.

Mar-Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (Eds.) (1996) Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities. Oxford: Berg.

Medrano, J. D. (1995) Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia. London: Cornell University Press.

Moxon-Brown, E. (1989). Political Change in Spain. London: Routledge.

Newton, T. M with Donaghy J. P. (1997) Institutions of Modern Spain: A political and Economic Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Ross, J. C. (1997) Contemporary Spain: A Handbook. London: Arnold.

Smith, A. (1991) National Identity. Reno, NV:University of Nevada Press.

Smith, A. (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations. London: Basil Blackwell.

Sullivan, J. (1988). ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euzkadi, 1890-1986. London: Routledge.

Woodworth, P. (2001) Dirty War Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy. Cork: Cork University Press.

Zirakzadeh, C. (1991) A rebellious people. Reno. University of Nevada Press.

Journals

Smith, A. 1999. ‘Ethnic election and national destiny: some religious origins of nationalist ideal’, Nations and Nationalism 5 (3).

Wallace, W. 1999. ‘The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox’. Political Studies. Vol. 47.

Wilson, R. ‘The politics of contemporary ethno-nationalist conflicts’. Nations and Nationalism. 7 (3), 2001

Other sources

Documentaries:

States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1, 01/12/93.

Internet:

http://constitucion.rediris.es/CodigoConst/Codigo.html

http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/sp00t.html

Is obvious that things are so bad for the Kurdish that when it comes to sovereignty, the crumbles that Spain has given to Euskal Herria seem like gold bars to them.

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Pro-Batasuna Demonstration

This report of the pro-Batasuna demonstration in Bilbao comes to us via The Militant:

Basques protest banning by Madrid

BY LAURA GARZA

MADRID, Spain--On September 14 tens of thousands of people poured into the streets of Bilbao, a major city in the Basque provinces, to oppose the Spanish govern-ment’s move to ban the political party Batasuna, which backs independence for the Basque people.

"We are protesting against the loss of fundamental political freedoms in the Basque Country, stated Unai, a student demonstrator. "This protest shows that the people oppose the authoritarian policies of the Spanish government." Marchers stepped off behind a banner reading, "Long Live the Basque People" (Gora Euskal Herria) together with a large Basque flag.

Independence for the Basque region, which straddles territory in southern France and northern Spain, is widely supported in the region. The intransigent fight by Basques had been a thorn in the side of the Spanish government, which has consistently opposed this demand.

The protest came within weeks of an August 26 order by Spanish High Court judge Baltasar Garzón declaring Batasuna banned for three years, while an investigation is under way to justify a permanent ban by linking supporters of Batasuna with the illegal pro-independence group ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom). Garzón issued orders to close offices of the political party, freeze bank accounts, and shut down taverns and other businesses in the Basque region. The order included a ban on protests by supporters of Batasuna.

Cops seek to break up march

The September 14 march, estimated to be between 30,000 and 50,000 people, greatly outnumbered the several hundred police seeking to disrupt it. The cops set up a barricade across the road at a point about halfway between the starting and ending points. When the demonstrators reached the barricade they were ordered to disperse. Shortly afterwards the police opened up on the crowd with high-powered water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets.

March leaders managed to address the crowd and most people then dispersed. Batasuna leader Arnoldo Otegi, one of those banned from publicly speaking, stated, "Today we have seen who is defending human rights. There will be new demonstrations and new opportunities. We ask that this should end peacefully."

A week earlier, hundreds protested in Guernica September 8 against the policy of transferring Basque political prisoners to prisons far from the Basque region. The next day in San Sebastian, thousands marched behind a banner reading, "The Basque Country Needs Freedom." Spanish government officials complained that the Ertzaintza, the local Basque police, had not broken up these events. Prior to the September 14 action, the Basque regional authorities agreed to hand a copy of Garzón’s orders to the marchers. The Madrid government, however, demanded that the Ertzaintza be ordered to carry out the judge’s order, and the Basque authorities complied.

