The Kurds and The Basques II

Here you have the second part of the essay published by Kurdish Media:

Challenge to the Transition and ETA’s Movement for the Basque Separatism

KurdishMedia.com - By Welat Lezgin
10/07/2002 00:00:00

Continued from

Until 1978, the problem of ethnic-nationalism not only remained unchallenged, but it was made worse by the policies of the Francoist regime which radically opposed to all the regional claims in favour of ‘centralism’ – which in fact was not a centralism of Castille or even Madrid, but of the State above the people. [1] According to Conversi, at the end of Francoism, not only was Francoism doomed but the very idea of the Spanish State was not legitimate in the Basque Country. This remained the case at least until the late 1980s, well after the Transition had run its course. [2] ETA’s violence during this period was at its peak. As Robert Clark puts it:

“The Basque region during these days was like a pressure cooker about to explode. Sentiments for change had been so sharply suppressed during the dictatorship of Franco that there had been little opportunity for the expression of dissent with dictator gone, Basques now sought to release the pressures built up over the preceding forty years.” [3]

There are several reasons why the violence by ETA continued despite the historic changes in Spain. On several occasions ETA was convinced that the Basque Country was on the verge of national extinction, of being erased from the map of peoples, because its language and culture were slowly dying out and its customs were being replaced by the alien ones. [4] Hence, they saw a peremptory and urgent need to put an end to this progressive disappearance. To achieve this end, the establishment of an independent Basque country was pivotal. As Conversi puts it:

“The subordination of cultural to political goals is reflected in an eschatological vision of independence as a panacea for all problems of cultural identity, in particular the recovery of the language: ‘There is only one path to save Euskera: political independence for -Euzkadi’. [5]

But also by now, due to Franco’s harsh oppressive policies, ETA had become highly radicalised and had experienced extensive splits. In its earlier days ETA was a heterogeneous organisation, made up of an uncomfortable mix of nationalists, socialists, students, labour activists and rural Catholic youth. By the late 1960s ETA was being pulled in at least three ideological directions: (1) toward a new Left, proletarian tradition; (2) a guerrilla national front tradition; and (3) non-violent, ethically oriented, cultural tradition. This heterogeneity resulted in a series of splits. In 1966 – 1967, ETA split into ETA-Berri (New ETA) and ETA-Zarra (Old ETA); in 1970, it split into ETA-V (followers of the program of the Fifth Assembly) and ETA-VI (Sixth Assembly). The final split took place in 1974 between ETA (m) and ETA (pm) and ETA as we know it is ETA Militar, which continues to use violent methods to this day. [6]

Despite conflicts over the use of violence within the organisation, ETA’s military activities have continued unabated. The outcome of every internal dispute on the matter had been the expulsion or defection of the advocates of non-violent means. [7] In the 1970s a similar pattern in ETA’s evolution began to acquire a quicker tempo as the more experienced and mature leaders of ETA were killed or forced into exile, younger and more radical ones quickly replaced them in a process that currently continues. The Military front, composed predominantly of very young people, became more and more uncontrollable, while its autonomous initiatives provoked further conflict. Therefore violence has become, a self-generating mechanism, a vicious circle very difficult to stop. Violence also served to complement internal fragmentation. Since 1975, and as a result of many splits, ETA has become progressively dominated by groups who spend little time debating ideological issues and see military confrontation as the only way to achieve their goal of independence for Euzkadi. [8] What is interesting to note is that while Spain was being painfully transformed into a democratic and a devolved state, ETA had transformed in the opposite direction where moderates and those against the armed struggle had been eradicated from the organisation. [9]

To understand the continuation of violence and the ideological void of ETA we also need to look at ETA’s action/repression/action theory. According to this theory, attacks on the Francoist state would lead to universal repression, which would lead to greater popular anger, which would spiral into mass rebellion, eventually resulting in the civil war and the Basque secession. [10] As predicted by Fanon, the state violence as an indispensable ingredient in spreading a general ‘national awareness’ among the wider population instigated them to fight back. [11] In synthesis, the adoption of the Third Worldist models could not be realised without the state repression and this repression was the central part of the ‘theory of action/repression/action’ taken up by ETA. [12] This theory of violence as the only solution was obviously also determined by the prevailing internal condition of ruthless dictatorship in Spain. [13] What mattered to ETA was that the nation found itself in a lethal situation and that, in order to save her, it was urgent to adopt a series of drastic measures. As a consequence it considered the will of the Basque people to recover their national identity as the only valid element to save the nation. [14]

The role of state repression in cementing a common identity out of previous anthropological chaos should be emphasised here. While the police actions hampered the activities and mobilisation of ETA on various occasions, the indiscriminate repression of the Francoist regime generated a climate of understanding and support for ETA activists among the certain nationalist sectors and clandestine left-wing organisations. In the Basque Country political violence responded both to an internal logic (the need to foster unity in the organisation) and an external logic (the need to respond to the challenge of the state). However, at any moment of the stormy ideological debate within ETA, violent factions seized the initiative. This direct action, and not ideology or culture, showed the way to follow in order to achieve mass mobilisation and the public support. The hard-liners, with their attacks, overcame the ideological debate and demonstrated the simple reality that only direct action could achieve popular support and even extend mobilisation to the non-ethnic population of the Basque homeland.

During the Franco period, there were strands of shared meaning as to what it meant to be a “Basque”. There was (1) a myth, a shared understanding of an ancient Basque past (including the Fueros), (2) an awareness of the structural pressures for the extinction of the Basque culture, which increased the participative function of the Basque language, music, games, etc., and its capacity for symbolising solidarity and differentiability, and (3) anti-state violence, as an expression of the direct Basque action. Yet, the symbols perceived to be “Basque” – including the Fueros as well as the Basque language – were defined largely by their transgression from and rejection of the centralist regime. There was no consensus as to the nature of the new Basque identity in the post-Franco state, or even about how to define the Basque identity. The old method of the action-repression theory continued to hide such worries.

In general terms, a common feature of the insurgent nationalist guerrillas in various countries is their relation with, and even dependence on, the state repression. All over the world, a plethora of nationalities and former tribes are drawn into violent confrontation with the state as a result of decades of coercion by the central authorities which is largely illegitimate. The more recent the memories of suffering and horrors, the more acute the conflict seem to be, as ETA’s hold on the armed struggle shows. The principle of ‘retaliation’ as expressed in the theory of action/repression/action was the key one, which in practice remained constant for ETA throughout its long history of splits and mutations within the party itself. [15]

For the first time since the Civil War, political channels were open for the Basques to peacefully negotiate their legitimate rights. As explained above this dilemma was overcome by the emphasis on the continuation of the action/repression theory, which in return made the Spanish government respond to ETA attacks by anti-terrorist laws and police measures that reminded many Basques of some of the worst features of Francoism. [16] These anti-terrorist laws helped the survival of the perception of the state as a terrorist machine after the demise of the dictatorship but also kept ETA’s recruitment machine alive. Despite its external image as a “terrorist” organisation, ETA enjoyed significant popular support under Francoism (and indeed well until the 1980s.) in the Basque country. Most Basques felt more threatened by Spanish security forces than by ETA. Whereas ETA killed 6 people in the 12 months prior to Franco’s death, Spanish police and civil guards killed 22, and injured 105 a trend that continued well into the 1980s. [17] ETA was viewed in terms of “patriotic action”, rather than of (irrational) terrorism. [18] Basque nationalist parties alleged that repression continued unabated after Franco’s death. For instance, the anti-terrorist laws, some of which were later condemned as unconstitutional, resulted in arbitrary arrests and detentions. [19] Widespread opposition to the law was being expressed through popular demonstrations in several Spanish regions. Furthermore, the murder of Basque political exiles in France by the GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion) a self-styled ‘anti-terrorist’ commando group, provoked angry popular demonstrations, and revealed a political scandal. [20]

Instead of assisting and fighting for Basque rights (even the right to self-determination) through peaceful means, due to the reasons explained above, [21] ETA continued its violence and as Conversi explains:

“The intrinsic confrontational character of Basque mobilisations, a partial fulfilment of the ‘action/repression/action theory’ envisaged by ETA’s first theorists, has in many ways handicapped any peaceful solution of the conflict.” [22]

While ETA’s violent methods were the voice of the Basque people but also the voice of dissidence during the Franco years, with the transition to democracy, ETA’s violence almost resulted in the abrupt end of democracy with the attempted coup on February 23, 1981. [23] As democratic reforms progressed – and ETA violence increased – reactionary sectors of the armed forces grew more volatile. In addition to increasing skirmishes between ETA, the police and the army in the Basque country, between 1978 and 1982, five different plans for a coup d’etat against the democratic regime were uncovered. [24]

The 1988 inter-party agreement to condemn violence unreservedly and to marginalise those who refused to do so played a big role in the marginalisation of the support for ETA’s violence. Known as the Pact of Ajura Enea, it was signed by all significant players in Basque politics apart from ETA’s political wing HB (Herri Batasuna). HB has suffered steady erosion of its support, which reflects ETA’s political marginalisation. That is apparent also in another way. Ross, J. has argued that to a significant extent, support for HB is unconnected with regionalist sentiment. Instead, it comes from disoriented and disillusioned young people in a society particularly hard hit by social problems, who sympathise primarily with ETA’s anti-state violence. [25]

With the establishment of democracy in Spain, many formerly private and semi-clandestine initiatives passed into the public hands. The nationalist movement was formalised and became articulated in different political parties. As the political struggle became institutionalised, the civil society which was previously ETA’s only support, begun to lose its former role. [26] The advent of democracy and the arrival on the political scene of a greater number of political parties resulted in the emergence in the Basque Country of a political-party system similar to the one seen for so long in the Catalonia region. The Basques voted in favour of the Statue of Autonomy, which was negotiated on behalf of the Basque people by the PNV (‘Basque Nationalist Party’), and a majority of them chose the bourgeois nationalist parties over the revolutionary nationalist organisations in the electoral contests. The popular support for independence seemed to have diminished up to the present era and the legitimacy of ETA’s actions were questioned more seriously by its potential sources of support amongst the people of the Basque Country.