These protest actions have deepened a schism between the capitalist parties ruling the Spanish state and the pro-independence bourgeois party in power in the Basque autonomous region. Officials in Madrid demanded an explanation of why the September 14 march had been allowed to take place. A spokesperson for Spanish prime minister José María Aznar’s ruling Popular Party in the Basque region complained, "ETA-Batasuna gained their objectives, they brought more than 70 buses into Bilbao, gathered their people, occupied the streets of Bilbao for more than half an hour, and held a political act addressed by no less than Arnaldo Otegi." He demanded someone be held responsible for letting tens of thousands of people take to the streets.

In response, the Basque National Party, the ruling party in the Basque region, accused Judge Garzón of perverting justice by limiting the right to free speech, and threatened to sue the judge for usurping power that belongs to the Basque regional authorities. Basque officials have also refused to abide by an order to dissolve the grouping of Batasuna representatives in the parliament, where they hold seven of 75 seats.

Madrid’s moves come in the context of the drive to war against Iraq and stepped up moves to justify repressive legislation on the basis of fighting terrorism. The government has recently proposed adding 20,000 troops to the streets under the guise of fighting delinquency, and has proposed an amendment to a law on foreigners that would allow the deportation of any immigrant found guilty of minor offenses. In the days leading up to the Bilbao march, Prime Minister Aznar told President George Bush, "We have strong reasons to support the United States," in its plans to attack Iraq, putting Spain at Britain’s side in giving full backing to Washington’s war.

Madrid is trying to use the war drive to push ahead with further measures aimed a limiting the rights of Basque activists. Previously, Spanish officials unsuccessfully tried to have Batasuna declared a terrorist group, thereby giving French and Belgian rulers a free hand in shutting down the offices of the party located in these countries. They hope to reintroduce such a proposal now that the group has been banned in Spain.

Meanwhile, the capitalist media here has given front-page coverage to a series of arrests in France of ETA members.

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Laxalt's Land

This is a nice essay on Robert Laxalt's book called Sweet Promised Land.

Too bad the Laxalts never got the USA to abandon its policy against the Basque dream of self determination.

Without further introduction, here it is:

Robert Laxalt’s Sweet Promised Land: A Place to Come To

by David Río Raigadas Universidad del País Vasco

This article was originally presented by the author as a paper at the II International Conference on Regional Literatures (Space and Place: The Geographies of Literature), Liverpool John Moores University, April 11-13, 1996.

Sweet Promised Land (1957)(1), the first and possibly best-known of Robert Laxalt’s books, appears to be a personal and rather simple story about the journey of the author’s father, Dominique, to his Basque homeland after forty-seven years as an immigrant sheepherder in the American West. In fact, the book has been often described as an intimate biography or as an affectionate memoir of a son to his father. Even Laxalt himself has emphasized to me the personal quality of this story:

“I couldn’t write it as a novel because something was missing. I thought that the poignancy of this trip moved me very much. It was a story of discovery for me, too. [..] It was a book written from the heart.”(2)

The intimate approach taken by Laxalt to portray his father’s life pervades the whole book and contributes to its success. Readers feel attracted by Laxalt’s personal and direct statements on his father and the fact that it is the true story of a man viewed through the eyes of his son, though some incidents in the book may have been a little fictionalized. Laxalt himself felt that the work meant an invasion of his family’s privacy and was particularly apprehensive of his father’s reaction toward it:

“When I told him about it, I thought I was running a risk of getting shot, but he accepted it well and even a little detachedly.”(3)

However, Sweet Promised Land must be read as the story not only of Dominique Laxalt, but of many Basque immigrants in the American West. The book goes beyond its personal level to embody the experience of Basque immigrants in the United States and even becomes a metaphor for American immigration in general.

Laxalt wrote this story about his Basque father at a time in which Basques were neither well-known nor popular in America. As William A. Douglass has pointed out,

“...the Basque-Americans were few in number, scattered lightly over the vastness of the American West and [...] their ethnic success as sheepherders par excellence identified them closely with the region’s most denigrated occupation.” (1986:xiii)

Set against this particular background, Sweet Promised Land constituted a vindication of the role of the immigrant Basque sheepherder in America, represented by the figure of Dominique Laxalt and his capacity to endure hardship in the New World. Basques in America identified themselves with Dominique’s story and felt encouraged to show their ethnic pride. At the same time, the wider public in the United States discovered Basques, “they discovered this romantic sheepherder thing,” in Douglass’ words.(4)

Although the book deals mainly with the way of life of Basque sheepmen in the American West, their experiences can be regarded as a symbol of the struggle of American immigrants in general. In fact, Laxalt himself agrees with this point and he even, in all modesty, refers to his lack of a deep knowledge about the Basques to support this idea:

“Sweet Promised Land became an immigrant book, not particularly a Basque book, because I didn’t know so much about the Basques.”(5)

The truth is that the story works as a classic tale of immigration, where the immigrant’s experience is portrayed by Laxalt as a process divided into three basic stages: the immigrant’s decision to abandon his homeland, his fight for acceptance in the new country and his impossible return to his native land once the assimilation process is over. Throughout these different stages Laxalt shows his deeply felt concern with the modern individual’s need for meaning, for a sense of place and identity.

Although Sweet Promised Land emphasizes primarily the challenges that immigrants must face in America and their often fruitless attempts to recapture the past, it also explores the main reasons that lie behind their decision to seek their future in America. Thus, immigration is presented as the only way to escape from poverty for many European youths, symbolized by Dominique. He, as most immigrants, regretted leaving his native land, but he was well aware that he had to find an opportunity in life somewhere else:

“What chance was there if I stayed? There was no money for anything. I wanted stock and the land to move in, [...] and we didn’t even own the property where we lived.” (1986: 35)

At first, the journey to America was viewed by people like Dominique just as a temporary experience, as a way to earn enough money to return home. However, most of these immigrants soon realized that their way to success was in America, a raw new land that could provide them with a chance in life if they were ready to suffer and work hard. Thus, America represents for Dominique and many other immigrants the land of opportunity, the place to make their fortune. Nevertheless, Sweet Promised Land also describes the decline of America as a land of opportunity since the mid-century, particularly for new groups of immigrants like the Puerto Ricans, who are shown leaving for Brazil in search of another America.

Although Laxalt stresses the importance of the economic reasons in the immigrant’s decision to abandon his native land, he also refers in the book to the lack of freedom of these people in the Old World. Thus, for instance, one of the characters in Sweet Promised Land, Michel, escapes from France in order not to be imprisoned after running away from the seminary where he was to be ordained. Besides, there are other references to the restrictions imposed by the French authorities on one of the main symbols of the Basque culture: the Basque language. This meant, as Dominique says, “to be made to feel that it was a crime to be born a Basque.” (1986:76). Being unable to display their ethnic identity in their own land, these people feel constricted in the Old World and they set their heart on America, which symbolizes for them not only the land of opportunity, but also of freedom.

The integration experience of the immigrant in American society is described by Laxalt as a gradual process in which the immigrant’s desire for acceptance and his reluctance to lose his ethnic identity often act as opposing forces. He particularly focuses his attention on the challenges that the newcomer must face during his first years in America. Thus, he gives in his book a detailed description of the hardships endured by his father when he first arrived in Nevada. Although Dominique’s struggle for integration presents some specific characteristics related to his condition of Basque sheepherder, the tests he must undergo during this process illustrate the hard lessons the ordinary immigrant usually has to learn in the new land.