Conclusion

The right to self-determination and secession is one of the most controversial issues both in the European and the world political contexts. This is particularly the case since the division of political units concerns the nation-state, which is located in a strategically sensitive area in Europe. Since the attacks on the World Trade Centre in the United States on September the 11th, any attempt to achieve self-determination by violent means is doomed to face the label of terrorism. This current context is in contrast to the ongoing process of fragmentation as more independent States continue to emerge on the map of World Politics.

The emphasis on the preservation of the map of international relations and the view that the nation-state is the final political structure can be a flawed argument. Regionalism is one of the challenges to the Centralist thesis of the nation-state also both in the European and non-European contexts. It is important to put these two arguments, namely those of the nation-state as the ideal and ultimate political form as opposed to its further fragmentation, in a comparative perspective at a time when, as Harold Isaacs argues, ‘two thirds of the world has barely begun to emerge from pre-industrial era and before most of the world’s people could glean any advantages at all from industrialisation and modernisation’. [27]

In Europe the nation-state has become under heavy pressure both from above by the supranational organisation of the European Union and from below by the regional powers and separatist movements, such as ETA’s struggle for the Basque Country in Southern Europe. As Wallace puts it, ‘to a remarkable degree, the processes of government in Europe overlap and interlock: among different states, between different levels of governance below and above the old locus of sovereignty in the nation-state’. As a result of this, the continent where nationalism and the nation-state first emerged after the French Revolution is going through an historical process of devolution where the national States, regional sentiments, minority identities and ethnic-nationalisms aim to get the chance to bypass the traditional nation-state. Although this recent trend should not be exaggerated, it is encouraging at the same time as the Catalan case demonstrates.

The Basque citizens have gained a broad-ranging Autonomy Statute over the course of the recent decades and an unprecedented level of self-government not enjoyed by any other European region. At the same European level, the nation-states can show a greater understanding for the self-government of the regional identities for their autonomous development as a democratic-constitutional necessity against the political manifestations of separatist ethnic nationalism. The right for the preservation and representation of ethnic identity, culture and language is a democratic right, which should not be seen as a threat to the ‘unity’ of the nation-state. As this essay has demonstrated, the repression of ethnic nationalism without any consideration of these basic rights and freedoms helps its growth and mobilisation across the society.

The dilemma between Centralist repression and unlimited political freedom has been at the centre stage of ETA’s separatist campaign and the Spanish government’s response increasingly after the end of the oppressive Franco regime. Democratic transition has brought into question the legitimacy of the Basques’ armed struggle both in the eyes of the Spanish public and within the organisation itself. At the same time, for many within ETA, the transition represented an opportunity to use violence to force Madrid to concede Basque independence. It is perfectly possible for ethnic minorities to succeed in their language and identity revival and national survival within a democratic nation-state. The possibility of national co-existence and the possession of multiple-identities can help to overcome the challenge of regional separatism as long as the essential element of a strong democratic context and self-government gain the upper hand.

Footnotes:

1. Maries, J. (1990) Understanding Spain. San Juan: University of Puerto Rico Press. p. 413

2. Conversi, D. (1997) p. 141.

3. Clark, R. P. (1984) The Basque Insurgents. ETA, 1952-1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. p. 90

4. Conversi, D. (1997) p. 241. An ETA document produced in 1979 reveals to us the importance of the Basque language in defining the Basque identity: “Since the times of Machiavelli [language] is an extremely well-known political counsel, and one which works infallibly, that to kill a pueblo there is nothing more deadly than to kill its language. A pueblo which stops speaking its language is a pueblo which has died. A pueblo which changes its language for that of its neighbour, is a pueblo which changes its soul for that of its neighbour.” See, ETA (1979), Documentos, 18 vols. San Sebastian quoted in: MacClancy, J. ‘Bilingualism and Multinationalism in the Basque Country’ in: Mar-Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (Eds.) (1996) Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities. Oxford: Berg. p. 211.

5. Conversi, D. (1997).

6. Zirakzadeh, C. (1991) A rebellious people. Reno. University of Nevada Press. p. 143.

7. Jauregui, B. (1981) Ideologia y estrategia politica de ETA. Madrid Siglo XXI. Cited in: Medrano, J. D. (1995) Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia. London: Cornell University Press. p. 149.

8. Ibid. p. 149.

9. On internal killings within ETA see: States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1 program on ETA, dated December 1st 1993.

10. Clark, R. P. (1990) Negotiating with ETA. Reno. University of Nevada. p. 8-9.

11. See: Fanon, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin Books.

12. Conversi, D. (1997). p. 244.

13. It is important to keep in mind that, at its inception, ETA did not advocate violence as a method of achieving political change, but was forced onto this road by the tactics of the Franco regime and its gratuitous physical suppression of any visible symbol of Basque national identity. See: Moxon-Brown, E. (1989). Political Change in Spain. London: Routledge. p.52

14. Jauregui, B. G. (1981) Ideologia y estrategia politica de ETA. Analisis de su evolucion entre 1958 y 1968. Madrid: Siglo XXI. p.151. Quoted in: Conversi, D. (1997). p.240.

15. A survey carried out by Irvin, L. C. which shows the distribution of ideologues, radicals and politicos in Herri Batasuna by the period in which they became active, supports the argument that regime repression, unless extremely severe, serves as a stimulus rather then a brake on the general recruitment of activists into militant nationalist organisations. See: Irvin, L. C. (1999) Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. p.199-200.

16. Clark, R. P. (1984). p. 103-105, 252.

17. Sullivan, J. (1988). ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euzkadi, 1890-1986. London: Routledge. p. 94.

18. According to a poll conducted in 1979, over half the Basques surveyed thought that ETA militants were “patriots” or “idealists” and only 14 percent considered them “madmen” or “criminals”. See: Desfor Edles, L. (1998) Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.128.

19. Clark, R. P. (1991).

20. GAL, a death squad created to wage a dirty war against ETA resulted in a major scandal that damaged the credibility of the Spanish State and the democratic transition. While GAL’s ruthless killings of ETA leaders dealt a big blow to ETA, these acts at the same time helped ETA’s recruitment activities as GAL had shown a darker side of the Spanish State. The GAL scandal uncovered by El Mundo revealed that top leaders including the Minister of the Interior, Jose Barrionuevo, were allegedly directly involved and that GAL mercenaries were paid with public funds. The scandal grew as rumours suggested as many as nine of the GAL’s twenty-seven victims may have had nothing to do with terrorism. See: Woodworth, P. (2001) Dirty War Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy. Cork: Cork University Press. The issue is also extensively examined in: States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1 on 01 December 1993.

21. Besides, as a proof for total belief in violence to reach their aims, Spanish democracy is seen by ETA as a “sham bourgeois democracy” to be used as a tool but not as an aim as a matter of fact. The following extract reveals this: “It is necessary to participate in the legal framework of bourgeois democracy . . . However, . . . a revolutionary strategy cannot limit it self to this path . . . . . to fall into electoralism is to suppress political principles for the sake of securing a certain number of votes . . . . Experience teaches us that it is utopian to believe that in playing the game we will receive any real advantages; and little is it possible to use those institutions as a tribunal in which to denounce them because we are there.” See, ETA (Commandos Autonomous), internal discussion document (1979) p. 275. Also see Paddy Bolger, interview in IRIS, 7 (November 1983): 7. Cited in Irvin, L. C. (2001). p.6.

22. Ibid. p.158.

23. On 23 February 1981 a session of the Spanish parliament was interrupted by a group of Civil guards led by Colonel Antonio Tejero, who seized the assembly and held the MPs prisoner for more than a day. A providential intervention by the King prevented the attempted coup. This coup attempt had long-lasting and damaging implications for the young democracy and halted further democratic progress, especially in matters of regional devolution. See: Aguero, F. (1995) Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. London: Johns Hopkins University Press. p.161-180.