One of the first challenges that the immigrant must face in America is the adaptation to a new setting, often completely different from that of the Old World. Laxalt particularly emphasizes the deep impact that the Nevada desert produces on Basque sheepherders like Dominique, who longs for his green land:

“You would have to see the beauty of the Basque country before you knew what I meant, but I remember going out into that cruel desert when I first came, and nights when I cried to sleep in my tent.” (1986: 50)

Thus, on their way to integration, these immigrants will inevitably have to adjust themselves to a harsh landscape, with a devastating climate, and gradually they will have to overcome their nostalgia for the old country, too.

Laxalt also portrays isolation and loneliness as common trials for the immigrant. Besides, in the case of the Basque sheepherders the challenge becomes especially arduous. Their loneliness is not simply the result of their condition of newcomers, their ignorance of the language or the bad reputation of their job, as was often the case with other immigrants. The loneliness of the Basques is also produced by the utter solitude in which they find themselves as sheepherders on the open range. In the most desolate corners of the American West they long for human company, for the sound of a human voice, and the monotony of their lonely life exposes them to potentially severe mental strain. Related to this, it is worth mentioning that, even though the Basques had a special reputation among all nationalities in America for their capacity to endure solitude,(6) Laxalt includes in Sweet Promised Land a Basque sheepherder, Joanes Ergela (or Crazy John), who loses his mind from loneliness in the mountains. This example works as a symbol of the serious nature of the ordeals that the immigrants must undergo in their new country.

Another major challenge that immigrants must face is economic survival, a subject that plays an important role in Sweet Promised Land. Laxalt shows that immigrants, apart from suffering hard working conditions, as in the case of the Basques mentioned above, usually have a difficult start making their living in the New World. America may be the land of opportunity, but working hard is not enough there. The newcomer must be ready to fight competitors, even resorting to violent means. In addition, he must resist the temptation of wasting his money, even if that means staying away from town for a long period. Last but not least, his economic success often depends on a volatile market. All these features are perfectly represented in Sweet Promised Land by the struggle experienced by Dominique and Basque-American sheepherders in general. Thus, these immigrants are shown in open conflict with the cattle ranchers for the feed and the water. Besides, the book describes their obsession with saving and their difficulties in resisiting the temptation of wasting their money in town. Finally, Laxalt also introduces the livestock crisis of the 1920s as an example of the uncertain economic conditions: the sheep market began to go and immediately most of the Basques lost everything for which they had worked so hard.

Apart from the different challenges mentioned throughout this paper, immigrants must sometimes confront hostility, fun-making or contempt from the host community. In some cases this hostile atmosphere is closely related to economic reasons, as we saw in the conflict with the cattlemen described above. However, in many cases this situation is simply due to the cultural and ethnic distinctiveness of the newcomers. They do not fit into the standard patterns of the American society because they are outsiders, who speak a different language and have a different culture. And at that time in America, as Robert Laxalt remembers, “it wasn’t fashionable to be ethnic.“(7)

As a result, the Basques, as other groups of immigrants with special ethnic features, will experience some bullying, fun-making, and rejection. Laxalt does not wish to exaggerate the importance of these incidents and consequently he does not include any episodes of violent discrimination against the Basques in Sweet Promised Land. However, he shows how two young Basques are made fun of just because of their speech and clothes and he also refers to the shame suffered by Basque-American children when they speak Basque in public. These examples illustrate the intolerance of the American society in the first half of the twentieth century toward expressions of cultural or ethnic diversity. As William Douglass has pointed out,

“persons who clung to their native language and who continued to manifest Old World lifeways were suspect.” (1986:x)

So, these immigrants, in spite of their reluctance to lose their original identity, will often have to hide their ethnic heritage or to renounce it in order to become Americans.