24. Gilmour, D. (1985) The Transformation of Spain. London: Quartet Books. p. 230.

25. Ross, J. C. (1997) Contemporary Spain: A Handbook. London: Arnold. p.93.

26. What happened to ETA is not very different from what happened to the PSUC in Catalonia, or the Spanish Communist Party. Despite their having led the opposition to Franco during the 1960 and 1970s, all of them were defeated in elections by more moderate parties. The fact that this happened reveals that the role of political capital and the logic of mobilisation in shaping political structures are constrained by socio-economic structural conditions, which in the end determine what is and what is not politically possible.

27. Isaacs, H. R. (1989). Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. p.215

28. Wallace, W. 1999. ‘The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox’, in Political Studies. Vol. 47. p.503.

Sources:

Aguero, F. (1995) Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Clark, R. P. (1990) Negotiating with ETA. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Clark, R. P. (1984) The Basque Insurgents. ETA, 1952 - 1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Desfor Edles, L. (1998) Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fanon, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin Books.

Gilmour, D. (1985) The Transformation of Spain. London: Quartet Books.

Heywood, P. (ed.) (1999) Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Irvin, L. C. (1999) Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Isaacs, H. R. (1989). Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Maries, J. (1990) Understanding Spain. San Juan: University of Puerto Rico Press.

Mar-Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (Eds.) (1996) Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities. Oxford: Berg.

Medrano, J. D. (1995) Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia. London: Cornell University Press.

Moxon-Brown, E. (1989). Political Change in Spain. London: Routledge.

Ross, J. C. (1997) Contemporary Spain: A Handbook. London: Arnold.

Sullivan, J. (1988). ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euzkadi, 1890-1986. London: Routledge.

Woodworth, P. (2001) Dirty War Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy. Cork: Cork University Press.

Zirakzadeh, C. (1991) A rebellious people. Reno. University of Nevada Press.

Wallace, W. 1999. ‘The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox’. Political Studies. Vol. 47.

States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1, 01/12/93.

The Basques will forever support the right to the self determination of the Kurdish people, no matter what the Turkish nor the Syrians nor the Iraqis nor the Iranians nor the Armenians have to say about it, citing their own constitutions and their laws.

This is the link to the first part.

.... ... .

The Kurds and The Basques

Here you have this interesting essay published by Kurdish Media:

Democratic Transition within the Spanish Constitutional Framework: The Case of the Basque Country

KurdishMedia.com - By Welat Lezgin
10/07/2002 00:00:00

There are many similarities between the opressed Basque and Kurdish ethnic-nationalisms. Both the Basque and the Kurdish issues are heavily influenced by the global changes and are trans-national. Although this essay concentrates specifically on the Basque question, Kurds can draw some useful conclusions from it.

However, there is one thing that should be kept in mind when reading this essay. The process of the erosion of the nation-state, and in paralell to that the rise of regionalism, which has been gaining pace in Europe, has not reached the states that control Kurdistan. The states that occupy Kurdish territories manage their Kurds with the same policies as Franco managed its Basque population during his ruthless reign. The biggest difference is that while the oppressive regime of Franco is long gone leaving his place to a vibrant Spanish civil and democratic society, unfortunately the Kurds are still heavily oppressed, probably by the most backward regimes this planet has ever seen.

Introduction

During the past decade we have witnessed intensifying ethnic conflicts, serious suffering and loss of lives from Bosnia, Kosovo and Kurdistan to Chechenya and beyond in many conflict areas around the world. As Anthony Smith argues, ‘it has become commonplace to recognise the 1990s as the decade of recrudescent ethno-nationalism’.[1] With the development of modernisation through industrialisation, liberal democracy, capitalist economy and universal literacy, nationalism emerged and nation-states were established in the 18th and 19th Century European politics as one of the historical consequences of the French Revolution. Later on, in the wider world through colonial expansion and incorporation, the extension of nationalism and the international system brought together various population groups within the same political units.

For some of these political units the historical progress has not been easy, however. In those countries both in Europe and beyond, where the state-building process has been problematic, the dominant or colonising ethno-nations either supplanted or absorbed the subordinate ethno-nations through a structural assimilation process. They created a system of exploitation by their exclusionist policies, forced assimilation and the denial of civil rights for the other nationalities. This oppression and inequality of citizenship rights contribute to the development of a collective political consciousness and ethno-nationalism by the subordinate ethno-national communities. The denial of identity and ethnic differences, as it happened during the Franco regime in Spain the consequences of which will be examined in detail here, create a political ground for the suppressed communities to seek their self-determination by ousting the foreign rulers and by trying to reshape the states’ despotic political structures, in the case of the Basque Country after the 1978 Spanish constitution for example.[2]

Some ethnic identities with their own distinctive cultures and identity feel on the verge of extinction and aim to save their political future. The regionalist movements can choose violent methods and carry out an armed struggle to establish a more independent political future for themselves, as it has happened in the case of the emergence and continuation of the ETA movement for the same example we study here. Even beyond this European context in the international world, ethnic violence and the regionalist autonomy movements created a system where the modern wars have become intra-, rather than inter-, state since the end of the Second World War.[3] Although it is hoped that the advent of a global culture will inspire peace, prosperity and a general lessening of conflicts, it is not easy to achieve this as a quick glance at the world map of ethnic conflicts would show.[4]

The Basque Autonomy and the 1978 Spanish Constitution

In relation to nationalism in Spain, as Conversi argued, and in parallel with the explanation we gave earlier about the reasons for ethnic conflict, modernity replaces the traditional markers of ethnicity through the subsequent processes of nationalism, namely state centralisation, assimilation of the local elites, and finally the mass migration.[5] In many other cases as well as in the Spanish context, this erosion of traditional societies has created difficult historical memories and caused the development of the aim of independence, despite the cultural assimilation attempts we referred to above. Taken together, these changes in the cultural and political life of the nations give rise to ethnic conflicts, further nationalist mobilisation and the separatist regional movements.[6]

Since we aim to examine the Basque case, we first need to look at the state response for the recognition of the Basque identity in detail here. We will specifically concentrate on the current Spanish Constitution and discuss the position of the minorities, and the Basques in particular. In this context, we will argue that support for secession and independence can diminish if there is a genuine democratic transformation, if the regional ethnic identity is well represented and an advanced level of self-government is allowed.

The landmark 1978 Spanish Constitution was the product of the consensus achieved between the main political parties, which arose out of the fall of the Franco regime. One of the important problems to tackle there was the issue of ethno-nationalism. It is not surprising, therefore, to see in the Constitution that nearly one-tenth of the text is specifically concerned with the regional issues.[7] Also, during the sixteen months of constitutional debates, the autonomy issue for the Basque country became by far the most controversial topic for the discussions.[8]

A key point in this constitutional discussion was the respect for regional languages and the provision for the public awareness of linguistic diversities in the country. The acceptance of this fact, as well as the formal State language, can be seen in the Article 3 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, which stipulates that:

“Castillian is the official language of the State. All Spaniards have a duty to know it and the right to use it. The other Spanish languages will also be official in their respective Autonomous Communities according to their own Statues. The richness of the distinct linguistic modalities of Spain represents a patrimony, which will be the object of special respect and protection.”

The Constitution also stipulated the national integrity of Span and it warned against any possible misinterpretations in this respect. According to the Article 2:

“The Constitution is based on the indivisible unity of the Spanish Nation, common and indivisible fatherland of all the Spaniards. It acknowledges and guarantees the right to Autonomy of the nationalities and regions, which form it and the solidarity among them.”[9]

An important note for the above stipulation of Article 2 can also be found in the Article 145 of the Constitution, which explains that no federation between Autonomous Communities can be permitted under any circumstances.[10] The most fundamental aspect of the Constitution was its acknowledgement of the existence of other ‘nationalities’ only within the boundaries of one and indivisible Spanish ‘nation’. The three other nationalities, not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, were Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. But the obvious difficulty was to extend decentralisation to most other regions and, using Conversi’s word, ‘relativising’ the potential impact of the Basque and Catalan autonomies.[11]

In one way or another, a balance had to be struck between the parties of the Right and the autonomist movement to overcome the fear that any reference to the nationalities of Spain and the preference of the Left for a federal-type solution represented a threat to the national unity. The need to obtain the support of the both sides generated endless discussions in the writing of the constitution and it contributed to the lack of precision and incoherence in some parts of the text, especially in the sections regarding the historical nationalities. Nevertheless, in the end of this process, and for the first time in the nation’s history, Spain would have a constitution which was not the consequence of the opposition of any significant political force against the others. No one agreed with the entire constitutional text, but almost no one felt it was absolutely unacceptable, either.[12] . More importantly, the fascist character of Spanish nationalism defended by Francoism was seriously questioned by the 1978 Constitution, which not only aimed at the transformation of Spain into a democratic state, but also admitted the existence of national minorities within its territory as a crucial part of this democratisation process.

Another positive point for the tolerance of the other ethnic groups was that at each stage of its approval large majorities supported the Constitution, which in the end created the belief that this was a Constitution ‘of all the people for all the people’. It is also important to note that when Spaniards went to the polls on 6 December 1978, the Constitution was approved by 87.8 percent of the voters. While the percentage of abstentions, 32 percent in Spain as a whole and 56 percent in parts of the Basque Country, gave the government and the major opposition parties some cause for concern, the Spanish people seemed to have voted convincingly to open a new democratic chapter in the country’s history.[13]

By emphasising the indissoluble unity of Spain, while recognising and guaranteeing the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions, the Constitution put forward a radically new model of the state, which rejected the Francoist centralism. But even more importantly, as we have seen earlier, the Article Two attempted to reconcile the two opposing conceptions of Spain, which were at stake during the Spanish Civil War. ‘Unity’ had to be preserved even though it was dramatically challenged by the recognition of the existence of ‘nationalities and regions’ within Spain. In this context, the reference to ‘the Spanish nation’ as the ‘common patria’ of all Spaniards seemed compatible with the existence of the other ‘little patrias’, such as Catalonia or the Basque Country.[14]

The Constitution also recognises and protects the right to ‘express and disseminate freely thoughts, ideas and opinions by word, in writing or any other means of reproduction’ (Article 20.1). In the following paragraph, the Article 20.2 forbids any form of prior censorship, something that was widely practised during the greater part of the Franco regime. Article 20.3, in a highly significant statement, ensures that the means of communication belonging to the state or other public entities shall be subject to parliamentary control and that access shall be guaranteed to all the social and political groups by ‘respecting the pluralism of society and the various languages of Spain’. On the right of assembly, which is another critical issue for the tolerance of ethno-nationalist differences, the Article 21.2 recognises the right of assembly provided that it is peaceful and it does not involve the use of violence. Assemblies in the public places and demonstrations require the permission of the authorities but can only be forbidden when there is a serious risk to public order or to the safety of the people and property.

Finally, on the right of association, the Article 22 recognises the right of association for all organisations, except for those whose objectives include activities declared to be of a criminal nature. Secret or paramilitary organisations are also banned in the same provision, which has particular relevance to political parties and workers’ organisations and trade unions. Over the last century the groups in Spain, as well as in other European countries, have waged an often one-sided battle to have these political and economic rights recognised. This development in Spanish history was also significant since it came after forty years of illegality for any organisation which did not conform in its aims and ideology to the narrow views of Franco’s National Movement.[15]

Overall, the 1978 Constitution rejects exclusive nationalism, whether it is the Spanish nationalism to the exclusion of the other group rights, or peripheral nationalism which rejects the State sovereignty with the probable inclusion of the other communities against the Central State nationalism on the basis of their claim to difference. But all the seventeen autonomous communities are now subject not only to the Constitution but also their own statues of autonomy, which govern all aspects of political life at regional level. In effect, they constitute regional constitutions. At the simplest level, a statue enables a region to organise its own institutions of self-government and establish the parameters of its own particular relationship with the central authorities.

It is interesting to note that, although these statues have many features in common, because each is the result of a long process of political negotiation, they all have individual features which reflect their own special relationship with Madrid. The Basque Statue, enshrines the restoration of the economic agreements, involving certain tax-raising privileges, while the Catalan Statute grants the region considerable freedom in matters related to education, culture and language. In common with the federal systems, with which the structure of the state had so much in common, the autonomous communities were granted the right of legislation and to execute and administer the laws through their provincial delegations. With this establishment of Autonomous Communities, the Basque and the Catalan regions also received the right to establish autonomous education systems, separate police forces and independent television networks. Additionally, the Basque and Catalan languages gained an official status alongside the Castillian in their own regions.[16]

These steps were taken to ensure a smooth democratic transition for all the peoples of Spain after the Second World War and its aftermath. However, given the expectations surrounding this programme of regionalism amongst the historic nationalities, and the economic climate for any territorial settlement in the 1970s and 1980s, it became inevitable that the reforms would fail to satisfy all the national and regional interest groups in the Spanish territory. The process of devolution has often been muddled and indecisive, although by the late 1980s major reforms had been implemented. Overall, this historic decentralisation process was probably unparalleled in terms of speed and scale elsewhere in the Western Europe.

Authentic autonomy also required the control of the financial resources. Article 156 of the Constitution recognised the right of the autonomous communities to financial autonomy, which is guaranteed in the Statues of Autonomy. The regional governments have been granted considerable freedom in spending and drawing up their own budgets, but were also subjected to strict limitations for levying their own taxes (or to share the taxes levied by the state). Over the past decade (in the 1990s), the regional governments had to take responsibility for increasingly large budgets and they managed substantial human, material and financial resources.[17]

On the issue of funds, while fifteen of the autonomous communities rely largely on the state to transfer funds in their direction, the Basque Country and Navarre enjoy the benefits of their historic rights (fueros). The Basque populated provinces (Alava, Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya) and the single province of Navarre, have the right to levy and collect all taxes, except for the custom duties and the taxes on petroleum products and tobacco. Furthermore, with respect to public security, Article 149 allowed fully autonomous regions to create their own regional police forces. The first region to take advantage of this was the Basque Country, which in 1980 created its own force, the Ertzaintza.

As it is seen in the examination above, the modern Spanish State has become highly de-centralised and extensive powers have been devolved to the regions, especially the Catalan and Basque regions due to their historical background and the level of ethnic consciousness. What we will be examining and discussing now is the development of Basque separatism and its continuation despite the democratic transition and the devolved powers for the region. What we are aiming to understand is how the democratic change has undermined the support for separatism and the armed struggle. We will also aim to explain why, despite the extensive devolution of power from the core to the peripheries, the radical Basque separatist organisation ETA (‘Basque Homeland and Freedom’) has been persistent in pursuing the political aim of creating an independent Basque Country by violent means.

Notes

Smith, A. 1999. ‘Ethnic election and national destiny: some religious origins of nationalist ideal’, Nations and Nationalism 5 (3), p.331-55. Ignatieff takes this further by arguing that ‘the key language of our age is ethnic-nationalism’. Ignatieff, M. (1994) Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Millennium. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. p. 5.

2 Smith, A. (1991) National Identity. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press.

3 This was pointed out by Wilson, R. ‘The politics of contemporary ethno-nationalist conflicts’, in Nations and Nationalism. 7 (3), 2001, p.368. The role of the state oppression is also important here as it helps to radicalise the movement of that specific identity.

4 For a general, global overview of ethnic conflicts, see Gurr, T. R. (1993). Minorities at Risk: A global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington. DC. United States Institute of Peace Press.

5 See the analysis in Conversi, D. (1997) The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation. London: Hurst & Company. p. 257.

6 The role of the nationalist elites has been to use such ‘slumbering’ human material and raise a set of popular myths and perceptions in the process. On this significance of the intellectuals for the nationalist interpretation of ethnic origins of nations, see Smith, A. (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations. London: Basil Blackwell.

7 The Spanish Constitution can be found online at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/sp00t___.html (the English translation) and at http://constitucion.rediris.es/CodigoConst/Codigo.html(the Spanish original).

8 Heywood, P. (1995). The Government and Politics of Spain: Comparative Government and Politics. London: Macmillan Press. p.143.

9 This basic principle is developed in detail in Section VIII of the Constitution entitled ‘The Territorial Organisation of the State’. Article 13.1 spells out this territorial integrity when the establishment of the self-governing regions becomes an issue: “Exercising the right to autonomy recognised in article 2 of the Constitution, adjoining provinces with common historical, cultural and economic characteristics, the islands and the provinces with a historical regional identity will be able to accede to self-government and form autonomous communities in accordance with the provisions of this section of the Constitution and of their respective statues.”

10 The aim of this article was to prevent the possibility of unification between the regions themselves. For example, the pan-Catalanism made reference to the importance of Valencia and the Balearic Islands, while the question of Navarre began to fuel nationalism in the Basque Country. (Conversi, p.144)

11 Conversi, D. (1997). p.144. There are now seventeen ‘Autonomous Communities’ on the official map, some entirely invented. Thus the modern Spanish State has become one of the most decentralised countries in Europe, as argued by Colomer, M. J. (1999), p.40

12 This was observed by Colomer, M. J. (1999). ‘The Spanish State of Autonomies: Non-Institutional Federalism’ in Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain. (Ed.) Paul Heywood. London: Frank Cass Publishers, p. 41 in particular. As Carr and Fusi put it at the time, this was the first Spanish constitution which was a result of ‘neither the unilateral imposition of a particular party nor the expression of a single ideology’. Carr, R. and Fusi, P. (1979) Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy. London: George Allen. p. 244.