All these hardships that immigrants must endure to achieve their integration in American society are symbolized in Sweet Promised Land by boxing, a sport whose rules Dominique and other immigrants understand perfectly well. The comparison between boxing and the immigrant experience enables Laxalt to enhance the sacrifice of these newcomers in America:

”Like the men in the ring, they too had stood alone and fought alone, with their only weapons the hands that God gave them, and the fight was everything they had ever done and seen and felt.” (1986:65)

The struggle for acceptance of the immigrants also extends to their descendants, for whom boxing works as a useful model, too. As Laxalt knows from his own experience, second- generation Americans often must fight harder than the rest, just because they “were born of old- country people in a new land.” (1986:66)

Although Laxalt’s interest is mainly focused on the obstacles that the immigrant finds on his way to integration, he also shows how the newcomer gradually becomes familiar with the host country and its people and even identifies himself with them. This process has its origin in the immigrant’s capacity to adapt himself to the new environment without questioning it:

”...afterward it wasn’t suffering, because it was the way things was, and a man couldn’t do anything about it, and maybe that’s why he didn’t spend the time thinking about it, either.” (1986:50)

However, the self-identification of the newcomer with American society is accelerated by a series of elements that represent the progressive acceptance of the immigrant by the host community. As an example of this, Laxalt describes the first time that his father did not feel like a stranger in America. It was an encounter with a group of bandits, where he discovered that even the cruel people who inhabited the harsh land were capable of kindness toward a foreigner like him. This incident shows him that the new country is not only a place of disillusionment and brutality, but also of generosity and love.

In Sweet Promised Land, Laxalt also pays close attention to the last stage of the immigrant experience: the impossible return of the native. The book shows the return to the homeland as an unrealistic idea for most immigrants. Certainly, Laxalt provides the reader with the examples of two Basques (Nazario and the innkeeper) who come back to their native land after a few years in America and decide to remain in their country of birth. However, these two cases can be regarded as exceptions because most of the Basque immigrants in the story fail to return to their homeland. In addition to this, the main character, Dominique, who manages to see the Basque Country again, prefers in the end to go back to America.

Although a lot of immigrants in Sweet Promised Land talk about going home, their return is nearly always postponed and in most cases it never takes place. Two opposite reasons may be argued to account for this situation: the failure of the integration process, and its overwhelming success. Actually, the book describes a group of Basque immigrants who are unable to overcome the challenges of the new land, but have to remain in America because their return has become physically impossible. They have failed to save money or they have been defeated by adversity, age, or loneliness. As one of the characters in the story says,

”...they were lost souls, and they did not even have the good fortune to be lost in their own hell. They were foreigners when they came and they will always be foreigners.” (1986:107)

As a contrast to these immigrants, Laxalt focuses his attention on the figure of his father, who symbolizes the success of the assimilation process. After forty-seven years in the New World, Dominique is so integrated in the American society that his early wishes to return to the Basque Country and settle there have vanished. We can even see how he hesitates when his family encourages him to go back to the old country for a short visit to his sisters. His nostalgic trip to the Basque Country is portrayed by his son, who accompanies him, as a shocking and ambiguous experience. In particular, Robert Laxalt emphasizes the deep impact produced on his father by his sudden return to the old country after forty-seven years of absence. Besides, the return becomes a catalyst for very opposite feelings. On the one hand, it is a moment for joy, reward and fulfillment. Dominique has the opportunity to meet his relatives again and these welcome him as a hero, as “the youth who had gone out into the world in beggar’s garb and come back in shining armor.” (1986:122) On the other hand, the return makes Dominique feel sad and old because he realizes that too much time has gone on and nothing can be the same again. His parents and some of his old friends are dead and, in spite of the joyous reunion with his relatives and the recall of youthful memories, he cannot avoid feeling like a stranger in his own land.

Robert Laxalt ends his tale of immigration by stressing the impossibility of returning to the past. To illustrate this point, he uses the example of his father’s nostalgic trip to the Basque Country. Actually, Dominique’s final decision to leave again for the United States shows that once the assimilation process is over and the old land has become only a dimming memory, the return of the native is nearly always a chimerical idea. As Dominique says at the end of Sweet Promised Land,

“I cannot go back. It ain’t my country anymore. I’ve lived too much in America ever to go back.” (1986:176)

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