13 The Basque nationalists urged their electorate to abstain from the constitutional referendum, arguing that the pre-existence of the Basque rights or fueros had not been clearly recognised. Michael T. Newton and Peter J. Donaghy (1997) Institutions of Modern Spain: A political and Economic Guide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 15-16.

14 Smith, G. (1995) ‘Federation: The multiethnic challenge’, in Montserrat Guibernau, Spain: Federation in the making? London: Longman.

15 Newton, T. M with Donaghy J. P. (1997) Institutions of Modern Spain: A political and Economic Guide. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 22.

16 These measures were particularly important in meeting the demands of the Catalans cultural autonomy. Del Rion, J. and Williams, A. (1999). ‘Regionalism in Iberia’ in Regionalism in the European Union. Peter Wagstaff (ed.) Exeter: Intellect. p. 179.

17 ibid. p.130.

Bibliography

Aguero, F. (1995) Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Carr, R. and Fusi, P. (1979). Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy. London: George Allen.

Clark, R. P. (1990) Negotiating with ETA. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Clark, R. P. (1984) The Basque Insurgents. ETA, 1952 - 1980. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Conversi, D. (1997) The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation. London: Hurst & Company.

Del Rion, J. and Williams, A. (1999). ‘Regionalism in Iberia’ in Regionalism in the European Union. Peter Wagstaff (ed.) Exeter: Intellect.

Desfor Edles, L. (1998) Symbol and Ritual in the new Spain: The Transition to Democracy after Franco. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fanon, F. (1963) The Wretched of the Earth. London: Penguin Books.

Guibernau, M. (1995) Spain: Federation in the making? London: Longman

Gilmour, D. (1985) The Transformation of Spain. London: Quartet Books.

Gurr, T. R. (1993). Minorities at Risk: A global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington. DC. United States Institute of Peace Press.

Heywood, P. (1995). The Government and Politics of Spain: Comparative Government and Politics. London: Macmillan Press.

Heywood, P. (ed.) (1999) Politics and Policy in Democratic Spain. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

Ignatieff, M. (1994) Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Millennium. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux.

Irvin, L. C. (1999) Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Isaacs, H. R. (1989). Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Maries, J. (1990) Understanding Spain. San Juan: University of Puerto Rico Press.

Mar-Molinero, C. and Smith, A. (Eds.) (1996) Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities. Oxford: Berg.

Medrano, J. D. (1995) Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia. London: Cornell University Press.

Moxon-Brown, E. (1989). Political Change in Spain. London: Routledge.

Newton, T. M with Donaghy J. P. (1997) Institutions of Modern Spain: A political and Economic Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Ross, J. C. (1997) Contemporary Spain: A Handbook. London: Arnold.

Smith, A. (1991) National Identity. Reno, NV:University of Nevada Press.

Smith, A. (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations. London: Basil Blackwell.

Sullivan, J. (1988). ETA and Basque Nationalism: The Fight for Euzkadi, 1890-1986. London: Routledge.

Woodworth, P. (2001) Dirty War Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy. Cork: Cork University Press.

Zirakzadeh, C. (1991) A rebellious people. Reno. University of Nevada Press.

Journals

Smith, A. 1999. ‘Ethnic election and national destiny: some religious origins of nationalist ideal’, Nations and Nationalism 5 (3).

Wallace, W. 1999. ‘The sharing of sovereignty: the European paradox’. Political Studies. Vol. 47.

Wilson, R. ‘The politics of contemporary ethno-nationalist conflicts’. Nations and Nationalism. 7 (3), 2001

Other sources

Documentaries:

States of Terror: The Organisation ETA, BBC1, 01/12/93.

Internet:

http://constitucion.rediris.es/CodigoConst/Codigo.html

http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/sp00t.html

Is obvious that things are so bad for the Kurdish that when it comes to sovereignty, the crumbles that Spain has given to Euskal Herria seem like gold bars to them.

.... ... .

Pro-Batasuna Demonstration

This report of the pro-Batasuna demonstration in Bilbao comes to us via The Militant:

Basques protest banning by Madrid

BY LAURA GARZA

MADRID, Spain--On September 14 tens of thousands of people poured into the streets of Bilbao, a major city in the Basque provinces, to oppose the Spanish govern-ment’s move to ban the political party Batasuna, which backs independence for the Basque people.

"We are protesting against the loss of fundamental political freedoms in the Basque Country, stated Unai, a student demonstrator. "This protest shows that the people oppose the authoritarian policies of the Spanish government." Marchers stepped off behind a banner reading, "Long Live the Basque People" (Gora Euskal Herria) together with a large Basque flag.

Independence for the Basque region, which straddles territory in southern France and northern Spain, is widely supported in the region. The intransigent fight by Basques had been a thorn in the side of the Spanish government, which has consistently opposed this demand.

The protest came within weeks of an August 26 order by Spanish High Court judge Baltasar Garzón declaring Batasuna banned for three years, while an investigation is under way to justify a permanent ban by linking supporters of Batasuna with the illegal pro-independence group ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom). Garzón issued orders to close offices of the political party, freeze bank accounts, and shut down taverns and other businesses in the Basque region. The order included a ban on protests by supporters of Batasuna.

Cops seek to break up march

The September 14 march, estimated to be between 30,000 and 50,000 people, greatly outnumbered the several hundred police seeking to disrupt it. The cops set up a barricade across the road at a point about halfway between the starting and ending points. When the demonstrators reached the barricade they were ordered to disperse. Shortly afterwards the police opened up on the crowd with high-powered water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets.

March leaders managed to address the crowd and most people then dispersed. Batasuna leader Arnoldo Otegi, one of those banned from publicly speaking, stated, "Today we have seen who is defending human rights. There will be new demonstrations and new opportunities. We ask that this should end peacefully."

A week earlier, hundreds protested in Guernica September 8 against the policy of transferring Basque political prisoners to prisons far from the Basque region. The next day in San Sebastian, thousands marched behind a banner reading, "The Basque Country Needs Freedom." Spanish government officials complained that the Ertzaintza, the local Basque police, had not broken up these events. Prior to the September 14 action, the Basque regional authorities agreed to hand a copy of Garzón’s orders to the marchers. The Madrid government, however, demanded that the Ertzaintza be ordered to carry out the judge’s order, and the Basque authorities complied.

These protest actions have deepened a schism between the capitalist parties ruling the Spanish state and the pro-independence bourgeois party in power in the Basque autonomous region. Officials in Madrid demanded an explanation of why the September 14 march had been allowed to take place. A spokesperson for Spanish prime minister José María Aznar’s ruling Popular Party in the Basque region complained, "ETA-Batasuna gained their objectives, they brought more than 70 buses into Bilbao, gathered their people, occupied the streets of Bilbao for more than half an hour, and held a political act addressed by no less than Arnaldo Otegi." He demanded someone be held responsible for letting tens of thousands of people take to the streets.

In response, the Basque National Party, the ruling party in the Basque region, accused Judge Garzón of perverting justice by limiting the right to free speech, and threatened to sue the judge for usurping power that belongs to the Basque regional authorities. Basque officials have also refused to abide by an order to dissolve the grouping of Batasuna representatives in the parliament, where they hold seven of 75 seats.

Madrid’s moves come in the context of the drive to war against Iraq and stepped up moves to justify repressive legislation on the basis of fighting terrorism. The government has recently proposed adding 20,000 troops to the streets under the guise of fighting delinquency, and has proposed an amendment to a law on foreigners that would allow the deportation of any immigrant found guilty of minor offenses. In the days leading up to the Bilbao march, Prime Minister Aznar told President George Bush, "We have strong reasons to support the United States," in its plans to attack Iraq, putting Spain at Britain’s side in giving full backing to Washington’s war.

Madrid is trying to use the war drive to push ahead with further measures aimed a limiting the rights of Basque activists. Previously, Spanish officials unsuccessfully tried to have Batasuna declared a terrorist group, thereby giving French and Belgian rulers a free hand in shutting down the offices of the party located in these countries. They hope to reintroduce such a proposal now that the group has been banned in Spain.

Meanwhile, the capitalist media here has given front-page coverage to a series of arrests in France of ETA members.

.... ... .

Laxalt's Land

This is a nice essay on Robert Laxalt's book called Sweet Promised Land.

Too bad the Laxalts never got the USA to abandon its policy against the Basque dream of self determination.

Without further introduction, here it is:

Robert Laxalt’s Sweet Promised Land: A Place to Come To

by David Río Raigadas Universidad del País Vasco

This article was originally presented by the author as a paper at the II International Conference on Regional Literatures (Space and Place: The Geographies of Literature), Liverpool John Moores University, April 11-13, 1996.

Sweet Promised Land (1957)(1), the first and possibly best-known of Robert Laxalt’s books, appears to be a personal and rather simple story about the journey of the author’s father, Dominique, to his Basque homeland after forty-seven years as an immigrant sheepherder in the American West. In fact, the book has been often described as an intimate biography or as an affectionate memoir of a son to his father. Even Laxalt himself has emphasized to me the personal quality of this story:

“I couldn’t write it as a novel because something was missing. I thought that the poignancy of this trip moved me very much. It was a story of discovery for me, too. [..] It was a book written from the heart.”(2)

The intimate approach taken by Laxalt to portray his father’s life pervades the whole book and contributes to its success. Readers feel attracted by Laxalt’s personal and direct statements on his father and the fact that it is the true story of a man viewed through the eyes of his son, though some incidents in the book may have been a little fictionalized. Laxalt himself felt that the work meant an invasion of his family’s privacy and was particularly apprehensive of his father’s reaction toward it:

“When I told him about it, I thought I was running a risk of getting shot, but he accepted it well and even a little detachedly.”(3)

However, Sweet Promised Land must be read as the story not only of Dominique Laxalt, but of many Basque immigrants in the American West. The book goes beyond its personal level to embody the experience of Basque immigrants in the United States and even becomes a metaphor for American immigration in general.

Laxalt wrote this story about his Basque father at a time in which Basques were neither well-known nor popular in America. As William A. Douglass has pointed out,

“...the Basque-Americans were few in number, scattered lightly over the vastness of the American West and [...] their ethnic success as sheepherders par excellence identified them closely with the region’s most denigrated occupation.” (1986:xiii)

Set against this particular background, Sweet Promised Land constituted a vindication of the role of the immigrant Basque sheepherder in America, represented by the figure of Dominique Laxalt and his capacity to endure hardship in the New World. Basques in America identified themselves with Dominique’s story and felt encouraged to show their ethnic pride. At the same time, the wider public in the United States discovered Basques, “they discovered this romantic sheepherder thing,” in Douglass’ words.(4)

Although the book deals mainly with the way of life of Basque sheepmen in the American West, their experiences can be regarded as a symbol of the struggle of American immigrants in general. In fact, Laxalt himself agrees with this point and he even, in all modesty, refers to his lack of a deep knowledge about the Basques to support this idea:

“Sweet Promised Land became an immigrant book, not particularly a Basque book, because I didn’t know so much about the Basques.”(5)

The truth is that the story works as a classic tale of immigration, where the immigrant’s experience is portrayed by Laxalt as a process divided into three basic stages: the immigrant’s decision to abandon his homeland, his fight for acceptance in the new country and his impossible return to his native land once the assimilation process is over. Throughout these different stages Laxalt shows his deeply felt concern with the modern individual’s need for meaning, for a sense of place and identity.

Although Sweet Promised Land emphasizes primarily the challenges that immigrants must face in America and their often fruitless attempts to recapture the past, it also explores the main reasons that lie behind their decision to seek their future in America. Thus, immigration is presented as the only way to escape from poverty for many European youths, symbolized by Dominique. He, as most immigrants, regretted leaving his native land, but he was well aware that he had to find an opportunity in life somewhere else:

“What chance was there if I stayed? There was no money for anything. I wanted stock and the land to move in, [...] and we didn’t even own the property where we lived.” (1986: 35)

At first, the journey to America was viewed by people like Dominique just as a temporary experience, as a way to earn enough money to return home. However, most of these immigrants soon realized that their way to success was in America, a raw new land that could provide them with a chance in life if they were ready to suffer and work hard. Thus, America represents for Dominique and many other immigrants the land of opportunity, the place to make their fortune. Nevertheless, Sweet Promised Land also describes the decline of America as a land of opportunity since the mid-century, particularly for new groups of immigrants like the Puerto Ricans, who are shown leaving for Brazil in search of another America.

Although Laxalt stresses the importance of the economic reasons in the immigrant’s decision to abandon his native land, he also refers in the book to the lack of freedom of these people in the Old World. Thus, for instance, one of the characters in Sweet Promised Land, Michel, escapes from France in order not to be imprisoned after running away from the seminary where he was to be ordained. Besides, there are other references to the restrictions imposed by the French authorities on one of the main symbols of the Basque culture: the Basque language. This meant, as Dominique says, “to be made to feel that it was a crime to be born a Basque.” (1986:76). Being unable to display their ethnic identity in their own land, these people feel constricted in the Old World and they set their heart on America, which symbolizes for them not only the land of opportunity, but also of freedom.

The integration experience of the immigrant in American society is described by Laxalt as a gradual process in which the immigrant’s desire for acceptance and his reluctance to lose his ethnic identity often act as opposing forces. He particularly focuses his attention on the challenges that the newcomer must face during his first years in America. Thus, he gives in his book a detailed description of the hardships endured by his father when he first arrived in Nevada. Although Dominique’s struggle for integration presents some specific characteristics related to his condition of Basque sheepherder, the tests he must undergo during this process illustrate the hard lessons the ordinary immigrant usually has to learn in the new land.

One of the first challenges that the immigrant must face in America is the adaptation to a new setting, often completely different from that of the Old World. Laxalt particularly emphasizes the deep impact that the Nevada desert produces on Basque sheepherders like Dominique, who longs for his green land:

“You would have to see the beauty of the Basque country before you knew what I meant, but I remember going out into that cruel desert when I first came, and nights when I cried to sleep in my tent.” (1986: 50)

Thus, on their way to integration, these immigrants will inevitably have to adjust themselves to a harsh landscape, with a devastating climate, and gradually they will have to overcome their nostalgia for the old country, too.

Laxalt also portrays isolation and loneliness as common trials for the immigrant. Besides, in the case of the Basque sheepherders the challenge becomes especially arduous. Their loneliness is not simply the result of their condition of newcomers, their ignorance of the language or the bad reputation of their job, as was often the case with other immigrants. The loneliness of the Basques is also produced by the utter solitude in which they find themselves as sheepherders on the open range. In the most desolate corners of the American West they long for human company, for the sound of a human voice, and the monotony of their lonely life exposes them to potentially severe mental strain. Related to this, it is worth mentioning that, even though the Basques had a special reputation among all nationalities in America for their capacity to endure solitude,(6) Laxalt includes in Sweet Promised Land a Basque sheepherder, Joanes Ergela (or Crazy John), who loses his mind from loneliness in the mountains. This example works as a symbol of the serious nature of the ordeals that the immigrants must undergo in their new country.

Another major challenge that immigrants must face is economic survival, a subject that plays an important role in Sweet Promised Land. Laxalt shows that immigrants, apart from suffering hard working conditions, as in the case of the Basques mentioned above, usually have a difficult start making their living in the New World. America may be the land of opportunity, but working hard is not enough there. The newcomer must be ready to fight competitors, even resorting to violent means. In addition, he must resist the temptation of wasting his money, even if that means staying away from town for a long period. Last but not least, his economic success often depends on a volatile market. All these features are perfectly represented in Sweet Promised Land by the struggle experienced by Dominique and Basque-American sheepherders in general. Thus, these immigrants are shown in open conflict with the cattle ranchers for the feed and the water. Besides, the book describes their obsession with saving and their difficulties in resisiting the temptation of wasting their money in town. Finally, Laxalt also introduces the livestock crisis of the 1920s as an example of the uncertain economic conditions: the sheep market began to go and immediately most of the Basques lost everything for which they had worked so hard.

Apart from the different challenges mentioned throughout this paper, immigrants must sometimes confront hostility, fun-making or contempt from the host community. In some cases this hostile atmosphere is closely related to economic reasons, as we saw in the conflict with the cattlemen described above. However, in many cases this situation is simply due to the cultural and ethnic distinctiveness of the newcomers. They do not fit into the standard patterns of the American society because they are outsiders, who speak a different language and have a different culture. And at that time in America, as Robert Laxalt remembers, “it wasn’t fashionable to be ethnic.“(7)

As a result, the Basques, as other groups of immigrants with special ethnic features, will experience some bullying, fun-making, and rejection. Laxalt does not wish to exaggerate the importance of these incidents and consequently he does not include any episodes of violent discrimination against the Basques in Sweet Promised Land. However, he shows how two young Basques are made fun of just because of their speech and clothes and he also refers to the shame suffered by Basque-American children when they speak Basque in public. These examples illustrate the intolerance of the American society in the first half of the twentieth century toward expressions of cultural or ethnic diversity. As William Douglass has pointed out,

“persons who clung to their native language and who continued to manifest Old World lifeways were suspect.” (1986:x)

So, these immigrants, in spite of their reluctance to lose their original identity, will often have to hide their ethnic heritage or to renounce it in order to become Americans.

All these hardships that immigrants must endure to achieve their integration in American society are symbolized in Sweet Promised Land by boxing, a sport whose rules Dominique and other immigrants understand perfectly well. The comparison between boxing and the immigrant experience enables Laxalt to enhance the sacrifice of these newcomers in America:

”Like the men in the ring, they too had stood alone and fought alone, with their only weapons the hands that God gave them, and the fight was everything they had ever done and seen and felt.” (1986:65)

The struggle for acceptance of the immigrants also extends to their descendants, for whom boxing works as a useful model, too. As Laxalt knows from his own experience, second- generation Americans often must fight harder than the rest, just because they “were born of old- country people in a new land.” (1986:66)

Although Laxalt’s interest is mainly focused on the obstacles that the immigrant finds on his way to integration, he also shows how the newcomer gradually becomes familiar with the host country and its people and even identifies himself with them. This process has its origin in the immigrant’s capacity to adapt himself to the new environment without questioning it:

”...afterward it wasn’t suffering, because it was the way things was, and a man couldn’t do anything about it, and maybe that’s why he didn’t spend the time thinking about it, either.” (1986:50)

However, the self-identification of the newcomer with American society is accelerated by a series of elements that represent the progressive acceptance of the immigrant by the host community. As an example of this, Laxalt describes the first time that his father did not feel like a stranger in America. It was an encounter with a group of bandits, where he discovered that even the cruel people who inhabited the harsh land were capable of kindness toward a foreigner like him. This incident shows him that the new country is not only a place of disillusionment and brutality, but also of generosity and love.

In Sweet Promised Land, Laxalt also pays close attention to the last stage of the immigrant experience: the impossible return of the native. The book shows the return to the homeland as an unrealistic idea for most immigrants. Certainly, Laxalt provides the reader with the examples of two Basques (Nazario and the innkeeper) who come back to their native land after a few years in America and decide to remain in their country of birth. However, these two cases can be regarded as exceptions because most of the Basque immigrants in the story fail to return to their homeland. In addition to this, the main character, Dominique, who manages to see the Basque Country again, prefers in the end to go back to America.

Although a lot of immigrants in Sweet Promised Land talk about going home, their return is nearly always postponed and in most cases it never takes place. Two opposite reasons may be argued to account for this situation: the failure of the integration process, and its overwhelming success. Actually, the book describes a group of Basque immigrants who are unable to overcome the challenges of the new land, but have to remain in America because their return has become physically impossible. They have failed to save money or they have been defeated by adversity, age, or loneliness. As one of the characters in the story says,

”...they were lost souls, and they did not even have the good fortune to be lost in their own hell. They were foreigners when they came and they will always be foreigners.” (1986:107)

As a contrast to these immigrants, Laxalt focuses his attention on the figure of his father, who symbolizes the success of the assimilation process. After forty-seven years in the New World, Dominique is so integrated in the American society that his early wishes to return to the Basque Country and settle there have vanished. We can even see how he hesitates when his family encourages him to go back to the old country for a short visit to his sisters. His nostalgic trip to the Basque Country is portrayed by his son, who accompanies him, as a shocking and ambiguous experience. In particular, Robert Laxalt emphasizes the deep impact produced on his father by his sudden return to the old country after forty-seven years of absence. Besides, the return becomes a catalyst for very opposite feelings. On the one hand, it is a moment for joy, reward and fulfillment. Dominique has the opportunity to meet his relatives again and these welcome him as a hero, as “the youth who had gone out into the world in beggar’s garb and come back in shining armor.” (1986:122) On the other hand, the return makes Dominique feel sad and old because he realizes that too much time has gone on and nothing can be the same again. His parents and some of his old friends are dead and, in spite of the joyous reunion with his relatives and the recall of youthful memories, he cannot avoid feeling like a stranger in his own land.

Robert Laxalt ends his tale of immigration by stressing the impossibility of returning to the past. To illustrate this point, he uses the example of his father’s nostalgic trip to the Basque Country. Actually, Dominique’s final decision to leave again for the United States shows that once the assimilation process is over and the old land has become only a dimming memory, the return of the native is nearly always a chimerical idea. As Dominique says at the end of Sweet Promised Land,

“I cannot go back. It ain’t my country anymore. I’ve lived too much in America ever to go back.” (1986:176)

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Eolian Energy

This information was published by the web page Innovations Report:

European Programme to promote renewable energy

04.10.2002

The European Commission has accepted EVE, the Basque Energy Entity, and Eolicas de Euskadi within the programme to promote renewable energy. The European Union is aware of the effort EVE is doing to obtain 12 % of primary energy from renewable energy. This entity has been accepted in the programme Campaign for Take-Off, together with Eolicas de Euskadi. The programme has been designed by the European Commission and as the first step they want to create a Renewable Energy Partnership. This partnership would group companies, public and private organisations that commit themselves in the development of renewable energy of the nature.

EVE has been included, particularly, through the programme “Photovoltaic solar installations connected to the electrical network in schools of the Basque Country”. This programme has been created with the collaboration of EVE, Department of Education, Universities and Research of the Basque Government. The aim of this initiative is to raise public awareness in relation to the advantages of renewable energy. Similarly, and as a consequence of this initiative, before the end of this year the Basque Autonomous Region will duplicate the number of photovoltaic installations.

The agreement, a pioneer at national level, between 2002-2005 will set 170 new photovoltaic solar installations in many other schools of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa. Each installation will have a power of 5kW. According to that, and taking into account that by the end of the year 2002 50 new installations will be established, the actual power will be duplicated. As for the information provided by EVE, on 31st December 2001, 227 kW were produced with photovoltaic installations.

The company Eolicas de Euskadi has been accepted after the presentation of the work “Plan for Promoting and Developing Eolian Energy in the Basque Country”. This plan explains how to make the maximum use of energy of less environmental impact. It suggests important socio-economic advantages: using native renewable resources, increasing of self-sufficiency rate of energy and promoting use of clean energy, and that way, polluting emissions to the air will be reduced.

The Basque Autonomous region is one of the countries that produces the less eolian energy. The generation of 27 MW eolian power places this region in the tenth position. However, in the next years, a significant increase of this kind of energy is expected in the Basque Autonomous Region.

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Basque Saga Takes a Twist

Yesterday, the Nobel Peace Prize, human rights activist Rigoberta Menchu was the honor guest speaker at an European Forum. Among many other things she spoke about the right of the Basque people for self determination and she also spoke against the new law in Spain that allows the government to outlaw oppositon political parties. She also spoke against ETA's violence and begged the terrorist group to stop their killings.

In response the PP, the ruling party in Spain demanded that her name be removed from a street in Madrid that honors Rigoberta Menchu for her actions to defend the rights of the indigenous people in Central America. The major of Madrid said that they should cut her some slack since she was from a land so far away that she was ignorant of anything regarding the Basque issue. Today, Spain's delegate to that European forum requested that since Rigoberta Menchu was not european, she should not be allowed to speak at that forum, and get this one, they heed to her request and Rigoberta Menchu could not speak today!

Rigoberta defended what she said and she is to visit the Basque Country in the next couple of days. Let's hope that Spain does not deny her a visa.

What is wrong with people?! The fascist Spanish government is openly attacking a Nobel Prize that is asking for easing a peace process in the region! Are the europeans going to forget so easily what the whole experience of Hitler and in recent years Milosevic tought them?

I hope not.

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Bilbao

After our visit to Gazteiz, it is now time to learn some information about Bilbao. Bilbao, (also Bilbo), in the west of Euskal Herria, is the capital of the province of Bizkaia. The city is the most financially and industrially active part of Greater Bilbao, Greater Bilbao’s 900,000+ inhabitants are spread along the length of the Nerbioi River, whose banks are home also to numerous business and factories, which during the industrial revolution brought heightened prosperity to the region.

Geography

A major seaport and industrial center, the city is located on the Estuary of Bilbao, the city's suburbs extending to the Bay of Biscay.

In the north, Bilbao’s city edge is considered to be around the towns of Erandio, Sondika and Derio, in the east it is encompassed by Zamudio and Etxebarri. The southern border passes outside Basauri and Arrigorriaga and in the west, Barakaldo and Alonsotegi are the furthest extremes. The urban area is enclosed by two small mountain ranges called Pagasarri (to the south) and Artxanda (to the north), this fact gives the city its nickname, "el botxo", "the hole".

Districts

The city of Bilbao is divided into eight different districts, including the following neighborhoods:

* 1st District (Deusto): Deusto, San Ignacio, Ibarrekolanda, Arangoiti, Ribera de Deusto/Zorrozaurre.

* 2nd District (Uribarri): Uribarri, Matiko, Castaños, Zurbaranbarri and Ciudad Jardín.

* 3rd District (Otxarkoaga-Txurdinaga): Otxarkoaga and Txurdinaga.

* 4th District (Begoña): Begoña, Santutxu and Bolueta.

* 5th District (Ibaiondo): Casco Viejo, Bilbao La Vieja, San Francisco, Zabala, Atxuri,(La Peña) Iturrialde, Solokoetxe, Abusu and the newly developed neighbourhood of Miribilla.

* 6th District (Abando): Abando and Indautxu.

* 7th District (Rekalde): Rekalde, El Peñascal, Ametzola, Iralabarri and San Adrián.

* 8th District (Basurto-Zorrotza): Basurto, Altamira, Masustegi, Olabeaga and Zorrotza.

History

Bilbao was founded as a village by Don Diego Lopez de Haro V, Lord of Biscay, on 15 June 1300 on the opposite river bank of an existing fishing settlement (now known as Bilbao la Vieja or Bilbo Zarra, "Old Bilbao").

Prior to formal establishment as a township, a village and port called "Bilbao" (the name designated in the founding village charter of 1300) is believed to have been located near an ancient wall (circa XII century) recently discovered by the "San Anton" Bridge. Other evidence suggests that first settlements in Bilbao came earlier near the "Malmasin" promontory.

The name of the city stems from Basque "bi albo" meaning "two river banks".

Nearby places like Sestao and Ugao-Miraballes have the same ending that could be Basque aho, "mouth".

1300–1600

Don Diego gave the city rights and privileges along with land for growth. At first there were only three streets: Somera ("Upper"), Artekale ("middle street") and Tendería ("Shopkeeper's"), following the pattern of three parallel streets found in other Basque towns, and the Santiago church, surrounded by a city wall. Bilbao was in the northern branch of the Way of Saint James, thus the name of Santiago (Saint James') church.

The city grew slowly but steadily, its area is now known as the "Seven streets", after the new parallel developments. The privileges conceded by the successive Lords of Biscay were resented, sometimes violently, by other chartered villas like Portugalete and by the unchartered villages. In the 15th century wars between noble families disrupted the city, which had reached a population of almost 3000. Three floods and a fire shook the city, and Santiago Church was almost totally destroyed. But once again the city recovered and it grew beyond the wall.

In 1511 the Consulate of Bilbao was granted to the city, this allowed Bilbao to be the main export port for Merino wool from Iberian peninsula to the northern European cities, like Antwerp.

Bilbao became the most important commercial and financial hub of the Basque coast during the Spanish Empire era. The swords exported through Bilbao were known in England as "bilboes".

1600–1900

In 1602 Bilbao was made capital city of Biscay, replacing the former capital Bermeo. The following centuries saw a constant increase of the city's wealth, especially after the discovery of extensive iron resources in the surrounding hills. At the end of the 17th century, Bilbao overcame the economical crises that affected the Iberian peninsula thanks to the iron ore and the commerce with England and the Netherlands. During the 18th century the city continued to grow and almost exhausted its limited space.

The 19th century's industrial revolution was crucial for Bilbao, with the developing of strong mining, steel and shipbuilding industries. At the beginning of the 20th century Bilbao was tone of the wealthiest cities of Europe, where the main banks (BBVA) and insurance companies were established.

Bilbao was besieged four times by the Carlists during the Carlist Wars in which the Basques supported the side that promised to uphold and respect the ancient Basque laws, but due to the defenders (the regular army and local Liberal volunteers), it was never conquered, as is recorded in the city's title ("undefeated").

In 1886 the University of Deusto was established by the Company of Jesus and a major plan for the city was announced after the village of Abando was annexed. The Alzola, Achúcarro and Hoffmeyer "Ensanche" (extension) project of 1876 almost doubled the city's area and was developed during the following decades, as it happened in other cities like Barcelona at that time.

The 20th century

In 1925, the village of Deusto was annexed and several other parts of the city were developed including Basurto and Begoña.

Bilbao sided with the Republican Government in the Spanish Civil War and was the capital of the first Basque Autonomous Government led by José Antonio Aguirre. A defensive ring, called "Cinturón de Hierro" (Iron Belt) was built around the city, with heavy artillery and a good number of bunkers linked by kilometers of tunnels. Despite these efforts, on 19 June 1937 Bilbao succumbed to Franco's troops' siege (aided by the betrayal of the engineer Goicoechea, designer of the defensive ring); the bridges were destroyed to stop the enemy, but the city survived relatively intact.

During Franco's dictatorship the city's heavy industries fueled Spain's economy and thousands of immigrants from central and southern Spain moved to Bilbao, the city and surrounding towns expanded greatly and sometimes chaotically. In an effort to accommodate the influx of immigrants in the city's limited space, the towns in the adjacent Txoriherri valley (Erandio, Derio, Zamudio, Sondika, Lezama) were annexed. This annexation was reversed in 1981.

In 1983 heavy floods struck the city, killing many people in the province and causing great damage to the old part of the city; the old Arriaga Theater was devastated. Since then the "Casco Viejo" (the old district) has been renewed, along with the general trend of renewal seen all around the city.

Regeneration and renewal

The city has recently undergone major urban renewal, in order to move away from the region’s industrial history and instead focus on tourism and services. The developments are centered around the new metro system by Sir Norman Foster and, most of all, the Guggenheim Bilbao Museum by Frank Gehry (featured in this post). The Port of Bilbao, formerly on the river, has been moved and expanded downstream on the Bay of Biscay, opening a great deal of central real estate on the river that has been the site of most of the new building. Other new landmarks include the Santiago Calatrava- designed Zubizuri Bridge and the Euskalduna Palace, a cultural centre, further downstream. The two points are linked by a new riverside passageway opposite University of Deusto, which provides an open green space for the city’s inhabitants to relax.

Tourism and monuments

As well as the famous Guggenheim Museum, the city acts as home for the Fine Arts Museum recognised as one of Spain’s finest art museums and recently refurbished) and the Maritime Museum on the Nervión’s banks, which recently hosted the RMS Titanic exhibition which has been touring Europe. Museums are only a part of the city's attractions.

Since the inauguration of the Guggenheim museum in 1997, eight new hotels have been opened in the city, reflecting the increasing interest for the city.

Museums

* Guggenheim Museum Bilbao
* Fine Arts Museum
* Basque Museum
* Maritime Museum

Churches

* Santiago Cathedral
* Saint Anton church
* Basilica of Begoña
* Saint Nicholas of Bari church
* Santos Juanes church
* Saint Vincent church

Civil buildings

* Arriaga Theater
* Bizkaia Delegation Palace
* City Hall
* Chavarri Palace (Moyúa square)
* Plaza Nueva
* Ribera Market
* San Mamés Stadium
* University of Deusto

Other

* Doña Casilda de Iturrizar park
* Artxanda Funicular
* Zubizuri bridge

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Aznar Outdoes Himself, Again

Is this article at Yahoo News about a guy that looks like Milosevic more and more everyday?

Or is just my imagination?

Will we ever learn? Or in a couple of years NATO soldiers will be laughing while Spanish soldiers murder ethnic Basque men and boys?

Just read and decide:

Spanish Prime Minister warns Basque government against meddling with independence

Mon Sep 30,10:46 AM ET

By CIARAN GILES, Associated Press Writer

MADRID, Spain - Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar warned the Basque regional government Monday that he would not tolerate any attempts to break up the Spanish state.

"There will be no margin for rupture," Aznar told a meeting of his conservative Popular Party. "Nobody is going to set up an illegal regime, nobody is going to be allowed take it upon themselves to choose which laws they will obey and which they won't."

Aznar was speaking in the wake of a storm raised by Basque regional premier Juan Jose Ibarretxe who on Friday announced he wanted to redefine the Basque region's relationship with the Spanish government along the lines of shared sovereignty and free association.

Stressing what he called the right of the Basque people to decide their own future, Ibarretxe said he hoped to have a draft proposal for a "new pact for coexistence" ready within a year and to put the definitive proposal to vote before the northern region's some 2 million inhabitants.
Ibarretxe said he would begin preparatory talks with other groups in the Basque Parliament next week but made no mention of consulting the Spanish government.

Aznar, backed by the opposition Socialist party, is firmly opposed to any changes in the Basque region's status as one of Spain's 17 semiautonomous regions.

Critics accuse Ibarretxe of playing into the hands of ETA, an organization which has killed more than 830 people since it began its campaign for Basque independence in 1968.

ETA is most recently blamed for the death of a Civil Guard paramilitary police officer in a bomb explosion last Tuesday.

Spain's 17 regions have ample administrative powers while the central government retains control over key areas such as defense and foreign affairs. The Basque government has long demanded greater autonomy and in recent months has criticized Madrid for ignoring agreements to hand over control over more than a dozen areas of government.

Ties with the Basque and Madrid governments have soured even more lately mainly because of moves by Aznar's government to outlaw the radical Basque independence party Batasuna because of its alleged links with and support for ETA. The ban is opposed by Ibarretxe's Basque Nationalist Party and other nationalist groups in the region."

If you don't know what happened in Bosnia, don't bother trying to figure out who Milosevic is.

Think Hitler and the Gypsies instead, oh no wait, you wouldn't know about that either. Easy, think of Hitler and the Jews.

Me for one, I stand up and accuse Aznar of being the European heir of racist monsters like Mussolini and Hitler, who were the bosses of Franco, who was the boss of Aznar's daddy.

The rest of the world in the mean time, look the other way, like you did with Bosnia. Is more comfortable.

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